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Abstract  
 
The issue of coordination is one that has received significant attention in the experimental 
literature. In this thesis I delve deeper into this by combining and exploring a number of 
issues from the literature in economics and the social sciences in the context of coordination 
games. More specifically in all three chapters a common theme of the examination of the 
efficiency-equality trade off in coordination games prevails. In the first chapter I take 
inspiration from Holm’s (2000) paper ''Gender Based Focal Points'' and look further into 
aspects of both the equity-efficiency trade off in coordination games and gender information. 
In the second chapter we combine elements of the coordination literature with the literature 
on the effects of punishment: Most previous investigations of punishment have concentrated 
on the effects of punishment when free riding is a possibility (for example Fehr & Gächter, 
2000, Abbink et al., 2010) and here we are able to report results from an experiment where 
free riding is not a possibility. In the third chapter we investigate the effects of 
communication in coordination games. We take our initial inspiration from Cooper et al. 
(1990) and Farrell (1987) and expand on these papers by examining the effects of rich and 
free form communication between subjects and also expanding the type of games used in 
the experiment. 
 We find a number of interesting results which will be described in more detail with 
this thesis.  In chapter one we find that an inefficient compromise very quickly loses its 
appeal to subjects as its inefficiency increases. We also find that unisex pairings are more 
successful in term of expected payoffs from coordination games as compared to mixed 
gender pairings.  In chapter two we find that, whilst gender information and punishment do 
not tend to affect behaviour in isolation, the two treatment variables combined do lead to 
observed behavioural changes. We also find gender differences in punishment behaviours 
with males becoming more aggressive in punishment when playing against a male and males 
punishing more aggressively than females. In chapter three we find that payoff structure is 
highly relevant in how the availability of communication affects choices in the game. 
Through our novel experimental design we show that subjects will use an equitable split of 
earnings as a focal point for coordination rather than out of an intrinsic preference for an 
equitable split of earnings. 
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Introduction 
 
In day to day life we are often want or need to engage in behaviours which will allow us to 
coordinate our behaviour with others. In other words we are frequently required to consider 
the potential actions of others in an interactive situation before deciding on our own actions 
in order to ensure a successful outcome for ourselves and a another person. Coordination 
failure can therefore lead to frustrations if expectations are not met and, potentially, a loss 
of earnings (and more generally welfare) if an interaction proves unsuccessful due to 
coordination failure. Coordination is thus a very important aspect of economic life. The 
methods by which we achieve coordination in the real world can take a number of forms. 
For example, governments may be able to induce people to coordinate their behaviours 
through political regimes such as dictatorships in which people can be forced to conform to 
certain behaviours. A market economy can also induce people to coordinate their behaviours 
in order to gain successful outcomes. Alternatively, in a democratic political regime the 
government can use laws and sanctions to achieve desirable coordination outcomes (for 
example, the smoking ban in the UK). As an alternative to these sorts of methods, the concept 
of achieving desirable outcomes through “nudging” has also recently become popular in the 
political arena. In this form of behavioural incentivising, positive reinforcement and 
suggestion (rather than laws or the threat of punishment) are used to gain desired outcomes. 
For example a recent UK trail found that payment of court fines increased if debtors were 
sent a text reminder in which they were personally mentioned by name1. 
The study of coordination games in the economics literature has also led to the 
establishment of a number of key concepts on how we achieve successful coordination 
outcomes voluntarily without further encouragement, even in the presence of multiple 
equilibria. For example Schelling (1960) introduced the concept of the inherent salience in 
certain coordination outcomes. In “Schelling Salience” one equilibria in a coordination game 
becomes a focal point even in the absence of communication and advice due to its inherent 
qualities of seeming natural or distinct in some form, thus making a certain equilibria focal. 
Coordination can therefore be achieved through certain outcomes being focal but also via 
personal attributes of a co-participant. Stereotypes and assumptions which connect personal 
traits to certain types of behaviour may also allow people to use this information in order 
coordinate behaviours.  
                                                 
1 As reported in the Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team report: Applying behavioural insights to 
reduce fraud, error and debt. 
(Available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60539/BIT_FraudErrorDebt_accessib
le.pdf) 
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In this PhD thesis I contribute to the coordination literature by presenting three essays 
which are linked by a common thread of experimental investigations into differing elements 
of the trade-off between equality and efficiency in coordination games. The issue of a trade-
off between equity and efficiency is one which I feel deserves further research for a number 
of reasons: I want to investigate if an equal outcome is focal when subjects attempt to tacitly 
(and non-tacitly) coordinate behaviour where there are a range of efficient outcomes, and 
also how focal this option becomes when it loses its property of efficiency as compared to 
an unequal outcome. In everyday life many strategic situations exhibit a conflict of interest 
together with different (perhaps inefficient) ways in which these situations can be resolved. 
In this paper we investigate different elements of games with an efficiency-equality trade-
off as well as issues of tacit and non-tacit communication in this context. The issue of tacit 
coordination (in the absence of communication) is one that has received some attention in 
the economics literature previously: For example Bardsley et al. (2010), Blume & Gneezy 
(2010), Crawford et al. (2008), Holm (2000), Isoni et al. (2013), Mehta et al. (1994), and 
Schelling (1960) and in these papers it is found that subjects are often able to tacitly identify 
a focal point which will lead to successful coordination.  I hope to be able to move beyond 
these findings in this thesis. 
An experimental methodology is employed in all three chapters with each experiment 
being conducted in labs at the Centre of Experimental and Behavioural Social Science at the 
University of East Anglia using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). In each chapter a 
different, interesting and novel element of the efficiency-equality trade-off is examined. 
More specifically, all the experiments presented here use the battle of the sexes game 
framework (and/or adaptations thereof) in order to investigate a varied number of issues and 
factors relating to the trade-off between equality and efficiency. In general games used in 
these experiments take one of the following forms: First, the battle of the sexes game where, 
in order to achieve coordination, subjects must coordinate on an outcome which leaves one 
subject better off than the other. Second, the battle of the sexes game with the addition of an 
equitable split of earnings which is efficient (in terms of total monetary earnings available 
to a pairing) in comparison to coordinating on an unequal split of earnings. Third, a battle of 
the sexes game with the option of an equitable split of earnings that is inefficient in 
comparison to coordinating on an unequal split of earnings. Where I use this third type of 
game in this thesis it took two possible forms: One in which both subjects would receive less 
compared to what they would have received had they coordinated on an unequal outcome 
and one in which only one subject received less. 
In the first chapter I examine the effects of gender information on behaviour. In this 
paper I also examine gender effects in interaction with the effects of decreasing the efficiency 
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(in comparison to an unequal split of earnings) of an equitable coordination outcome. In the 
second chapter (joint with Dr. Subhasish Modak Chowdhury2) we present an experiment in 
which we continue to investigate elements of equality and efficiency in interaction with 
gender effects whilst further investigating the effects of (the threat of) punishment on 
behaviour in a repeated coordination game. In the third chapter (joint with Dr. Anders 
Poulsen3) we investigate the effects of communication in the equality-efficiency trade off 
and also further investigate this in conjunction with a study of how subjects react to both 
subjects in a pairings gaining from abandoning equality compared to how behaviour is 
affected when only one subject in the pairing can gain.   
A number of common themes dominated the results found in the experiments. The 
first is that the appeal of an equitable amount can very easy be manipulated. Both efficiency 
and relative payoffs compared to an inequitable outcome often dramatically affect how 
subjects view and use equitable outcomes. We also find the counter-intuitive result that 
subjects are able to achieve higher monetary earnings if the gap between the equitable 
outcome and the inequitable outcome is higher if the inequitable split is kept constant and, 
that subjects are also able to achieve higher monetary earnings if the equitable amount is 
kept constant but the inequitable outcome is not “too” different from the equitable outcome.  
In both of the jointly authored papers the majority of the contributions to the papers 
were made by me. In both I was wholly responsible for programming and running the 
experiments as well as for the majority of the writing of the papers, the co-authors providing 
advice and assistance where required. 
                                                 
2 School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences 
and the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy 
3 School of Economics, University of East Anglia and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social 
Sciences 
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Chapter 1: Coordination and Gender: An Experiment 
Chapter 1 contains investigations of two main elements: The first is gender effects and the 
second is the effects of varying the degree of inefficiency in an equitable split of earnings. I 
therefore run two treatment conditions: The first in which subjects were unaware of their co-
participant’s gender (or any other information on their co-participant) and the second in 
which subjects were universally aware of their co-participant’s gender. My treatments allow 
for both mixed gender and single gender subject pairings to be observed in all gender 
configurations.  Both treatments are run using a variety of games which all took the basic 
form of a battle of the sexes type game (unequal split of earnings) with the addition of an 
equitable split of earnings. In the first game the equal split was efficient in comparison with 
the unequal split of earnings. In the remaining games the efficiency of the equal split of 
earnings was decreased in comparison to the unequal split of earnings. All subjects played 
all games (without feedback) regardless of the presence of gender information. This 
experiment thus employed a 2x1 factorial design. 
I am able to obtain a number of interesting findings in this experiment:  I find that 
unisex pairings are the most successful in achieving higher expected payoffs in the game 
with unisex pairings (i.e. males playing a coordination game with a male or females playing 
a coordination game with a female) achieving higher expected earnings than mixed gender 
pairings (i.e. pairings containing both a male and a female). I also provide an analysis of how 
decreases in efficiency act on the trade-off between equality and efficiency for subjects.  I 
find that subjects do make trade-offs between equality and efficiency and, additionally, that 
even small decreases in efficiency often lead to subjects abandoning an inefficient equitable 
option.  
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Chapter 2: Gender Identity and Punishment in Coordination Games 
 
In this second chapter the investigation of the trade-off between equality and efficiency 
continues. However, within this chapter, whilst we also investigate the effects of gender 
information on subject behaviour and outcomes, we also explore some elements in addition. 
In this chapter, in contrast to chapter 1 described above, we employ a repeated game design 
(with feedback) with subjects repeating the same game five times. Subjects exclusively 
played either a battle of the sexes type game or the adapted battle of the sexes game with the 
addition of an inefficient equitable split. We also included the ability to punish a co-
participant after seeing their strategy choices as a treatment variable.  Our experiment is thus 
a 2x2x2 factorial design with treatment variables on the availability of gender information, 
the availability of punishment and the form of the repeated game. 
Our analysis is presented in two main parts. Due to the repeated nature of the games 
with feedback, we first provide an analysis of behaviour in the first period of game play only. 
This was because our period 1 observations provide as with the only truly independent 
observations in the game and are thus interesting in themselves. We then continue on to 
provide a dynamic analysis of the games over all five periods. 
Again we are able to ascertain a number of interesting results. With regard to 
punishment we find that knowing a subject is male induces higher punishment rates than 
knowing a co-participant is female. We also find that knowing a co-participant is of the 
opposite gender leads to both the threat of punishment and the addition of gender information 
increases in equitable behaviours but that the presence of gender information is required in 
order to induce the effects of the availability of punishment and vice versa. We also find that 
game structure and payoffs are important in how the treatments variables affect behaviour. 
 
 
 
  
25 
 
Chapter 3: Pre-Play Communication and the Efficiency-Equality Trade-Off in 
Coordination Situations: An Experiment 
 
In chapter 3 we further progress our investigation of the equality-efficiency trade off and 
concentrate our attention on the effects of cheap talk communication on behaviour is a 
variety of coordination game payoff structures. The experiment employs a simple 4x2 
factorial design consisting of four game types and two communication “types” – free form 
pre-play communication or no communication. We begin our analysis with a simple battle 
of the sexes type game. We then continue with the analysis of two games which look at 
different elements of the equality-efficiency trade off: In our first game of this nature (as in 
the previous two chapters) we make the equitable split inefficient as compared to the 
unequal-battle of the sexes type split. Then, in the second game of this type, in order to 
investigate this trade off further, we reduce payoffs from coordinating on an unequal split of 
earning in the game in order to make the equal split only “weakly” Pareto dominated. Finally 
we wished to examine behaviour if we increase the monetary stakes available to subjects and 
hence the inequality between the payoffs upon coordination.  
 We present the results of this novel experiment and report some interesting findings: 
We find that game structure is very important in determining the effects of the availability 
of cheap talk communication. It is in the games where the unequal split Pareto dominates 
the equal split that we see the largest changes in behaviour between treatments with and 
without communication with the equal split proving highly focal in the games without 
communication and its use dropping off almost entirely when communication is available. 
In contrast we find that when the equitable split is only weakly Pareto dominated by the 
unequal split it retains its desirability to subjects both with and without communication. We 
conclude that subjects are only willing to abandon an equitable split of earnings if both 
parties could benefit from this. In an additional section of analysis we use coded conversation 
content from the experiment and analyse how conversations are affected by game structure. 
We are able to establish interesting differences in conversational and bargaining language 
and strategies between games. 
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1. Introduction and motivations 
 
In this first chapter, using an experimental methodology, I examine the effects of both own 
gender and a co-participant’s gender (and both in combination) on behaviour in a series of 
coordination type games with differing payoff structures. My experimental design means 
that I provide insights into how own gender and a co-participant’s gender influences 
behaviour in conflict and compromise situations, and subsequently how this affects 
outcomes in a coordination game.  
With regard to gender, research remains relevant from a broader perspective since 
issues of gender related behaviour and outcomes are still prominent in everyday life. For 
example, it is well-documented in the popular news that there still exists a pay gap between 
males and females and that board membership is still dominated by males. I illustrate this in 
figures 1.1 and 1.2 below, which show, respectively, both that there was a persistent wage 
gap in the UK between males and females between 1997 and 2012 and that males are over-
represented (proportionally, compared to the gender mix in the population) in directorships: 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Median full-time gross weekly earnings (£) by sex, UK, April 1997 to 20124,5 
 
                                                 
4 In 2004, 2006 and 2011 data collected for discontinuous and thus the measure reported here is an average of 
2 measurements taken in each of those years. 
5 Data taken from “Patterns of Pay: Results from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 1997 to 2012” 
published by the Office for National Statistics. 
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Figure 1.2. Board Membership in FTSE 100 Companies in 2013 by gender6 
 
Further to evidence pointing to the importance of gender in society in general, there 
is also a body of experimental evidence which examines how gender affects behaviour in a 
lab setting and in particular in coordination games, and it is to this literature which I feel this 
chapter contributes. Successful coordination of behaviours can be an aim of everyday life 
and thus the ways in which we can achieve successful coordination are of interest. 
Schelling’s 1960 work - “The Strategy of Conflict” - first presented the idea of focal points 
in coordination games and the concept has spawned a large body of literature on methods of 
coordination also in the context of gender.  For example, in this chapter, Holm (2000) 
provides the initial framework and inspiration for the experimental methods and 
coordination games used. Whilst one of the coordination games used in Holm (2000) serves 
as a baseline treatment in this experiment I advance this game and adapt it so that further 
aspects of gender related behaviour, not investigated in the original Holm (2000) design, can 
be studied. Furthermore, whilst Holm ran his experiments in a series of lecture based 
sessions using a pencil-and-paper method to record and collect decisions, I use a 
computerised version programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). More specifically, a 
section of Holm’s experiment is a coordination type game in which subjects are faced with 
a coordination problem (with an anonymous co-participant and without pre-play 
communication) similar to the standard battle of sexes type game but with the addition of an 
equitable split of earnings which sum to the same amount as available through coordination 
on an inequitable split of earning in the battle of the sexes portion of the game. In this 
experiment I look further into the focality of splitting money equally by reducing the sum of 
                                                 
6 Data based on the Female FTSE Board Report 2013 (Cranfield University) 
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money which is available through coordination on an equitable split of money thereby 
investigating its appeal at different levels of comparative financial gain as compared to 
coordinating on the inequitable, battle of the sexes, portion of the game. In other words I 
investigate if the amount of money which can be gained from coordination on an equal 
outcome can be reduced to total less than the total amount available through coordination on 
an unequal outcome without altering its appeal to subjects. I will therefore sometimes label 
equal splits of this nature as inefficient in this paper due to their financial “inefficiency” as 
compared to coordinating on a battle of sexes portion of the game. 
With regard to coordination games, past research offers a number of insights into 
how coordination behaviour is affected by various influences and payoff structures: In 
particular with regard to game structures, a good starting point for my exploration of 
coordination behaviours is the work of van Huyck et al. (1992) since they use some game 
structures which are similar to one of mine (a battle of the sexes game with an efficient equal 
split). However van Huycks’ et al. line of investigation focuses on the effects of strategy 
advice from an anonymous arbitrator and if this kind of advice can “over-run” elements of 
focality (symmetric and efficient outcomes) in coordination games. They find that when 
subjects are choosing a strategy, they are more concerned with principles of symmetry and 
payoff dominance as opposed to an anonymous arbitrator’s suggestion.  Symmetry of 
payoffs is clearly an important property in subjects’ decision making.  Furthermore, the 
existing literature has, aside from a number of exceptions, only researched coordination 
game with an equal and efficient split of earnings. For example we can consider Nydegger 
& Owen (1974), Holm (2000), Roth & Malouf (1979), Mehta at al. (1992), Roth and 
Murnighan (1982), Roth (1995), Schelling (1960) and van Huyck et al. (1995). In this 
chapter I concentrate further on aspects of game structure (i.e. changes in symmetry and 
equality with regard to payoffs) in coordination games and therefore hope that this chapter 
will also contribute to this work.  To my knowledge games of this nature have not been 
studied in depth in the previous literature and I therefore offer a substantial contribution to 
the literature. I therefore hope that this paper provides insights into the ways in which 
coordination and conflict situations are resolved and specifically how gender relates to this.     
The paper will continue as follows: In section two below I examine the previous 
literature in the fields to which I feel this paper contributes, in section three I examine 
theoretical considerations in the experiment, in section four I present my experimental design, 
in section five I present my hypotheses, in section six I present the results and in section 
seven I end on a conclusion and final discussion. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1.Gender Related Behaviour 
 
For the purpose of this literature review I first consider previous findings on the 
effects of one’s own gender on behaviour. The treatment variable in this experiment was 
whether subjects are aware of the gender of a co-participant (or not) and therefore, where no 
gender information is given, these are the kinds of effects which are being examined in 
isolation.  
To begin, these initial papers and studies have provided insights in the effects of own 
gender on behaviour but do not offer evidence of ‘pure’ gender effects since they are based 
on observation or case studies, and not on experimental findings where the information that 
a subject has on the personal attributes of a co-participant can be carefully controlled. 
Therefore the effects of own gender and another’s gender on behaviour cannot be cleanly 
separated here. However they provide some very interesting and relevant insights. For 
example, it is striking that many disciplines have found that women are inherently 
disadvantaged in bargaining or competitive situations. Notably, Babcock & Laschever’s 
(2007) seminal book described case studies in which they illustrate that females are 
disadvantaged in bargaining and negotiation situations because they are unwilling to express 
personal wants and similarly Tiger (2005) asserts that due to anthropological differences 
men are more competitive and consequently more eager to “dominate” than females. 
Likewise, Valian (1999) also claims that females interpret equality as greed (p.1051) since 
they feel less entitled than males. In addition Darwin (1874) famously proclaimed that there 
were evolutionary and biological influences on the difference between the genders and that 
females are more coy and less eager than their male counterparts (Darwin, 1874, p.194). In 
addition, Belot et al. (2012) find that gender, and not attractiveness, is important in how 
subjects share out a sum of money in a prisoner’s dilemma type game at the end of a game 
show with females more likely to choose to split the money equally. Differing attitudes of 
genders for competition have also proved fruitful in pin pointing behavioural difference 
between males and females: For example, Gneezy & Rustichini (2004) find that competition 
is beneficial in terms of performance for school age boys but not for school age females. 
I now look further into lab-based economic experiments which look closer, and in a 
more controlled environment, at how gender affects behaviour and, due to the nature of the 
methodology are able to offer us clearer insights into ‘pure’ gender effects. There are a 
number of different games and set-ups which have been examined in this context and they 
find mixed evidence with regard to gender differences in behaviour. For example in the 
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dictator game Bolton & Katok (1995) find no gender differences in behaviour with regard 
to dictator behaviours. However, Eckel & Grossman (1998) find that females give away 
twice that of males in a dictator game in terms of initial endowment, suggesting that females 
are more generous than males: however, Andreoni & Vesterlund (2001) find that altruism is 
conditional based on the costs of doing so and that, consequently, females display more 
altruism than males when costs of being altruistic are higher but this reverses when the costs 
are lower. Generosity is clearly conditional! With regards to the examination of coordination 
games and gender, in a prisoner's dilemma type game Ortmann & Tichy (1999) find that 
females are significantly more cooperative than males in the first few rounds of a repeated 
game (as in the Belot et al., 2012 field study described above) but that these gender 
differences disappear as rounds progress. The same result, with regard to diminishing gender 
differences, is found by Cadsby & Maynes (1998) who find that, in a public goods game, 
females contribute more than males early on in the game but that these gender effects 
disappear as subjects move through repeated periods of the game. Similar to the non-
experimental literature described above, with regard to differing competitive preferences 
between the genders, Niederle & Vesterlund (2007) conclude that there are gender 
differences with regards to preferences (but not ability) for entering into competitive 
situations with males being more willing to do so than females. Datta Gupta et al. (2013) 
also find females are more prone to avoiding competitive situations than males. Finally, 
Croson & Gneezy (2009) find that gender affects preferences for competition.  
There is also a literature which goes beyond the ‘pure’ gender effects described above 
and additionally looks at how the gender of a co-participant (or whomever a subject is 
dealing with) affects behaviour. Since, one of the treatment variables in this experiment was 
to give subjects knowledge of a co-participant’s gender, this literature is of relevance to my 
investigation. The papers described below could therefore give us insights into how 
culturally based expectations or stereotypes related to gender are employed (successfully or 
not) in an economics experiment. The source of such expectations and stereotypes which 
subjects bring into the lab may be vast and multiple. However daily interactions and 
experiences within the society we live can help us to form these and learn about those which 
are already present (whether we use choose to use these in our judgements or not). Whilst 
not everyone may support or advocate the gender norms which exist with our society, in a 
lab setting, if they are commonly known to exist in some form then subjects may be able to 
“use” them to inform their decision making processes. Therefore a certain equilibria or 
action may become salient in an experiment in a fashion that could be described as “self-
fulfilling”. The concept of contextual information about a co-participant creating focal points 
  
33 
 
in a game was one introduced by Schelling (1960). In the context of gender this would imply 
that a particular outcome in a game becomes salient or focal due to knowledge of the gender 
of co-participant (in Schelling’s work this was common knowledge that everyone in a game 
was familiar with New York’s landmarks in order to coordinate on a meeting place). The 
presence of these kinds of focal points was also more formally investigated by Mehta et al. 
(1994) who find that subjects are far more able to coordinate on common answers to a 
question than would be predicted. That is, they find that, when subjects are asked to attempt 
coordination of their answers to a question with a co-participant, coordination rates are much 
higher than if they were asked to pick an answer at random, showing that subjects are capable 
of using some form of coordination device in order to employ aspects of focality, rather than 
random picking, in order to coordinate their answers at a higher level than might be expected 
if focality was not considered.  
In this experiment I seek to investigate if similar commonly known information 
relating to a co-participant (in this case gender) can have an effect akin to this. I aim to see 
if information about a co-participant’s gender will affect behaviour and coordination 
outcomes and if expectations or stereotypes such as those described above exist in the 
context of gender and within the framework of this experimental design. For a further 
discussion of stereotypes, labels and norms see for example Bowles & McGinn, 2002, 
Cadsby et al., 2007, Pickering, 2001, Moncrieffe & Eyben, 2007.  
To return to more specific examples of studies which examine both the effects of 
own gender and a co-participant’s gender, a number of papers have found that subjects in an 
experimental lab setting do behave differently depending on if their co-participant is known 
to them. For example, Holm (2000) finds that use of a hawkish (or aggressive) strategy is 
more common towards females than males in a battle of the sexes type game. Experiments 
using ultimatum and dictator games also offer interesting insights into distributional 
preferences dependent on co-participant gender. For example, using a simple ultimatum 
game, Solnick (2001) find that knowing a co-participant is male increases offers made 
compared to knowing a co-participant is female. However Slonim & Garbarino (2007) found 
that subjects prefer to donate to females if given the choice and that females also sent more 
than males using a adapted version of the dictator game (amounts sent were tripled) and a 
simple trust game. Similarly Holm (2005) finds that females receive more offers in both 
ultimatum and dictator games when the gender of a co-participant could be chosen by the 
subject making the offer. Aguiar et al. (2009) also find that behavioural expectations are 
different for males and females in a dictator game with females expecting females to be more 
generous than males whilst males having no such pre-conceived expectations. Also, in a 
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dictator game Cadsby et al. (2010) find that unisex female groupings donate more than half 
of an endowment significantly more often than unisex male groupings. Dufwenberg & 
Muren (2006) conclude that the gender composition of groups affects dictator game 
behaviour and that subjects are more generous towards females than males and, that females 
are significantly more likely to send nothing than males. Using the ultimatum game 
Hannagan & Larimer (2010) find that females are more likely than males to suggest an 
equitable distribution of the endowment. With regards to competition, Ivanova-Stenzel & 
Kübler (2011) found that all female teams were most successful in competition against all 
male teams and that males are most successful if females are present in their teams.  
 
3. Theory and Background 
 
In this section I discuss the theoretical underpinnings of this experiment. This section also 
introduces the games used in the experiment. 
 
3.1. The Battle of the Sexes Game and Focal Points 
 
As all my games contain the following battle of the sexes structure I first examine 
this structure in isolation and in more extensive detail here. For that reason, and although 
this game is not used in isolation in this experiment, it will provide context to the games I 
do use. As is often standard in this type of game a strategy of choosing the higher amount 
for oneself is labelled as “hawkish” whilst a strategy of choosing the lower amount for 
oneself is labelled as “dovish”.  I will continue to use this terminology throughout the paper.  
A standard battle of the sexes type game is shown below in Table 3.1.17. As per all 
standard coordination type games mis-coordination leads to zero earnings in the game: 
 
                                                 
7 The battle of the sexes game is also illustrated in, for example, Luce & Raiffa (1957) 
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Table 3.1.1. The Battle of the Sexes matrix 
  Player 2 
  
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
Player 1 
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
(0, 0) (x, y) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
(y, x) (0, 0) 
 
Where it is assumed that x>y>0 
 
This type of game has also been described as a classic ''mixed-motive'' game. 
(Camerer & Fehr, 2004, p.89) since, whilst coordination on a certain outcome is preferable 
to not (since mis-coordination leads to zero earnings), coordination is difficult to achieve 
here since one person must leave the game with - financially speaking - more than the other. 
The problem is also further exacerbated by the fact that subjects are assumed to have no 
opportunity to communicate before making decisions. However, the ease with which this 
type of ''mixed-motive'' problem is solved (i.e. coordination is achieved) could be affected if 
there exist commonly held conventions about which strategies (and resulting coordination 
outcomes) are more acceptable – with regard to gender in the case of this experiment – as 
was described above. Additionally these types of conventions could potentially lead to 
economic gains for those in possession of gender information about a co-participant if they 
aid coordination and thus diminish mis-coordinating behaviours. The coordination problem 
with which subjects are faced in this study is also particularly interesting since Crawford et 
al. (2008) have shown that, as the title of their paper proclaims, “even minute payoff 
asymmetry may yield large coordination failures”. 
The battle of the sexes game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria (from here on in 
“PSNE”) i.e. at {Strategy 1, Strategy 2} and at {Strategy 2, Strategy 1}. These equilibria can 
also be described as {Hawkish, Dovish} and {Dovish, Hawkish} respectively as is common 
practice in the battle of the sexes game. Whilst neither of these equilibria dominates the other 
as discussed above, the introduction of gender information for both subjects (i.e. making 
gender common knowledge) may make one of the equilibrium more salient than the other.  
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Naturally, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (from here on in “MSNE”) for 
this game. Here I calculate the mixed equilibrium for the values of x and y used in this 
experiment: In my experiment x is equal 30 and y is equal to 208.  
 
Table 3.1.2. The Battle of the Sexes matrix with payoffs 
  Player 2 
  
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
Player 1 
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
(0, 0) (30, 20) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) 
 
The MSNE is calculated in the appendix where it is shown that each subject chooses 
a hawkish strategy with probability 
3
5
, and a dovish strategy with probability 
2
5
 in the MSNE. 
In this case each subject has expected payoffs of 12. We therefore notice that the payoffs 
available from playing the MSNE are naturally less than those available through 
coordination on one of the PSNE. It can therefore logically be conceived that the introduction 
of gender labels, together with the presence of expectations of behaviour which relate to 
gender, would lead to higher payoffs for subjects.  
 
3.2. The Games: Equal Split Game and the Compromise Option Games 
 
Having described the battle of the sexes as the basis of all my games I now describe the 
specific games used in the experiment. The experiment involved four games all of which 
were identically used in all sessions and treatments and, as previously described, all took the 
form of a battle of the sexes type game with the addition of an option to coordinate on an 
equal split of resources.  
The first of the games used in this experiment - The Equal Split Game - allowed 
subjects the option of coordination on an equitable outcome where the financial gains 
                                                 
8These point amounts were selected because they equate to the same percentage difference in payoffs 
between x and y as that in Holm (2000). Whilst payoffs were presented in Swedish Krona (SEK) in Holm 
(2000) and were 200 and 300 I felt that in my experiment (and since experimental currency as opposed to 
monetary amounts were presented in the experiment) subjects would be better able to calculate final 
monetary payoff amounts if points were divided through 10. 
  
37 
 
available from this outcome summed to an amount equal to the amount available from 
coordination on the unequal (Battle of the Sexes Type) portion of the game (as illustrated by 
the condition below that (x+y) = (z+z)).  
 
Table 3.2.1. The Equal Split Game 
  Player 2 
  
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
Strategy 3 
(Equal) 
Player 1 
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
 
(0, 0) (x, y) (0, 0) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
(y, x) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
Strategy 3 
(Equal) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (z, z) 
 
Where x>z>y>0 and x+y = z+z 
 
That is, in this case the sum (i.e. to both player 1 and player 2 combined) of the 
payoffs available is the same whether the players coordinate on the battle of the sexes portion 
of the game - {Strategy 1, Strategy 2} or {Strategy 2, Strategy 1} - or if they coordinate on 
the equal split. The equal split here can thus be described as efficient. This game is similar 
to those used by Holm (2000) and van Huyck et al. (1992). More specifically the game took 
the following form in the experiment with regards to payoffs: 
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Table 3.2.2. The Equal Split Game with payoffs 
  Player 2 
  
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
Strategy 3 
(Equal) 
Player 1 
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
 
(0, 0) (30, 20) (0, 0) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
Strategy 3 
(Equal) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (25, 25) 
 
Following the same theoretical analysis as conducted above, this game has three PSNE at 
{Strategy 1, Strategy 2}, {Strategy 2, Strategy 1} and {Strategy 3, Strategy 3}. In this game 
there is also a MSNE where strategy 1 (Hawkish) is played with probability  
15
37
 , strategy 2 
(Dovish) is played with probability  
10
37
, and strategy 3 (Equal) with probability 
12
37
. The 
expected payoff from playing the MSNE is 8
4
37
. Finally there exists an MSNE where player 
1 mixes between a strategy of choosing hawkish and equal and player 2 mixes between 
dovish and equal (or vice versa).  In this case player 1 plays hawkish with probability 
5
9
 and 
equal with probability 
4
9
 and player 2 plays dovish with probability  
5
11
 and equal with 
probability 
6
11
 . The expected payoff from playing the MSNE is 13
7
11
  for player 1 and 11
1
9
  
for player 2. Full detailed calculations of MSNEs are provided in the appendix. 
I now introduce a key element of this research which will be described as the 
“compromise option” for the remainder of this chapter. This is shown in table 3.2.3 below: 
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Table 3.2.3. The Compromise Option 
  Player 2 
  
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
Strategy 3 
(Compromise) 
Player 1  
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
(0, 0) (x, y) (0, 0) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
(y, x) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
Strategy 3 
(Compromise) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (z, z) 
 
Where x>y>z>0 and thus (x+y)> (z+z) 
 
It can easily be seen that the non-shaded section of the game described in table 3.2.3 
above is the same as the standard battle of the sexes game described in the previous section. 
The compromise option can be seen in the shaded area and is described by {Strategy 3, 
Strategy 3}. This inefficient compromise adds a strategy option to the game which could 
potentially lead to coordination on an equitable and symmetric outcome but that leads to 
combined earnings which are less than could potentially have been achieved if coordination 
had been achieved on an asymmetric “battle of the sexes” outcome (since (x+y)>(z+z)). 
With the addition of this option subjects can now potentially coordinate on an outcome 
which offers Pareto inferior (as compared to the unequal battle of the sexes type payoffs) but 
equal payoffs for both subjects. However the inherent potential unattractiveness of the 
inefficiency in this outcome could be counteracted by the fact that it does lead to an equitable 
split of earnings: this could greatly increase the desirability of this outcome if inequality is 
something subjects find intrinsically undesirable. I refer specially to Camerer & Fehr (2004): 
 
“People who dislike inequality are willing to take costly actions to 
reduce inequality, although this may result in a net reduction in their 
material payoff” (p.56) 
 
Consequently, in order to further test the ability and willingness of subjects to 
coordinate on an equitable outcome I also decrease the efficiency of the equitable payoff in 
comparison to that available in the equal split game described above. That is, using the 
notation from above, by further increasing the difference between x+y and z+z. This is 
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shown more explicitly, with regards to specific payoffs used in the experiment, in the tables 
which follow below: . 
First let us consider the “High Compromise Game”. Coordinating on {Strategy 3, 
Strategy 3} in the High Compromise Game (table 3.2.4) gave payoffs of 15 points per subject 
in a pairing. Payoffs of 15 points were chosen because, in comparison to the efficient 25 
point payoff in the Equal Split Game, I felt that it was high enough that subjects would still 
consider it as an attractive and viable strategy choice but still sufficiently low that the 
inherent inefficiency in this outcome would be evident to subjects. Now let use consider the 
“Medium Compromise Game” where payoffs from the compromise option are reduced to 
12 points per subject (table 3.2.5). Finally in the “Low Compromise Game” payoffs from 
the compromise option are reduced to 5 points per subject (table 3.2.6). As such, 
coordinating on the high, medium or low compromise options leads to substantial 40%, 52% 
and 80% reductions in combined total earnings respectively as compared to coordinating on 
either {Strategy 1, Strategy 2} or {Strategy 2, Strategy 1}. 
As can easily be calculated, each of the three games below has three PSNE at 
{Strategy 1, Strategy 2}, {Strategy 2, Strategy 1} and {Strategy 3, Strategy 3}. I report the 
MSNE below each game below. Again, these calculations are provided in more detail in the 
appendix. 
 
Table 3.2.4. The High Compromise Game 
  Player 2 
  
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
Strategy 3 
(Compromise) 
Player 1 
Strategy 1 
(Hawkish) 
 
(0, 0) (30, 20) (0, 0) 
Strategy 2 
(Dovish) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
Strategy 3 
(Compromise) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (15,15) 
 
In the High Compromise Game there is a MSNE where strategy 1 (hawkish) is played with 
probability  
1
3
, strategy 2 (dovish) is played with probability 
2
9
, and strategy 3 (compromise) 
with probability 
4
9
. The expected payoff from playing the MSNE is 6
2
3
. Finally there exists 
an MSNE where player 1 mixes between a strategy of choosing hawkish and equal and 
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player 2 mixes between dovish and equal (and vice versa).  In this case player 1 plays 
hawkish with probability 
3
7
 and equal with probability 
4
7
 and player 2 plays dovish with 
probability 
1
3
 and equal with probability 
2
3
 . The expected payoff from playing the MSNE is 
10  for player 1 and 8
12
21
  for player 2. 
 
Table 3.2.5. The Medium Compromise Game 
  Player 2 
  
Strategy 1  
(Hawkish) 
Strategy 2  
(Dovish) 
Strategy 3  
(Compromise) 
Player 1  
Strategy 1  
(Hawkish) 
(0, 0)  (30, 20) (0, 0) 
Strategy 2  
(Dovish) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) (0, 0)  
Strategy 3  
(Compromise)  
(0, 0)  (0, 0)  (12,12) 
 
In the Medium Compromise Game there is a MSNE where strategy 1 (hawkish) is played 
with probability 
3
10
 , strategy 2 (dovish) is played with probability 
1
5
,  and strategy 3 
(compromise) with probability  
1
2
. The expected payoff from playing this MSNE is 6. 
Finally there exists an MSNE where player 1 mixes between a strategy of choosing 
hawkish and equal and player 2 mixes between dovish and equal (and vice versa).  In this 
case player 1 plays hawkish with probability 
3
8
 and equal with probability 
5
8
 and player 2 
plays dovish with probability 
6
21
 and equal with probability 
15
21
 . The expected payoff from 
playing the MSNE is 8
12
21
    for player 1 and 7
1
2
  for player 2. 
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Table 3.2.6. The Low Compromise Game 
  Player 2 
  
Strategy 1  
(Hawkish) 
Strategy 2  
(Dovish) 
Strategy 3  
(Compromise) 
Player 1  
Strategy 1  
(Hawkish) 
(0, 0)  (30, 20) (0, 0) 
Strategy 2  
(Dovish) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) (0, 0)  
Strategy 3  
(Compromise) 
(0, 0)  (0, 0)  (5, 5) 
 
In the Low Compromise Game there is a MSNE where strategy 1 (hawkish) is played with 
probability  
3
17
 , strategy 2 (dovish) is played with probability 
2
17
, and strategy 3 with 
probability 
12
17
. The expected payoff from playing the MSNE is 3
9
17
. Finally there exists an 
MSNE where player 1 mixes between a strategy of choosing hawkish and equal and player 
2 mixes between dovish and equal.  In this case player 1 plays hawkish with probability 
1
5
 
and equal with probability 
4
5
 and player 2 plays dovish with probability 
1
7
 and equal with 
probability 
6
7
 . The expected payoff from playing the MSNE is 4
2
7
    for player 1 and 4  for 
player 2. 
These values were also chosen to allow the compromise option in the Medium 
Compromise Game to correspond to the expected payoffs available from playing the MSNE 
if only the battle of the sexes game without a compromise option was considered (this was 
calculated in the previous section). Thus, if behaviour is well described by the MSNE we 
would not expect subjects to try to coordinate anymore often on the asymmetric part of the 
matrix (as described by Strategies 1 and 2) as on the compromise option part of it (as 
described by Strategy 3) in the Medium Compromise Game since the expected payoff from 
both is the same. 
 
4. Experimental Design 
 
The experiment was conducted at the University of East Anglia using facilities provided by 
the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS)9. As has become 
                                                 
9 http://www.uea.ac.uk/cbess 
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standard for economic experiments the experiment was computerised using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). I employed an experimental methodology since it allows an effective 
and simple method to examine the effects of gender in isolation as also described in the 
review of previous experimental literature above. 
 
4.1. Subjects 
 
Subjects were recruited via the University's ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) system and a total of 
176 subjects (all of whom were students at the University) participated in the experiment10. 
Subjects were only told that they would be taking part in a decision-making experiment and 
were at no point told that the experiment related to gender effects. I did this in order to 
circumvent any possible experimental demand effects which could influence subject 
behaviour. Zizzo (2010) provides a more detailed discussion of experimenter demand effects 
which I do not include here.  
 Subjects were randomly seated in a partitioned computer lab. They were provided 
with paper instructions which were read aloud at the beginning of the experiment. Questions 
were then answered publicly. After this the experiment began on the computer screens. 
Instructions are loosely based on the original translation from the Swedish provided in Holm 
(2000). However some changes were made in order to ensure that there was full 
comprehension of experimental procedures and in order to fit the instructions and games into 
a computerised setting. 
 
4.2. Treatments 
 
I conducted two treatments: As described above, the first was conducted without providing 
subjects with information about their co-participant's gender (or any other information on a 
co-participant) whilst the other was conducted with subjects receiving information on a co-
participant’s gender. My experimental design ensured that, in the latter treatment, only 
information on the gender of a co-participant was available to subjects. Here, the key element 
of the investigation is gender information and as such I took great care to introduce this 
information to subjects in isolation from any other information about a co-participant in the 
                                                 
10 Psychology students were omitted during recruitment (via email) as we suspected that, the kind of gender 
revelation process used here may have been familiar with students who had studied psychology literature. (See, 
for example, Friedman & Sunder, 1994, p.39 for a more in-depth discussion) 
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appropriate treatments so that any gender effects were not “muddied”. The methods used for 
this will be described in more detail in the following section.  
In total 82 subjects took part in the treatment without gender labels (NGL) and 94 
subjects took part in the treatment with gender labels (GL). This is illustrated in table 4.2.1 
below: 
 
Table 4.2.1. Treatment Conditions and Subject Numbers 
without gender information with gender information 
NGL (n = 82) GL (n = 94) 
 
In the GL treatment it was essential that all gender configurations were collected (i.e. 
males playing against a males, females playing against females, males playing against 
females and females playing against males) so that data could be gathered on all possible 
pairing types. As per Holm (2000) these are labelled as MM, FF, MF and FM respectively 
throughout this chapter. From the perspective of observations, I therefore collect, for each 
male pair (MM) two males each playing against another male; for each male/female pair 
(MF/ FM) one female each playing against a male and one male playing against a female, 
and for each female pair (FF) two females each playing against another female. 
Consequently from each pair of subjects I glean two observations. Subject pairings were 
made randomly by the computer and therefore subjects were not given the opportunity to 
select if they wanted to play a male or female in the game. Subject pairings remained fixed 
throughout all the games and subjects were aware of this. Subjects played all four games 
without feedback and in the same order in order to keep observations independent and to aid 
statistical analysis. Subjects could achieve experimental earnings of up to £7.20 or 120 
experimental points with each point being worth 6p in monetary earnings. 
 
4.2.The Gender Revelation Procedure 
 
The gender revelation procedure describes the process by which information about 
the gender of a co-participant is transmitted to subjects. Similar to Holm (2000) and Datta 
Gupta et al. (2013)11 I decided that this information should be conveyed to subjects by way 
of fictitious names. In line with the original inspiration for this paper, this method was used 
by Holm (2000). Subjects were made aware that the names were indeed fictitious and did 
not relate to the subject in any way apart from that female names had to been assigned to 
                                                 
11 Fershtman & Gneezy (2001) also use names to introduce information about both ethnic origin and gender. 
However real names were used in their experiment. 
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female co-participants and male names to male co-participants12. As can be seen from the 
instructions which are presented in the appendix I also informed subjects of this in language 
that was designed to make the introduction of these “names” appear more as an 
administrative component of the experiment rather than a crucial and central one. Subjects 
could also see the “name” of their co-participant throughout the experiment as they were 
asked to write it on a piece of paper which was in front of them during the whole experiment. 
This was to ensure that subjects did not forget about this initial piece of information on their 
co-participant and it remained prevalent in their minds. In addition, it was important that I 
ensured all subjects understood that everyone in the experiment was privy to the same gender 
information. As such subjects were informed, both in writing on their paper instructions and 
through reading the instruction aloud, that everyone had received identical instructions and 
information.  
The following names, shown in table 4.3.1 below, were selected for use in the 
experiment. The forenames were chosen due to their recognisability as male or female 
names13. I also decided to combine each of these forenames with a surname in order to 
further “distract” subjects from the focus on gender in the experiment. These surnames are 
listed below and were selected from the top 5 surnames in England in 2001 (McElduff et al., 
2008). Thus, by combining each of the first names with each of the surnames a total of 25 
names per gender were available. 
 
  
                                                 
12 Datta Gupta et al. (2013) run “weak” and “strong” information procedures in which subjects are not told 
that fictitious name corresponded to actual gender and where they are, respectively, and find that results for 
males were sensitive to the type of procedure. I felt that ensuring subjects were aware of gender by 
additionally making clear the direct relationship between fictitious name and gender would therefore create 
stronger results. 
13 In order to check which names would definitely be recognised as male or female by native and non-native 
speakers alike, I ran an online questionnaire asking if a selection of the top 100 names for boys and girls were 
male or female. Only names where 100% of respondents choose the correct gender were used. In order to 
ensure that a wide variety of British and non-British subjects were polled, subjects were also asked how long 
they had been resident in the UK. 
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Table 4.3.1. Anonymised names used14 
Female Male Surnames15 
Lilly Daniel Smith 
Eva William Jones 
Sophie Thomas Taylor 
Isabelle Ben Brown 
Ellie Lewis Williams 
 
I also felt that this method of gender revelation would be appropriate since various field-
based studies have shown that discrimination on the basis of gender, and specifically on the 
basis of gender specific names, exists. For example Moss-Racusin et al. (2012) illustrate 
how gender discrimination can take place, even against an anonymous job candidate, in a 
field experiment in which a job application is sent out for an academic position to various 
universities with only the (fake) name of the applicant randomly alternated between an easily 
recognisable male or female name. They find that even this small change in the application 
form effects people’s reactions to the application form: From feedback given by subjects 
asked to assess the applications it was found that subjects found the female to be less 
competent and employable and also deserving of a lower starting salary. This piece of 
research provides simple and effective evidence of gender discrimination in the workplace 
and is also particularly relevant here since expectations of gender were elicited via fake 
names and anonymously (i.e. subjects had no distinguishing information about the subject’s 
personal attributes aside from their gender) and this is also the method we use here to 
communicate gender information to subjects. Similar results with regard to gender 
discrimination were also found by Steinpreis et al. (1999) in a comparable style of study. 
Gender discrimination in some form clearly exists. 
 
5. Hypotheses 
 
Since it is the one of the unique contributions of this study, it will be useful to 
examine some hypotheses relating to the compromise option in isolation first. As such, the 
Equal Split Game serves as a baseline here since it represents a game in which an equitable 
                                                 
14 Forenames were selected from the top 100 baby names for boys and girls born in England and Wales in 
2009 supplied by the Office of National Statistics (2009) 
15 Surnames were the top 5 must common surnames in England in 2001. Taken from McElduff et al. (2008) 
and measured by percentage of the population- Smith: 1.26%, Jones: 0.75%, Taylor: 0.59%, Brown: 0.56%, 
Williams: 0.39% 
  
47 
 
split of money is efficient in comparison to an inequitable one (See game tables above). 
Comparing the results I obtain in this game, we can assess how use of an equal split changes 
as if moves from being efficient to being inefficient and subsequently becomes increasingly 
inefficient. A strategy which leads to an equal and efficient split of money proved to be 
highly salient in Holm (2000). I will therefore examine a couple of matters here. It is assumed 
that the reliance on the compromise option will decrease as its efficiency decreases: naturally, 
as the gap between potential earnings (i.e. between coordinating on an inequitable outcome 
and an equitable split) increases, I would expect subjects to attempt coordination on an 
asymmetric outcome more. 
 
Therefore: 
 
 H1: Reliance on the compromise option/ equal split will decrease as its efficiency 
decreases. 
 
Moving onto the second hypothesis, as established in Holm (2000), subjects appear to be 
capable of using gender discrimination to increase payoffs in his experiments. We might 
therefore expect that the addition of gender labels will decrease reliance on this equitable 
option (especially amongst mixed gender pairs) since players have information about their 
co-participant which they could potentially use to discriminate between the two inequitable 
outcomes more easily. However if gender labels in the experiment are able to introduce a 
“cost” in that they “force” subjects to make choices against or in line with gender stereotypes 
(if gender labels are very salient and not used in an unconscious way in the experimental 
setting) this may make the (Equal, Equal) option more appealing in mixed gender pairs since 
it opens up an opportunity to make a politically correct decision. 
 
Therefore: 
 
 H2: The addition of labels will alter reliance on the compromise option 
 
I can relate the first two hypotheses to those remaining below in that, as the reliance on the 
compromise option decreases, we would see greater use of the hawkish and dovish strategy 
options. In Holm’s experiment he found that subjects are significantly more hawkish when 
playing a coordination game against a female compared to against a male in a battle of the 
sexes game. He also finds that mixed gender pairings are more successful in achieving higher 
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payoffs when compared to unisex parings as mixed gender pairings are able to use 
discrimination to coordinate more successfully. If, as in the hypotheses above, we 
hypothesise that as the efficiency of the equitable split decreases it will become less attractive 
this might also suggest that as the equitable split becomes an increasingly rejected strategy 
(due to inefficiency) subjects will turn more to using the battle of the sexes portion of the 
game and will exhibit behaviours such as those detailed above. Thus I pose the following as 
hypotheses in the games with an inefficient compromise option (i.e. the High, Medium and 
Low Compromise Games): 
 
Therefore: 
 
 H3: The gender of a co-participant will affect levels of hawkish behaviour 
 H4: Mixed gender pairs will be able to use discrimination to achieve higher 
expected payoffs than unisex pairings. 
 
Similarly, we might assume that mixed gender pairings would be more successful in using 
gender labels to achieve higher payoffs compared to their unisex counterparts.  
 
Therefore: 
 
 H5: The addition of labels will advantage mixed gender pairings more than 
unisex pairings. 
 
Finally, it has been found in the lab that own gender can impact on behaviour but evidence 
has been hugely mixed as indicated in the literature review above. 
 
Therefore: 
 
 H6: Own gender will affect behaviour 
 
6. Results 
6.1. Demographics and subject information 
 
Subjects were required to provide demographic information when they signed up the 
experiment via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Information was collected on gender, age, faculty 
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of study and nationality. 49.43% of subjects were females and 50.57% male, the average age 
of subjects was 24.58 years, 40.34% were British and 59.66% were non-British, 14.86% 
were postgraduate research students16, 38.86% postgraduate taught students17 and 46.29% 
undergraduate students18. 47.16%, 34.09%, 17.05% and 1.7% of subjects came from the 
faculties of Science, Social Sciences, Humanities and Medicine & Health Sciences 
respectively. 
Data for the GL treatment and the NGL treatment was collected independently in a 
between subjects design. The following number of observations, as defined above, were 
collected in each treatment and pairing subgroup: 
 
Table 6.1.1. Observations 
  Treatment 
  GL NGL 
Observation 
MM 24 18 
FF 26 18 
FM 22 23 
MF 22 23 
 
6.2. Summary of Results 
 
I will now present the results of individual choices made in the games. For this purpose, as 
well as examining strategy choices in the games by subjects, I will also utilise two additional 
measures - expected payoffs and expected coordination rates. Both are explained in greater 
detail here:  
Expected payoffs in the game are calculated using the same method as described in 
Holm (2000). I denote expected payoffs to a subject of gender a which is in the set {Male, 
Female} who has been made aware of their co-participant’s gender - b  - which is in the set 
{Male, Female}, as πab. Similarly, pab(30) is the proportion of those of gender a who choose 
to take 30 experimental points for themselves (i.e. use a hawkish strategy) when they aware 
that their co-participant is of gender b, and pab(COES)
19 is the proportion of those of gender a 
who choose the compromise option (High, Medium and Low Compromise Games) or an 
equal split (in the Equal Split Game), when they are aware that their co-participant is of 
                                                 
16 Enrolled on PhD, MRes or MPhil programs 
17 Enrolled on MA, MSc or LLM programs 
18 Enrolled on BA, BSc, LLB or MBBS programs 
19 Compromise Option or Equal Spilt i.e. 25 in the Equal Split Game, 15 in the High Compromise Game, 12 
in the Medium Compromise Game & 5 in the Low Compromise Game 
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gender b. Using this notation, expected payoffs are therefore calculated in the manner which 
follows: 
 
πij = [pab(30) *(1- pba(30) – pba(COES)) * 30] + [pba(30)*(1- pab(30) – pab(COES)) * 20]  
+ [(pab(COES) * pab(COES))  * COES] 
 
Expected coordination rates (ECR) are examined using the same notation as in the expected 
payoff calculations illustrated above. With the ECR I am calculating the product of the 
proportions of people choosing an individual strategy in each game. The expected 
coordination rate therefore provides a measure of coordination ''success'' but does not 
consider point earnings from the game. It is calculated as follows: 
 
ECRij = [pab(30) *(1- pba(30)  - pba(COES)) ] + [pba(30)  *(1- pab(30)   - pab(COES))] +[pab(COES) * 
pba(COES)] 
 
These two measures (expected coordination rate and expected payoffs) are also 
interesting in relation to one another: Expected coordination rate provides a measure of 
successful alignment of expectations without consideration for the resulting payoffs. On the 
other hand, expected payoffs provide an indication both of successful coordination levels 
but also the resulting financial implications of that success.  
In the tables that follow I will present a summary of the data from the experiment in 
all games and treatments. Data will be presented for all subjects and also for these subgroups 
of participants (i.e. different pairing types) in the experiment. I not only report results on the 
four main subgroups (MM, MF, FM, FF) but also on “higher level” subgroups such as results 
from subjects who had a female co-participant (i.e. pooled data from MF and FF subjects) 
or from male participants (i.e. pooled data from MF and MM subjects). It is acknowledged 
that some significance may occur in some of the subgroup comparisons for purely random 
reasons.  
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Table 6.2.1. Code for summary data presentation 
(M,F) Data for all males and all females regardless of partner type 
(MP, FP) 
Data for all subjects with a male partner and all subjects with a 
female partner regardless of own gender 
(MM, FF, MF, FM)  
Data for males partnered with males, females partnered with 
females, males partnered with females and females partnered with 
males 
(Unisex, Mixed) 
Data for all unisex pairings (i.e. MM and FF) and for all mixed 
gender pairings (i.e. FM and MF) 
All subjects Data for all subjects 
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Table 6.2.2. Labelled Treatment (GL) 
 Equal Spilt Game High Compromise Game Medium Compromise Game Low Compromise Game 
Males/ Females (M, F) 
a) (M,F) Dovish (%)  2.174, 6.25 17.391, 29.167  21.739, 29.167  30.435, 43.75 
b) (M, F) Hawkish (%) 8.696, 8.333  34.783, 18.75  32.609, 27.083  60.87, 39.583 
c) (M, F) ES/CO (%)  89.13, 85.4175  47.826, 52.083 45.652, 43.75  8.696, 16.667 
d) (M, F) Exp. Payoffs (points)  18.578, 19.731  6.678, 6.853  6.612, 5.996  9.849, 8.932  
e) (M, F) ECR (%)  74.291, 78.906  35.066, 38.976  35.681, 35.46  38.847, 38.802 
Male/ Female partnered (Mp, Fp) 
a) (Mp, Fp) Dovish (%)  4.348, 4.167  21.739, 25  32.609, 18.75  36.957, 37.5 
b) (Mp, Fp) Hawkish (%)  13.043, 4.167  32.609, 20.833  23.913, 35.417  50, 50 
c) (Mp, Fp) ES/CO (%)  82.609, 91.667  45.652, 54.167 43.478, 45.833  13.043, 12.5 
d) (Mp, Fp) Exp. Payoffs (points)  18.568, 19.722  6.489, 6.992  6.068, 6.521  9.121, 9.635  
e) (Mp, Fp) ECR (%)  74.291, 78.906  35.066, 38.976  35.681, 35.46  38.847, 38.802 
MM, FF, MF, FM 
a) (MM, FF, MF, FM) Dovish (%)  0, 3.846, 4.545, 9.091  12.5, 26.923, 22.727, 31.818  37.5, 30.769, 4.545, 27.273  29.167, 42.308, 31.818, 45.455 
b) (MM, FF, MF, FM) Hawkish (%)  8.333, 0, 9.091, 18.182  41.667, 15.385, 27.273, 22.727 20.833, 26.923, 45.455, 27.273  62.5, 42.308, 59.091, 36.364 
c) (MM, FF, MF, FM) ES/CO (%)  91.667, 96.154, 86.364, 72.727  45.833, 57.692, 50, 45.455 41.667, 42.308, 50, 45.455  8.333, 15.385, 9.091, 18.182 
d) (MM, FF, MF, FM) Exp. Payoffs (points)  21.007, 23.114, 16.116, 16.116  5.755, 7.064, 7.045, 6.694  5.99, 6.29, 6.694, 5.579  9.149, 9.068, 10.454, 8.926  
e) (MM, FF, MF, FM) ECR (%)  84.0278, 92.456, 64.463, 64.463  31.424, 41.568, 36.57, 36.57 32.986, 34.467, 36.364, 36.364  37.153, 38.166, 40.082, 40.082 
Unisex, Mixed Gender 
a) (Unisex, Mixed) Dovish (%)  2, 6.818  20, 27.273  34, 15.909  36, 38.636 
b) (Unisex, Mixed) Hawkish (%)  4, 13.636  28, 25  24, 36.364  52, 47.727 
c) (Unisex, Mixed) ES/CO (%)  94, 79.545  52, 47.727  42, 47.727  12, 13.636 
d) (Unisex, Mixed) Exp. Payoffs (points)  22.13, 16.284  6.856, 6.826  6.197, 5.626  9.432, 9.313  
e) (Unisex, Mixed) ECR (%)  88.52, 65.134  38.24, 36.415  33.96, 34.349  38.88, 38.74 
All Subjects 
a) (All Subjects) Dovish (%)  4.255  23.404  25.532  37.234 
b) (All Subjects) Hawkish (%)  8.511  26.596  29.787  50 
c) (All Subjects) ES/CO (%)  87.234  50 44.681  12.766 
d) (All Subjects) Exp. Payoffs (points) 19.206 6.862  6.198  9.716  
e) (All Subjects) ECR (%)  76.822 37.449  35.174  38.864 
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Table 6.2.3. Un-Labelled Treatment (NGL) 
 
 
 
 
 Equal Spilt Game High Compromise Game Medium Compromise Game Low Compromise Game 
Males/ Females (M, F) 
a) (M, F) Dovish (%)  4.878, 7.317  29.268, 19.512  36.585, 41.463  43.902, 51.22 
b) (M, F) Hawkish (%) 9.756, 4.878  19.512, 31.707  31.707, 29.268  46.341, 39.024 
c) (M, F) ES/CO (%)  85.366, 87.805  51.22, 48.78  31.707, 29.268  9.756, 9.756 
d) (M, F) Exp. Payoffs (points)  18.055, 19.952  6.791, 6.936  6.782, 7.341  10.547, 9.768  
e) (M, F) ECR (%)  72.1, 79.893  36.764, 38.132  33.135, 33.135  42.534, 40.214 
Male/ Female partnered (Mp, Fp) 
a) (Mp, Fp) Dovish (%)  9.756, 2.439  24.39, 24.39  34.146, 43.902  46.341, 48.78 
b) (Mp, Fp) Hawkish (%)  7.317, 7.317 24.39, 26.829  29.268, 31.707  46.341, 39.024 
c) (Mp, Fp)  ES/CO (%)  82.927, 90.244  51.22, 48.78  36.585, 24.39  7.317, 12.195 
d) (Mp, Fp) Expected Payoffs (points)  17.995, 19.994  7.029, 6.686  6.77, 7.371  10.434, 9.863  
e) (Mp, Fp) ECR (%)  72.1, 79.893  38.132, 36.764  33.135, 33.135  42.534, 40.214 
MM, FF, MF, FM 
a) (MM, FF, MF, FM) Dovish (%)  11.111, 5.556, 0, 8.696  33.333, 22.222, 26.087, 17.391  33.333, 50, 39.13, 34.783  44.444, 55.556, 43.478, 47.826 
b) (MM, FF, MF, FM) Hawkish (%)  5.556, 0, 13.043, 8.696  11.111, 27.778, 26.087, 34.783  22.222, 22.222, 39.13, 34.783  44.444, 27.778, 47.826, 47.826 
c) (MM, FF, MF, FM) ES/CO (%)  83.333, 94.444, 86.957, 82.609  55.556, 50, 47.826, 47.826  44.444, 27.778, 21.739, 30.435  11.111, 16.667, 8.696, 4.348 
d) (MM, FF, MF, FM)  Expected Payoffs (points)  17.67, 22.299, 18.299, 18.185  6.481, 6.836, 6.607, 7.06  6.074, 6.481, 7.599, 7.599  9.938, 7.855, 11.04, 10.832  
e) (MM, FF, MF, FM) ECR (%)  70.679, 89.198, 72.968, 72.968  38.272, 37.346, 36.484, 36.484  34.568, 29.938, 33.837, 33.837  40.741, 33.642, 44.045, 44.045 
Unisex, Mixed Gender 
a) (Unisex, Mixed) Dovish (%)  8.333, 4.348  27.778, 21.739  41.667, 36.957  50, 45.652 
b) (Unisex, Mixed) Hawkish (%)  2.778, 10.87  19.444, 30.435  22.222, 36.957  36.111, 47.826 
c) (Unisex, Mixed) ES/CO (%)  88.889, 84.783  52.778, 47.826  36.111, 26.087  13.889, 6.522 
d) (Unisex, Mixed)  Expected Payoffs (points)  19.869, 18.207  6.879, 6.739  6.194, 7.646  9.124, 10.938  
e) (Unisex, Mixed) ECR (%)  79.475, 72.826  38.657, 36.106  31.559, 34.121  38.04, 44.093 
All Subjects 
a) (All Subjects) Dovish (%)  6.098  24.39  39.024  47.561 
b) (All Subjects) Hawkish (%)  7.317  25.61  30.488  42.683 
c) (All Subjects) ES/CO (%)  86.585  50  30.488  9.756 
d) (All Subjects)  Expected Payoffs (points) 18.966  6.873  7.064  10.198  
e) (All Subjects) ECR (%)  75.863  37.493  33.09  41.553 
  
54 
 
6.3. Analysis 
 
I predominately use the chi-squared test in this analysis (and the Fisher Exact Test where 
appropriate i.e. where subject numbers fall below 7 for a given category). The test is appropriate 
here because I observe nominal values of choices (Hawkish, Dovish, Equal). It is also relevant 
and appropriate for analysis in all periods since subjects were not given feedback between 
rounds. I can thus consider all observations in all periods to be truly independent.  
Let us first consider the hypotheses relating to the compromise option in more detail: 
 
 H1: Reliance on the compromise option/ equal split will decrease as its 
efficiency decreases 
 H2: The addition of labels will alter reliance on the compromise option 
 
The tables which follow provide some initial indications of how the equitable split of earnings 
(i.e. the equal split and the compromise options) is used by subjects in all possible pairings 
configurations.  
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Table 6.3.1. The rate of use of the Equal Split/ Compromise Option20  
 
Equal  
Split  
(GL) 
High  
Compromise 
(GL)  
Medium  
Compromise  
(GL) 
Low  
Compromise  
(GL) 
Equal 
Split 
(NGL) 
High  
Compromise  
(NGL) 
Medium  
Compromise  
(NGL) 
Low  
Compromise  
(NGL) 
All  
subjects 
87.23%  50%  44.68%  12.77%  86.59% 50%  30.49%  9.76% 
FF  96.15% 57.69%  42.31%  15.39%  94.44% 50%  27.78%  16.67% 
MM  91.67% 45.83%  41.67%  8.33%  83.33% 55.56%  44.44%  11.11% 
FM  72.73% 45.46%  45.46%  8.18%  82.61% 47.83%  30.44%  4.35% 
MF  86.36% 50%  50%  9.09%  86.96% 47.83%  21.74%  8.7% 
Male  
subjects  
89.13% 47.83%  45.65%  8.7%  85.37% 51.22%  31.71%  9.76% 
Female  
subjects  
85.42% 52.08%  43.75%  16.67%  87.81% 48.78%  29.27%  9.76% 
Unisex  
pairings  
94% 52%  42%  12%  88.89% 52.778%  36.11%  13.89% 
Mixed  
gender  
pairings 
79.55% 47.73%  47.73%  13.64%  84.78% 48.78%  26.09%  6.52% 
Subjects 
with  
a male  
partner 
82.61% 45.65%  43.48%  13.04%  82.93% 51.22%  36.59%  7.32% 
Subjects 
with  
a female  
partner 
91.67% 54.17%  45.83%  12.5%  90.24% 48.78%  24.39%  12.2% 
 
  
                                                 
20 GL - Labelled Treatment, NGL - Unlabelled Treatment 
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Let us first provide some initial observations on the effects of reducing efficiency in the 
equal split in the experiment. From table 6.3.1 we can observe that, despite the property of 
equality, a strategy of choosing an equal split decreases in popularity as its efficiency decreases 
in most subgroups (in both the GL and NGL treatments). Thus subjects are interested in both 
payoffs and equality, and are making trade-offs as the payoffs from the outcome that offers 
equal payoffs decreases. Also we notice that when the equitable payoff is efficient (as in the 
Equal Split Game) the vast majority of subjects choose this strategy option. However the drop 
in the use of an equitable strategy as soon it becomes inefficient (as in the difference in the use 
of the equitable strategy between the Equal Split Game and the High Compromise Game) is 
striking. Even when there is only a very small fall in efficiency in a compromise option type 
payoffs (as in for example from the High Compromise Game to the Medium Compromise Game) 
the drop in the use of the compromise option is often large, particularly in the NGL treatment. 
People move away from this strategy very quickly. I therefore accept hypothesis 121. 
Let us now consider hypothesis 2. As can also be seen from table 6.3.1 above, female 
subjects, subjects with a female partner and MF subjects show an increased reliance on the 
compromise option when labels are added over all games. This could suggest that with the 
addition of labels makes these groups more cautious about using a hawkish or dovish strategy 
and moves them towards using the compromise options. The only subgroup that consistently 
decreases their reliance on the compromise option when labels are added are MM subjects.  
However, using a chi-squared test a significant difference between a strategy of choosing 
the compromise option was found between treatments in the Medium Compromise Game only 
for the following subgroups: all subjects ( = 3.7420, p < 0.1), those with a female co-participant 
( = 4.4153, p < 0.05) and mixed gender pairings ( = 4.5351, p < 0.05) with all these showing 
a greater use of the compromise option when labels were present. These result appears to be 
driven by MF subjects (Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.065) who are the only pairing subgroup to use 
the compromise option significantly more in the treatments with labels. I am thus unable to 
establish that subjects are less likely to use the inefficient compromise option in the presence of 
gender labels as predicted by hypothesis 2.  It is interesting that it is MF subjects who display 
some significant differences in compromise type behaviours in the Medium Compromise Game 
with and without labels as it was these mixed gender pairings who we might have expected to 
                                                 
21 The hypothesis is accepted purely on observational grounds. We will continue our analysis of choices in more 
details in the sections which follow. 
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be able to use playing against a co-participant of a different gender to discriminate between the 
two higher payoff options (as in Holm, 2000). However I do not observe this. I therefore reject 
hypothesis 2. 
Let us now move on to look at our second set of hypotheses. 
 
 H3: The gender of a co-participant will affect levels of hawkish behaviour 
 
In Holm (2000) it is found that when an unequal split is unavailable in the coordination game, 
males and females exhibited more hawkish behaviours towards females than males with 67.9% 
and 47.9% respectively choosing the hawkish option dependent on the gender of a co-participant 
(Holm, 2000, p.299). In addition Holm (2000) found that females choose the dovish option more 
often when they were aware their co-participant was a male as compared to a female co-
participant.  
Tests of hypothesis 3 offer some surprising results. In the High Compromise Game 
subjects are more hawkish towards males than females. However this pattern reverses in the 
Medium Compromise Game, and in the Low Compromise Game where 50% of those partnered 
with both male and female co-participants chose a hawkish strategy. I therefore have partial 
evidence that supports hypothesis 3 in the Medium Compromise Game. 
 
Table 6.3.2. Hawkish behaviour towards men and women (with gender information) 
 
High  
Compromise 
Medium  
Compromise 
Low  
Compromise 
With  
Male Partner  
32.609%  23.913%  50% 
With  
Female Partner  
20.833%  35.417%  50% 
Difference  -11.775%  11.504%  0% 
 
However using a (one-tailed) chi-squared test no significant difference was found between 
choosing a hawkish strategy between those with a male and female partner. This result is 
contrary to Holm’s finding reported above with regard to differences in hawkish behaviour 
towards the genders. This is despite the result reported above in which I observe that the use of 
the compromise option does tend to decrease as its efficiency decreases. Despite increasingly 
abandoning the equitable strategy as efficiency decreases subjects do not exhibit behaviours as 
seen in the Holm’s battle of the sexes game with regard to use of the hawkish and dovish options. 
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It could be hypothesised that when the compromise option is available it may influence the ways 
subjects view the hawkish and dovish strategy options. Those who reject the equitable strategy 
and are choosing to use the hawkish and dovish options, are not resorting to behaviours that are 
similar to those seen in Holm’s battle of the sexes set-up.  
 
Let us now consider the hypotheses 4 and 5: 
 
 H4: Mixed gender pairs will be able to use discrimination to achieve higher expected 
payoffs than unisex pairings. 
 H5: The addition of labels will advantage mixed gender pairings more than unisex 
pairings. 
 
Now referring to the expected payoffs in table 6.3.3 we see that unisex pairings consistently get 
higher expected payoffs and outperform mixed gender parings in the GL treatment. In all four 
games expected payoffs for unisex and mixed gender were as follows: 
 
Table 6.3.3. Expected Payoffs - Unisex v. Mixed pairings (GL Treatment) 
 
High  
Compromise 
Medium 
Compromise 
Low  
Compromise 
Mixed Gender 
Pairings 
6.826  5.626  9.313  
Unisex  
Pairings 
6.856  6.197  9.432  
% difference22  0.441%  10.145%  1.278%  
 
From this table we also note the interesting result that expected payoffs from the low 
compromise game are higher23 than those in the High Compromise and Medium Compromise 
games despite payoffs from the compromise option being lower in the Low Compromise Game. 
If subjects aren’t as “distracted” by the compromise option (only 12.766% of subject choose the 
compromise option in the low compromise game) they appear to be capable on coordinating on 
                                                 
22 % difference is calculated at (Unisex Pairings Expected Payoffs – Mixed Gender Pairings Expected Payoffs)/ 
Mixed Gender Pairings Expected Payoffs. A positive % difference thus indicates that unisex pairings achieved 
higher payoffs. 
23 However these differences are not found to be statistically significant: 
Unisex: (High Compromise/ Low Compromise – p = 0.4, Medium Compromise/ Low Compromise – p = 0.29) 
Mixed Gender: (High Compromise/ Low Compromise – p = 0.42, Medium Compromise/ Low Compromise – p = 
0.23) 
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the unequal section of the game. We note however that ECRs for all four of the labelled games 
are fairly similar24. This could indicate that although absolute expected levels of coordination 
are similar, coordination on higher value outcomes in the Low Compromise games leads to 
higher overall expected payoffs. 
Let us now consider elements of individual strategy choice in order examine if this gives 
us some explanation as to where these differences in payoffs are coming from. Using a two-
tailed chi-squared test, I am unable to establish a significant difference in strategy choice 
(between mixed and unisex pairings) over all strategies (Dovish, Hawkish or Equal/ 
Compromise). However the game in which the difference between payoffs is most large (The 
Medium Compromise Game), the p-value is just outside the standard threshold of significance 
level ( = 4.3729, p = 0.112). I also find a significant difference between the number of subjects 
choosing a dovish strategy in the Medium Compromise Game between mixed and unisex 
pairings ( = 4.0287, p < 0.05) with mixed gender pairings choosing this strategy significantly 
less often than unisex pairings (34% for Unisex and 15.909% for Mixed) 
With regard to hawkishness, again the Medium Compromise Game shows p-values just 
outside the standard threshold of significance level ( = 1.7106, p = 0.191). We have weak 
evidence that mixed gender couples are being hawkish “too” frequently (24% for unisex and 
36.364% for mixed gender in the Medium Compromise Game) to allow coordination with this 
strategy in these games (combined with not enough subjects being dovish to allow coordination 
on a hawkish strategy for mixed gender pairings) thus leading to lower expected payoffs. So it 
seems the largest differences in unisex and mixed gender expected payoffs (as in the Medium 
Compromise Game) are driven mainly by a difference in the number of subjects choosing a 
hawkish strategy, with mixed gender parings doing so too often to allow coordination with 
someone on a dovish strategy. Maybe there is some Schelling salience at work here: Subjects 
                                                 
24Using a chi-squared test to test for differences between each of the ECRs in each of the games I find the 
following p-values which suggest the differences in ECRs between games are (as anticipated) non-significant. 
 
 Pairing Type 
Game 
Comparison 
Mixed Unisex 
p Value p Value 
High-Medium 0.971879 0.941452 
Medium-Low 0.943774 0.937109 
High-Low 0.970219 0.991811 
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are aware they are different in gender and thus pick a strategy of choosing something that will 
lead to different outcome in payoffs (i.e. the asymmetric payoffs of (20, 30)). However the 
salience of labels is failing them. 
Now we will look further into why mixed gender pairings are less successful to see if 
the result is driven by males or females in these pairings: 
 
Table 6.3.4. Difference between MF and FM subjects’ expected payoffs (GL treatment) 
 
High  
Compromise 
Medium  
Compromise 
Low  
Compromise 
Difference % 
(MF-FM)  
5.247%  20%  17.13% 
 
In the High Compromise Game, Medium Compromise Game and Low Compromise Game 
lower expected payoffs for mixed gender pairings seem to be driven by FM pairings who 
consistently achieve lower expected payoffs than MF pairings. MF subjects are actually the most 
successful (of all 4 pairing subgroups MM, FF, FM and MF subjects) in the Medium 
Compromise Game and Low Compromise Game and 2nd most successful in the High 
Compromise Game with regard to total coordination. Given this result we will now consider if 
individual behavioural differences can be used to explain changes in expected payoffs and 
expected coordination rates amongst MF and FM pairings. From looking at the proportions in 
table 6.3.5 below it seems the lower expected payoffs for FM subjects might be due to MF 
subjects being more hawkish and FM subjects being more dovish. Where the differences in 
payoffs are small (High Compromise Game) it seems that subjects are choosing an equitable 
outcome. Where FM are scoring much lower than MF subjects it seems it's because FM subjects 
are using the dovish strategy a lot (4.545% for MF subjects and 27.273% for FM subjects - a 
22.727% difference in the Medium Compromise Game and 31.818% for MF subjects and 
45.455% for FM subjects - a 13.636% difference in the Low Compromise Game). This 
difference is only 9.091% in the High Compromise game. 
 
Table 6.3.5. MF and FM strategy choices in labelled treatment  
 
High  
Compromise  
Medium  
Compromise  
Low  
Compromise 
MF  27.273, 22.727, 50  45.455, 4.545, 50 59. 59.091, 31.818, 9.091 
FM  22.727, 31.818, 45.455  27.273, 27.273, 45.455  36.364, 45.455, 18.182 
NB: Reported as % of all subjects choosing each strategy - Results are presented as Hawkish(%), Dovish(%), Compromise(%) 
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Overall there is no significant difference in strategies (Dovish, Hawkish and Compromise) 
between FM and MF pairings apart from in the Medium Compromise Game ( = 4.6190, p = 
0.099). FM subjects are also consistently more dovish over all games as compared to MF 
subjects. There is found to be a significant difference between a strategy of choosing a dovish 
strategy and not doing so in the Medium Compromise Game (Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.095) 
but not in the Low Compromise Game ( = 0.8627, p = 0.353) There is no significant difference 
in the High Compromise game. Also where FM pairings are achieving much lower expected 
payoffs than MF pairings it seems all that FM pairings are using the hawkish strategy a lot less 
(45.455% for MF subjects and 27.273% for FM subjects - a 18.182% difference in the Medium 
Compromise Game and 59.091% for MF subjects and 36.364% for FM - a 22.727% difference 
in the Low Compromise Game). This difference is only 4.545% in the High Compromise game. 
However no significant difference is found between incidences of choosing the hawkish strategy 
between MF subjects and FM subjects in all games. However in the Low Compromise Game 
the difference is very close to significant (  = 2.2774 p = 0.131). So in conclusion, where the 
gaps in mixed and unisex expected payoffs is the largest (The Medium Compromise Game) it 
is mainly driven by FM subjects being subject to receiving a dovish payoff. In the Low 
Compromise Game we have weak evidence that FM subjects’ payoffs are lower due to not 
receiving the hawkish payoff. 
Following this it is logical to see if mixed and unisex are affected differently by the 
addition of labels. From above we have shown that unisex pairings are better at using labels than 
mixed gender pairings (with regard to expected payoffs) and might expect that unisex pairings 
will see more advantage from the addition of labels than mixed: 
 
Table 6.3.6. The % difference in expected payoffs when gender labels are added 
 
High  
Compromise 
Medium  
Compromise 
Low  
Compromise 
Unisex  -0.332%  0.038%  3.373%  
Mixed  
Gender  
1.288%  -26.414%  -14.857%  
 
From table 6.3.6 above we can see that it is indeed unisex pairings who are more successful in 
using labels to increase expected payoffs (although the increase is minimal). Mixed gender 
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pairings lower total expected payoffs in the GL treatment are much more striking as compared 
to NGL treatments. It seems that people's expectations of each other’s behaviour are failing to 
serve them well in achieving higher payoffs. Perhaps the salience of gender labels when playing 
against someone of the opposite gender with regard to expected behaviour is failing and 
behavioural expectations are not aligned. It could also be true that subjects are unwilling and 
uncomfortable in using any gender stereotyped of norms of behaviour that they are aware of. 
However big reductions in ECRs (table 6.3.7 below) are only seen in the Low Compromise 
Game for mixed gender pairs. It may also thus be interesting to examine this difference by 
looking at differences in individual behaviour between treatments. 
 
Table 6.3.7. The % difference in ECRs when gender labels are added 
 
High  
Compromise 
Medium  
Compromise 
Low  
Compromise 
Unisex  -1.08%  7.609%  2.208% 
Mixed Gender  0.857%  0.669%  -12.14% 
 
With regard to mixed gender pairings, there is a significant difference in overall strategy choice 
between treatments (i.e. GL v. NGL) overall ( = 6.6103, p < 0.05) and also in the number of 
subjects choosing a dovish strategy (GL - 15.909%, NGL – 36.957%,  = 5.0944, p < 0.05) and 
the number of subjects choosing an equal split (GL – 47.727%, NGL – 26.087% ,  = 4.5351, 
p < 0.05) in the Medium Compromise Game only. No significance difference is found for 
hawkish behaviour. Since it is in the Medium Compromise Game that the largest fall in expected 
earnings is observed (26.414%) it may come as no surprise that significance is found here. 
Within the unisex parings we find no evidence of behavioural differences between treatments. 
 
H6: Own gender will effect behaviour 
 
Let us now also look at pure gender effects. As discussed above these are the effects that 
own gender has on behaviour when information about a co-participant’s gender is not present. 
We test if there are differences in the frequency of using all strategies, and if incidences of 
choosing the dovish, hawkish or equal split/ compromise strategy are different between genders. 
We find no significant differences in male and female behaviour between genders. We thus 
conclude that there are no pure gender effects in this game. Results obtained must therefore 
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relate either to people expectations of others with regards to gender related behaviour or a 
combination of 'pure' gender effects and expectations of 'pure' gender effects.  
To complete our analysis we now also consider the MSNEs we calculated above to see 
if they are able to predict behaviour in our games. We would expect subjects to be more likely 
to exhibit behaviour similar to that described by the MSNE when no gender information is 
present compared to when there is, due to subjects potentially having no focal PSNE to focus 
on in the absence of subject labels.  P-values from each chi-squared test used to test for 
significant differences between each of the MSNEs and the observed behaviour is reported 
below with p-values greater than 0.05 highlighted in grey, indicating statistically similarity with 
the MSNE. An abbreviation for each of the MSNE calculated in the theoretical section above is 
provided at the top of the table with an explanation for each in the footnote below the table. 
These abbreviations will be used throughout the thesis to describe each of the MSNE. 
A number of MSNE seem to predict behaviour. It is interesting to note that the MSNE 
where subjects mix between all three strategy options appears to describe behaviour in the High 
Compromise game whether gender information is present or not. However, when gender 
information is present this MSNE also appears to describe behaviour in the Medium 
Compromise game. Observing the data between the GL and NGL treatments we note that this 
result holds because the compromise option remains more popular in the Medium Compromise 
game when gender information is present compared to when it is not. Without gender labels we 
note that use of the compromise option drops off much quicker meaning that the “MSNE All” 
no longer describes behaviour in the game. We also note that, presumably due to the focality 
and high use of the equal outcome, this MSNE does not describe behaviour in the Equal Split 
Game in either treatment. This supports previous finding, reported above, that an efficient equal 
spilt is often chosen by subjects if available. Also interesting is that in the Low Compromise 
Game, in both the GL and NGL treatments, the MSNE where subjects mix between dovish and 
hawkish appears to reflect observed behaviour. Therefore we could conjecture that in this game, 
where use of the compromise is largely abandoned by subjects, subjects who choose the hawkish 
and dovish options begin to mix between the two options. We can make this interpretation if we 
interpret an MSNE as a method of behaviour subjects use, in situations where no other 
information is available to them on which equilibrium is focal on via the methods discussed 
above. 
 
  
  
64 
 
Table 6.3.8. p-values for comparisons to MSNEs (GL) 
Actual (Males) MSNE All
25 MSNE DH26 MSNE HE P127 MSNE DE P2 
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.73 0.00 0.38 0.05 
Medium Compromise 0.84 0.01 0.77 0.08 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 
Actual (Females)     
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.09 0.00 0.99 0.41 
Medium Compromise 0.28 0.01 0.62 0.08 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 
Actual (All Subjects)     
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.37 0.00 0.19 0.04 
Medium Compromise 0.37 0.00 0.73 0.01 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Actual (Male Partnered)     
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.99 0.01 0.59 0.09 
Medium Compromise 0.10 0.00 0.54 0.07 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00 
Actual (Female Partnered)     
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.18 0.00 0.60 0.35 
Medium Compromise 0.71 0.01 0.73 0.05 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00 
Actual (Unisex)     
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.55 0.00 0.59 0.12 
Medium Compromise 0.05 0.00 0.54 0.04 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.00 
Actual (Mixed)     
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.47 0.00 0.60 0.24 
Medium Compromise 0.60 0.01 0.73 0.05 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 
 
  
                                                 
25 MSNE where subjects mix between all three strategy options 
26 MSNE where subjects mix between the dovish and hawkish strategy options 
27 These 2 columns represent the MSNE where one player mixes between hawkish and equal with the expectation 
that the other player mixes between dovish and equal (and vice versa) 
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Table 6.3.9. p-values for comparisons to MSNEs (NGL) 
Actual (Males) MSNE All MSNE DH MSNE HE P1 MSNE DE P2 
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.16 0.00 0.07 0.43 
Medium Compromise 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 
Actual (Females)     
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
High Compromise 0.84 0.01 0.43 0.12 
Medium Compromise 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 
Actual (All Subjects)     
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.33 0.00 0.04 0.07 
Medium Compromise 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Actual (Male Partnered)    
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.47 0.00 0.17 0.29 
Medium Compromise 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.02 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 
Actual (Female Partnered)    
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.68 0.01 0.23 0.23 
Medium Compromise 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 
Actual (Unisex)     
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.21 0.00 0.09 0.50 
Medium Compromise 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 
Actual (Mixed)     
Equal Split 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High Compromise 0.89 0.01 0.31 0.12 
Medium Compromise 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 
Low Compromise 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 
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7. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
In this paper I have reported an experiment which combined elements of gender information 
and efficiency. I used several adaptions of the battle of sexes game in order to examine aspects 
and interactions of gender related behaviour and game structure. I hope that this experiment has 
provided some interesting insights into the different ways that gender can affect how we interact. 
As such I am able to find evidence that strategy choice in the games is sometimes affected by 
the gender of a co-participant. Additionally I find that unisex pairings receive higher expected 
earnings than pairings where the co-participant is of the opposite gender. It is largely female 
unisex pairings who are driving the higher expected payoffs in unisex pairings as compared to 
mixed gender pairings earnings. Similarly only unisex pairings are successful in achieving 
higher expected payoffs in labelled as opposed to the unlabelled treatments. The fact that unisex 
groups were able to achieve higher payoffs than mixed gender groups may also suggest that 
gender composition of groups could be an important factor in other experiments of this nature.  
Contrary to Holm (2000) I am not able to establish a consistent pattern of more hawkish 
behaviour towards a particular gender. We find significant increases in the use of the 
compromise option between treatments (higher use in the labelled treatment for all subjects, MF 
subjects, those with a female co-participant and mixed gender pairings in the Medium 
Compromise Game) when in the treatment with gender labels.  
The property of equality does not keep people from increasingly abandoning this 
strategy as its efficiency decreases. The attractiveness of an equitable over an efficient option is 
questioned by this result.   
These results could be important in the bargaining and negotiation literature since they 
suggest that group composition could be relevant to outcomes and choice. I hope also that this 
experiment has provided some interesting insights at the intersection between gender, efficiency 
and equality and serves as motivation for future work. 
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“WOMEN HAVE SERVED ALL THESE CENTURIES 
AS LOOKING GLASSES POSSESSING THE MAGIC 
AND DELICIOUS POWER OF REFLECTING THE 
FIGURE OF MAN AT TWICE ITS NATURAL SIZE.”                                                                                                                
 
  ― Virginia Woolf, A Room of One's Own 
 
1. Introduction and motivations 
 
The ability to coordinate behaviour is a crucial element of economic life. As such, and inherent 
in coordination, our behaviour is not only governed by our own desires but also by our beliefs 
in how others will behave (Geanakoplos et al., 1989)28. Our ability to coordinate with, for 
example, colleagues or employees may be decisive in achieving successful or desirable 
outcomes and mis-coordination (i.e. our beliefs not being met) may lead us to want to take 
retalitative action which could have negative economic effects.  This will occur if coordination 
failure (and thus reduced payoffs for both parties) itself is not in itself viewed as sufficient 
“punishment” leading a person to want to further punish. We therefore combine aspects of 
coordination including (1) options, (2) gender identity and (3) retaliation in a laboratory 
experiment in order to examine this further. 
In day-to-day life coordination attempts can come at both a reward and cost. With regard to 
loss, we can experience coordination failure which makes us angry and induces us to punish the 
person we feel contributed to this coordination failure.  
We also see application for our research in the area of peer-reviewed promotion. In this 
practice the opportunity to “punish” a colleague for not coordinating their actions with yours is 
high. Negative feedback supplied to a promotion panel could be seen as an opportunity to inflict 
negative consequences on a colleague who you feel has “wronged” you by not aligning their 
behaviour with your own. Also in politics and business coordination behaviours, own gender 
and the gender of others may affect how people behave with regard to punishment behaviours.  
We use experimental methods to investigate these issues. The experiment which forms the 
basis of this paper places itself at the intersection of two substantial areas of literature, yet 
unexplored by itself. The experiment aims to join the growing experimental and behavioural 
literature relating to the effects of own gender and the gender of others on behaviour, with the 
literature on the effects of punishment on behaviour. Combining these two literatures is 
                                                 
28 Geanakoplos et al., 1989 actually go as far to say that payoffs in the game are actually dependent on beliefs. 
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interesting and relevant on a number of levels: First, it is interesting to see if punishment can be 
used as an instrument to induce coordination in a pure coordination game with no cost and free 
riding incentive (whereas the literature mostly uses public good or group coordination, e.g., 
contest games29, here we use a battle of the sexes game). Second, and relating to the gender 
aspects of this paper as mentioned in the introduction, it is of interest to examine if males or 
females take the threat of punishment as a 'coordination cue' more seriously with costless 
coordination and with no free-riding opportunity, i.e., if any social norms that may exist, and 
may aid coordination, are complied with more strongly by males or females under the threat of 
punishment. Relating to this point we also wish to examine if males or females are more 
vindictive or malicious in a pure coordination game with regard to their willingness to punish 
for certain types of behaviour. Finally, we wish to examine if revealing information about a co-
participant’s gender has an effect on both coordination and punishment behaviours.  
 
2. Related Literature 
 
We will now examine the previous literature in the areas which relate to this research and the 
areas which we feel this piece of research contributes to. 
 
2.1. Punishment 
 
…[] if a person leaves an exchange in which he was treated unkindly, then 
his unhappiness at being so treated should be a consideration in evaluating 
the efficiency of that exchange. 
(Rabin, 1993, p.1283) 
 
Punishment and sanctions are common place in everyday economic life. They are often used 
in disputes when others are seen to break accepted behavioural or social norms but can also be 
antisocial in nature (see, for example, Herrmann et al., 2008). Additionally, in everyday life 
punishment can take a formal form but can also include informal forms such as peer pressure, 
gossip or social ostracism (Masclet et al., 2003, p.366).  
                                                 
29 See for example: Fehr & Gächter (2000), Masclet et al. (2003), Sefton et al. (2007), Nikiforakis (2008), Abbink 
et al. (2010) 
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Previous experiments looking at the effects of punishment, incorporate a huge body of work 
of which we will look at a selection here. Whilst punishment has been studied extensively in the 
literature, the combination of coordination and punishment is one of the novelties of our 
experiment. Pervious experiments have tended to use games in which free riding was a 
possibility (for example public good or contest games e.g. Fehr & Gächter, 2000, Abbink et al., 
2010), however in our pure coordination games free riding is not possible. The pioneering work 
in this area of literature is by Fehr & Gächter (2000). They find that, in a public goods game, 
the addition of the ability to punish leads to contributions to the public goods remaining between 
50% and 90% whilst in the treatments without punishment contributions are seen to converge 
to lower percentages. A similar result is found in related experiments run by Masclet et al. (2003), 
Sefton et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis (2008). In contrast, in a group contest with public good 
prizes Abbink et al. (2010) find that allowing subjects to punish leads to a lowering of efficiency 
due to the expenditures used to punish other subjects lowering overall earnings in the experiment. 
Ostrom et al. (1992) also find that, in a public good investment type game, financial investment 
gains (by increasing contribution rates) gained via inflicting punishment are undermined by the 
costs of punishment. Furthermore, Fehr & Fischbacher (2004) find that a third party, unaffected 
by the outcome of a game, was prepared to punish norm breaking behaviour at their own cost 
and thus conclude that norm perceptions play an important role in punishment behaviour. With 
regard to gender effects, Brañas-Garza & Ottone (2009) find that the threat of punishment makes 
females increase transfers in a dictator game whilst this threat has the opposite effect on males. 
The existence and implementation of a punishment technology is clearly a powerful tool in 
effecting behavioural change. In Eckel & Grossman (1996) they found that the relative price of 
punishment has different effects on males and females. They find that females punish more 
when the relative costs of doing so are lower and males are not affected by relative costs. As 
previously mentioned, the literature looking at punishment in games without a free-riding option 
is limited. However, one example is the work of Dreber et al. (2008) in which they use a 
prisoner’s dilemma game with the possibility of costly punishment in a repeated game with 
partner matching. They find that those who receive a higher payoff in the game are not likely to 
punish a co-participant.  They conclude that punishment is maladaptive in cooperation games 
(p. 348).  
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2.2. Player labels and gender effects 
 
There have been a wide selection of experiments in which some form of information about 
a co-participant (player labels) is given to a participant. The nature of information provided 
about a co-participant in the experimental literature has been wide and, as such, the literature on 
player labels has provided a rich and interesting selection of evidence on the effects of differing 
types of co-participant labelling in a controlled experimental setting. Labels include social status 
(De Kwaadsteniet & Van Dijk, 2010, von Essen & Ranehill, 2011, Ball et al., 200130), race 
(Benjamin et al., 2010), nationality (Bogach & Leibbrandt, 201131, Ahmed, 201032), surname 
(Charness & Gneezy, 2008), ethnicity (Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001, Chen et al., 201433) and 
gender (Sonsino & Sirota, 2003, Kahn et al., 1971, Holm, 2000, Dufwenberg & Muren, 2006, 
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965, Mack et al., 1971, Sutter et al., 2009).  
As described in the introduction, this study will more specifically look at how gender 
information and own gender is used in coordination situations and if this information or attribute 
can be applied to make certain outcomes, actions or equilibria more salient. A review of the 
literature in this area is also provided in chapter one of this thesis but we will provide a version 
here too.   
The prisoner’s dilemma game has been commonly used to investigate the interaction 
between gender and coordination. Whilst van Huyck & Battalio (2002) and Orbell et al. (1994) 
observe no gender differences in behaviour in the game, Kahn et al. (1971) find that men are 
more cooperative. They also find that females were more susceptible to changing their 
behaviour dependent on the gender of a co-participant.  Mack et al. (1971) find that both males 
and females are more cooperative when faced with a co-participant of the same gender and 
overall males are more cooperative than females in a prisoner’s dilemma game. Charness & 
Rustichini (2011), in a similar game, observe that, under observation by a third party males are 
less cooperative and females are more cooperative. In a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, 
Rapoport & Chammah (1965), find that women are significantly less cooperative than male 
                                                 
30 von Essen & Ranehill (2011) use surnames to communicate social status. 
31 Information on age, current degree level, eye colour and hair colour is not observed to effect behaviour. 
32 Ahmed (2010) observes discriminatory behaviour towards people with foreign surnames (as opposed to 
Swedish where the experiment was run) by subjects with Swedish surnames. 
33 Chen et al. (2014) also prime on a common organisation  of subjects (in this case the university which they all 
attended) 
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counterparts when playing against a male. However, when males played against females this 
difference vanished.   
A number of other games have also been used to investigate gender effects. For example 
Chen et al. (2013) find that women bid more and earn less than men in a first-price auction.  
Castillo & Cross (2008) compare findings in ultimatum and dictator games and find that in the 
dictator game men are more altruistic than women but that no difference in gender related 
behaviour is observed in the ultimatum game. Sutter et al. (2009) find no pure gender effects in 
a “power-to-take game” but find that  single sex pairings are more competitive and retalitative 
(leading to a decrease in efficiency) than their mixed gender pairing counterparts. In Gneezy et 
al. (2009) males in a patriarchal society are found to be more competitive than females whereas 
the opposite is true in a matriarchal society. Gneezy et al. (2003) observe greater productivity 
amongst men in a competitive environment (in contrast to a piece rate environment) but not for 
women.  
 
2.3. Repeated coordination games  
 
The issue of behaviour in repeated coordination games and the examination of dynamic 
decision making is not one that has received much attention in the experimental economics 
literature. In this experiment subjects were asked to play the same coordination game five times 
in which subjects received feedback after each game and thus we might also expect some 
correlation in behaviours over periods. Although subjects played a different subject each time 
(and were aware of this), in our experiment subjects do remain paired with the same gender 
throughout. If we can observe convergence patterns in behaviours we might therefore assume 
that the effects of gender are stronger as they persist even with a change of co-participant. We 
are unable to find any similar literature or experimental results which look at repeated 
coordination games with random stranger matching and feedback between games (the studies 
described below describe experiments in which subjects were in fixed pairs) and so the data we 
have provided here gives some interesting insights. We will examine this is more detail 
empirically in the results section and will initially describe previous studies here.  
In Sonsino & Sirota (2003) almost half of subject pairs (which were always mixed gender 
and with gender based player labels) playing a repeated modified battle of the sexes34 game 
                                                 
34 Payoffs were (95, 168), (30, 30), (30, 30), (198, 99) 
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converge to a strategy of alternating between strategies over a number of rounds. A large 
proportion of subjects however also converge on a fixed strategy of choosing the same strategy 
repeatedly. With anonymous stranger matching females, more often than males, end up 
converging to an equilibrium which is their preferred (higher) outcome in the battle of the sexes 
game after a number of rounds35. Cooper et al. (1990) examine experimentally if, when multiple 
equilibria are present, some equilibria become more “natural” as a coordination outcome and 
find that a Pareto dominated outcome is often chosen. Arifovic et al. (2011) run 40 repeated 
rounds of the battle of the sexes game with fixed pairs and find that behaviour in this game often 
reaches an equilibrium in which subjects are alternating between strategies with a partner (thus 
leading to average equal monetary outcomes at the end of the experiment36) or settling on one 
Nash equilibrium. 
The rest of this paper will be structured in the following way. In section three we present a 
novel experimental design which provides insights into the effects of gender information about 
a co-participant, coordination behaviour and punishment behaviour, in section four we present 
the results of the experiment and in section five we present a final discussion.  
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
The treatment variables used in this experiment were punishment, compromise and gender 
information. All three of these elements are explained and examined in the sections which 
follow. 
 
3.1. Gender revelation process 
 
As described in chapter one, Holm (2000) runs battle of the sexes games and uses two 
methods to make the gender of a co-participant salient to subjects. In one he merely wrote “male 
student” or “female student” on a subject’s experimental instructions to indicate the gender of a 
co-participant. In another he used gender specific fake names to indicate gender. The issue of 
how to introduce gender information to subjects in this experiment is one which requires much 
care in achieving a sensible balance between making the gender of a co-participant salient to 
                                                 
35 They also run treatments in which subjects are introduced to each other face to face before they had any 
knowledge of the experiment) before the experiment and do not observe this effect here. 
36 All games were paid out at the end of the experiment. 
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subjects without inducing demand possible effects (See for example Zizzo, 2010). As in Datta 
Gupta et al. (2013) and Holm (2000) we use fake names to introduce a co-participant’s gender 
to a subject. We also tell subjects that fake names relate to actual gender: In Datta Gupta et al. 
(2013) in particular, the importance of telling subjects that fake names are indicative of a 
subject’s gender is examined and it is concluded that this is important in order to ensure that 
subjects make the connection between a fake name and gender identity. In practice, subjects 
were given a list of five names37 at the beginning of the experiment (one for each period) and 
instructed to enter the fake name in the box on their screen when prompted.  This is shown in 
the screen shoot from the experiment below: 
                                                 
37 Names used were the same as those used in the chapter one 
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Figure 3.1.1. The welcome screen 
Figure 3.1.2. Game presentation in the experiment 
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3.2. Punishment technology 
 
Subjects could engage in costly punishment after seeing the results of the coordination game 
but were aware that punishment would be available from the start of the experiment. Punishment 
was costly, an experimental method which was chosen for three reasons: The first is that this 
practice is common place in economic experiments involving punishment (such as those 
described above) and the second was in ensure that punishment decisions were based on a 
preference to do so and not due to subjects potential pure egotism (see Carpenter, 2006, for 
further discussion38). Third, Rabin (1993) develops a model in which people are willing to make 
financial sacrifices in order to inflict punishment on others. Subjects were given three 
punishment options:  
 
1. To not punish 
2. To take 10 points off their co-participant at a cost of 2 points to themselves  
3. To take 50 points off their co-participant at a cost of 10 points to themselves39.  
 
The lower punishment level will be referred to as a “Slap on the Wrist” and the higher as “Full 
Monty40” in this paper41. Figuratively a “Slap on the Wrist” means to receive a light punishment 
(for doing something wrong). We use the term since this level of punishment was designed to 
allow subjects to send a minimal signal of punishment without being too harsh. Similarly, “Full 
Monty” means ‘everything which is necessary, appropriate, or possible’ and we use it since the 
level of punishment was high in comparison with possible earnings. These punishment options 
were listed for participants after they had seen the outcome of the game and the order in which 
the three options were presented was randomised. Subjects were aware that this punishment 
stage would be presented to them after the results of the game had been revealed from the 
beginning of the experiment. After all subjects had completed the punishment stage subjects 
                                                 
38 They state that when punishment is costless “there are equilibria in which strictly egoistic players punish 
alongside those with preferences to punish” (Carpenter, 2006, p. 524) 
39 We decided on a cost of punishment at a level of 5:1 since this seemed like a viable “cost-punishment 
inflicted” ratio to be viable to subjects and to make them consider it seriously. The literature standard is 3:1. See 
Carpenter, 2006 and Rabin, 1993 for a further discussion of how decreasing the costs of punishment (i.e. 
increasing this ratio) leads to greater punishment levels. 
40 Definition taken from the online version of the Oxford English Dictionary 
(http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/253885). This is a commonly used phrase in British English slang. 
41 This terminology was not used in the experiment. 
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were informed if their co-participant had punished them and of their total earnings for that 
period.  
 
 
Figure 3.2.1. The results screen with punishment decision screen 
 
3.3. The Games, Compromise Option and Theoretical Considerations 
 
We use two variants of the battle of the sexes game42. There are a number of forms of this game 
but in the most common form the game is often used to describe the tension between a couple 
who have different preferences and thus payoffs from attending different events. However both 
achieve higher payoffs from attending an event together rather than attending a preferred event 
on their own. Going to one’s own preferred event is described as hawkish behaviour, whereas 
going to a partner’s preferred event is described as dovish behaviour. In our game subjects are 
presented with a simple list of ways in which amounts could be divided between them in which 
one subject will receive more than their co-participant if coordination occurs. The difficulties in 
achieving coordination in this game are evident. However if information on gender conveys 
ideas about who “should” choose the higher or lower amount, one would expect that mixed 
gender couples will achieve higher payoffs than pairings without gender information and unisex 
                                                 
42 Luce & Raiffa (1957) provide an example of this type of asymmetric payoffs matrix. 
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pairings with gender information since knowing the gender of a co-participant is different to 
one’s own may make one asymmetric equilibrium focal . Our second game is an adapted version 
of the game (battle of the sexes game with compromise) in which we add an inefficient equitable 
split to the options available to subjects. In this case subjects do have the opportunity to resolve 
the issue of inequality in payoffs but at the sacrifice of total earnings. Charness & Rabin (2002) 
find that “inequality reduction is not a good explanation of Pareto damaging behaviour” 
(Charness & Rabin, 2002, p.819) and it will be interesting to see if we observe similar results 
here as subjects are forced to take on a Pareto dominated outcome if they coordinate on an 
equitable outcome. 
 The battle of the sexes game takes the following form: 
Table 3.3.1. Battle of the Sexes Game 
  Player 2 
  
Hawkish 
(𝛽) 
Dovish       
(1 − 𝛽) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(𝛼) 
(0, 0) (30, 20) 
Dovish  
(1 − 𝛼) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) 
 
In this game there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria – when subjects coordinate on 
choosing {Hawkish, Dovish} or {Dovish, Hawkish}. To find possible non-degenerate mixed 
strategy equilibria, consider Player 1 to choose Hawkish with probability 𝛼 and Player 2 to 
choose Hawkish with probability 𝛽43. Following the standard solution procedure, we get α∗ =
β∗ =  
3
5
 . It is shown in the appendix that the payoff from playing the mixed strategy equilibrium 
is 12 which is lower than either of the payoffs which could be achieved via coordination where 
the lowest possible payoff from coordination is 20. 
We now complete the same analysis with our second game, the battle of the sexes game with 
a compromise option, a battle of the sexes game with the addition of an equal yet inefficient 
split of money: 
 
                                                 
43 Additionally since subjects in the treatments without gender information have no contextual information in the 
game we would anticipate that these subjects would receive lower earnings than their counterparts in a treatment 
with common gender information since without contextual information the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium will 
be played. (See for example Mehta et al., 1994, Schelling, 1960) 
  
79 
 
Table 3.3.2. Battle of the Sexes with a Compromise Option 
   Player 2  
  
Hawkish 
(2) 
Dovish 
(
2
) 
Compromise 
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (30, 20) (0, 0) 
Player 1 
Dovish  
(
1
) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Compromise  
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (15, 15) 
 
This game has three pure strategy Nash equilibria, when subjects coordinate on either 
{Hawkish, Dovish}, {Dovish, Hawkish} or {Compromise, Compromise}. To calculate the 
possible non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium consider Player i (i = 1, 2) to choose 
Hawkish with probability 𝑖  and Dovish with probability 𝑖. Following the standard procedure 
we find the equilibrium strategies for player 1 as: α1
∗ =
1
3
  and 
1
∗ =  
2
9
. Similarly, the equilibrium 
strategy for player 2 is: α2
∗ =
1
3
  and 
2
∗ =
2
9
. Expected payoffs from the game are 6
2
3
 points for 
each player. Finally, there exists an MSNE where player 1 mixes between a strategy of choosing 
hawkish and compromise and player 2 mixes between dovish and compromise (and vice versa) 
as shown in the table below.  
 
Table 3.3.3. Battle of the Sexes with a Compromise Option (Alternative MSNE) 
  Player 2 
  
Dovish 
(2 ) 
Compromise 
(1 − 2 ) 
Player 1 
Hawkish 
(1 ) 
(30, 20) (0, 0) 
Compromise 
(1 − 1 ) 
(0, 0) (15, 15) 
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In this case for player 1:  α1
∗ =
3
7
 and (1 − 1 ) = 
4
7
 and for player 2:  α2
∗ =
1
3
 and (1 − 1 ) = 
2
3
.  The expected payoff from playing the MSNE is 10 for player 1 and 8
12
21
  for player 2. All the 
calculations are included in the appendix. 
In addition it is possible that gender serves as a signal to induce correlated equilibrium. In a 
correlated equilibrium players receive a signal about which equilibrium to coordinate on. After 
receiving this signal they have no motivation to deviate from this strategy since deviation would 
lead to a lower payoff than if they had not deviated. Gender could be such a signal if it offers 
conventions about which party should receive more. For example in an MF partnership there 
could be a convention that the male should receive the higher amount. Regardless of if one or 
both players believe that this is “right” they know that if they adhere to this convention both 
parties will end up with more since mis-coordination leads to zero payoffs. However, 
considering correlated equilibria does not add anything to the set of Nash equilibria. 
 We also believe it is relevant and interesting to consider aspect of theories of inequality 
aversion in this context. In Fehr & Schmidt (1999) peoples’ perceptions of fairness are based on 
the notion of an equitable outcome (p.820). Therefore if subjects are inequality adverse we 
would expect to see high use of the equitable outcome. They also model what they term as “self-
centred inequality aversion” as a form of inequality aversion where subjects …are willing to 
give up some material payoff to move in the direction of more equitable outcomes (p.819).  We 
may therefore have further motivation to believe that costly punishment will be seen by subjects 
as a way in which to reduce inequality if it occurs. However due to coordination nature of the 
game, if an inequitable coordination outcome is achieved, the subject themselves must have 
made an inequitable (hawkish or dovish) strategy choice. In this case it would seem unlikely 
that following this decision, the decision to punish in order to “even up” inequitable payoffs 
would be made, unless subjects view punishment as a “tool” to even out outcomes before the 
game is even played – i.e. perhaps due to knowledge of certain social norms regarding 
expectations of who will choose hawkish or dovish (as discussed above) they play these options 
despite a “distaste” for the potential inequitable outcome but do so in order to aid coordination. 
However on achieving coordination punishment could be used as a “tool” to bring payoffs into 
a more equitable form.  
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3.4. Treatments and treatment labelling 
 
The following notation will be used to denote treatments type: (N)G denotes if subjects did 
(not) receive gender information on a co-participant. (N)P denotes if subjects did (not) received 
access to a punishment technology. (N)C denotes if subjects had the option to pick an inefficient 
but equal split. Therefore: 
 
Table 3.4.1. Treatment Variables  
 Present Not Present 
Punishment P NP 
Gender information G NG 
Compromise option C NC 
 
We thus label our treatments as follows in treatments with and without the inefficient but equal 
split (compromise): 
 
Table 3.4.2. Treatment Table (without compromise) 
 Punishment No Punishment 
Gender Information G-P-NC G-NP-NC 
No Gender Information NG-P-NC NG-NP-NC 
 
Table 3.4.3. Treatment Table (with compromise) 
 Punishment No Punishment 
Gender Information G-P-C G-NP-C 
No Gender Information NG-P-C NG-NP-C 
 
The experiment therefore employs a 2x2x2 factorial design. In this way we can investigate 
first if there are social norms relating to gender that allow subjects to coordinate more effectively 
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on a certain distribution, with or without the ability to punish, but also if certain actions result 
in greater punishment and sanctions. We also investigate if punishment is successful in 
converging male and female behaviour to any kind of social norm. It also allows us to investigate 
if game form is important in behavioural patterns. 
 
3.5. Treatment Comparisons 
 
The following treatment effects can easily be observed:  
 
Effects of gender information (G-NP-NC v. NG-NP-NC, G-NP-C v. NG-NP-C): In the G-
NP treatments subjects play the relevant game with gender information whilst in the NG-NP 
treatment the gender information is removed but the same game is played. A comparison of 
these two treatments thus provides us with a clean measure of the effects of gender information. 
Effects of gender information with punishment (G-P-NC v. NG-P-NC, G-P-C v. 
NG-P-C): These treatment comparisons provide us with similar measures as above but 
in the presence of the punishment technology. 
 
Effects of punishment (NG-P-NC v. NG-NP-NC, NG-P-C v. NG-NP-C): In the NG-NP 
treatment subjects play the game without the punishment technology present. In the NG-P 
treatment subjects play the same game but can punish a co-participant after seeing the results of 
the game. A comparison of these two treatments thus provides us with a clean measure of the 
effects of punishment. 
Effects of punishment (G-P-NC v. G-NP-NC, G-P-C v. G-NP-C): These treatment 
comparisons provide us with similar measures as above but in the presence of the gender 
information. 
 
Effects of the compromise option (-C suffixed games v. -NC suffixed games): In the -NC 
suffixed games subjects play a standard battle of the sexes game sometimes with the addition of 
the punishment technology and/or gender information. In the -C suffixed games subjects play 
the same games with the additional option of compromise. A comparison of these two treatments 
thus provides us with a clean measure of the effects of the compromise option. 
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3.6. Experimental Procedures and Practicalities 
 
The experiment was run in a lab provided by the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental 
Social Science (CBESS) based on the UEA campus. The laboratory has 20 computer terminals, 
separated by a modular partitioning system. Through the CBESS experimental subject pool, 
which includes over 1500 registered participants from diverse demographic backgrounds and 
nationalities, we were able to recruit via the “Online Recruitment System for Economic 
Experiments - ORSEE” (Greiner, 2004).  
Once recruited, subjects were told where and when to attend a session. Subjects entered the 
lab and were assigned to a seat. Subjects were able to read a set of paper instructions on their 
desk. The instructions were also read aloud to ensure that subjects had a thorough understanding 
of the experimental procedure. After the instructions were read aloud subjects were asked to 
complete a number of practice questions to ensure understanding. Subjects were told to raise 
their hands if they were unsure about anything.  
Throughout the experiment no communication between participants was permitted at any 
time and subjects were seated in individual partitioned booths to ensure privacy. Subjects had 
been made aware of the procedures of random stranger matching and random period selection 
for payment in the instructions and understanding of these crucial elements was assessed in the 
practice questions. Instructions can be seen in the appendix to this chapter. 
Subjects repeated the game five times using random stranger matching with feedback 
between periods. This meant that there was no opportunity to build reputation between pairs. 
Subjects played the game and made decisions separately and simultaneously and were then told 
the choice their co-participant had made and how this combined (with regards to earnings i.e. if 
they had coordinated with their co-participant) with their own choices. After seeing which 
strategy their co-participant had chosen, and consequently the outcome of the game, subjects 
were given the opportunity to punish their co-participant whilst also being aware that their co-
participant was currently making the same decision. Subjects could choose to not punish or 
could choose to inflict costly punishment on their co-participant. Again subjects made this 
decision simultaneously and were only informed of their co-participant’s decision after the 
decision had been made. In this way the decision to punish was based purely on own perceptions 
of behaviour rather than as retaliation for a co-participant punishing. The random stranger 
matching procedure also ensured that retaliation for punishment could not be inflicted on a co-
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participant in a later period. After seeing the punishment decision subjects moved onto the next 
period with a new co-participant. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
 
We investigate the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: (Punishment) Punishment will affect behaviour.  
 
We saw in the punishment literature above that the presence of punishment can affect behaviour. 
We thus hypothesise that it will also affect behaviour here. However, more specifically we 
investigate the following punishment based sub hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: (Punishment and coordination) Coordination will decrease 
punishment activity. 
 
Due to the nature of the coordination game, successful coordination would suggest 
that a co-participant had acted in a way that had been expected or was seen as 
acceptable by a co-participant. Thus we would expect successful coordination to 
decrease punishment. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: (Own Gender and Punishment) Own gender will affect 
punishment rates. 
 
It has often been found in the biological and anthropological literature that males 
behave in a more aggressive and dominant way than females. For example Darwin 
describes females as more coy in their decision making whilst Tiger (2005) suggest 
that males are more dominant than females. However we have no direct evidence to 
support differing punishment behaviour in either direction with regard to gender. 
We therefore use hypothesis 1b. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: (Punishment and Choices) The addition of punishment will effect 
individual choice behaviour in the game.  
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In the past literature it has been found that punishment can have significant effects 
of behaviour (particularly in situation where a free-riding opportunity exists) as 
described in the literature section above. We would therefore expect behaviour to 
differ between comparable treatments with and without punishment. It should be 
noted that whilst the two sub-hypotheses above relate to actual punishment, this 
hypothesis relates to potential punishment or the threat of punishment. 
 
Hypothesis 2: (Effects of Gender Information on choices)  
 
Hypothesis 2a: (Gender information and punishment rates) Gender information 
will affect punishment rates 
 
Hypothesis 2b: (Gender information and choices) Gender information will affect 
choices made in the game 
 
As illustrated in the review of literature above, we have very mixed evidence about 
the effects of gender information on choices in coordination game from previous 
studies. We therefore propose hypothesis 2b. 
 
5. Results  
In this results section we provide what we consider to be the most insightful and 
interesting results from the experiment. The experiment contains a large data set due to its 2x2x2 
factorial design and so we report the findings we found to be most relevant to this investigation 
here. Where relevant, when examining the treatments with gender information, we report data 
for all four gender pairing subgroups: MM - A male playing against a male, FF - A female 
playing against a female, FM - A female playing against a male, MF - A male playing against a 
female. The following key is used to represent pairing types: 
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Table 5.1(a).  Summary of Pairing Types 
MM male’s decision against a male 
→ Unisex Pairings 
FF female’s decision against a female 
FM female’s decision against a male 
→ Mixed Gender Pairings 
MF male’s decision against a female 
 
We obtained the following number of observations in each subject subgroup: 
 
Table 5.1(b). Number of observations per subject subgroup 
 
Treatments 
without gender information 
Treatments 
with gender information 
Treatment Males Females MM MF FF FM 
NG-NP-NC 30 30 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
NG-P-NC 30 30 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
G-P-NC n/a n/a 30 30 30 30 
G-NP-NC n/a n/a 30 30 30 30 
NG-NP-C 29 31 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
NG-P-C44 30 29 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
G-P-C n/a n/a 30 30 30 30 
G-NP-C n/a n/a 30 30 30 30 
 
We will now examine treatment effects in various directly measurable outcomes in the 
experiment and, where relevant, will examine within treatment effects between subject 
subgroups. Within this, we may also use a number of different subject subgroup comparisons in 
order to test the data and provide insights into behavioural patterns and these are explained in 
the table below. It should be noted that we may find significant effects in some of these 
comparisons for purely random reasons. A larger sample could be useful for future research in 
order to test for the robustness of these results. 
                                                 
44 One subject had to be excluded from the data in this treatment since they failed to complete the demographic 
questionnaire and as such we could not confirm if this subject was male or female which was essential to analysis 
in this experiment. 
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Table 5.2. Summary of subject comparisons 
Sub group 
analysed 
Purpose of analysis 
Males How males are affected by treatment variables 
Female How females are affected by treatment variables 
MM How males playing against males are affected by treatment variables 
FF  How females playing against females are affected by treatment variables 
FM  How females playing against males are affected by treatment variables 
MF  How males playing against females are affected by treatment variables 
Males v. 
Females 
How own gender effects behaviour 
MM v. MF How the gender of a co-participant affects male behaviour 
FF v. FM  How the gender of a co-participant affects female behaviour 
FF v. Females 
How a female knowing a co-participant is female affects behaviour 
compared to not knowing the gender of a co-participant 
FM v. Females 
How a female knowing a co-participant is male affects behaviour 
compared to not knowing the gender of a co-participant 
MM v. Males 
How a male knowing a co-participant is male affects behaviour 
compared to not knowing the gender of a co-participant 
MF v. Males 
How a male knowing a co-participant is female affects behaviour 
compared to not knowing the gender of a co-participant 
 
5.1. Period 1 Analysis Only (Independent Observations) 
 
Since subjects were given feedback between games we first look at results from period one 
in isolation in order to examine the purely independent outcomes in the games. We find a 
number of interesting results which we report below. We use the chi-squared test (or the Fisher’s 
exact test when observation numbers are low) when examining period one only since these 
observations can be deemed truly independent as subjects had previously received no feedback 
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on choices made by a co-participant.  It is also relevant and natural to look at individual choices 
in this experiment since choices are made in isolation from a co-participant and without 
communication. 
 
5.1.1. Individual Choices (Period 1 only) 
 
Let us first consider individual choices made by subjects. In order to provide a robustness 
check we first report results we find in period one of our experiment in treatment (G-NP-NC) 
in comparison to those found in Holm (2000). This comparison is relevant and interesting 
because in the G-NP-NC treatment we, as in Holm (2000), provide subjects with gender 
information about a co-participant, don’t allow punishment and use and battle of the sexes type 
game. Also Holm’s equivalent game was one shot and as such it is most relevant to consider 
only the first period of our experiment in this comparison.  
 
Table 5.1.1.1. Choices made in battle of sexes treatment with gender information (G-NP-NC) 
Pairing 
Our Experiment 
(Period 1 only) 
Holm 
(Name Labels)45 
Holm 
(Gender Labels)46 
Hawkish Dovish Hawkish Dovish Hawkish Dovish 
FF 
46.67% 
(14) 
53.33% 
(16) 
55.3% 
(21) 
44.7% 
(17) 
66.7% 
(22) 
33.3% 
(11) 
MF 
66.67% 
(20) 
33.33% 
(10) 
77.1% 
(37) 
22.9% 
(11) 
68.3% 
(28) 
31.7% 
(13) 
MM 
50% 
(15) 
50% 
(15) 
55.3% 
(21) 
44.7% 
(17) 
51.9% 
(28) 
48.1% 
(26) 
FM 
53.33% 
(16) 
46.67% 
(14) 
35.7% 
(10) 
64.3% 
(18) 
35.3% 
(6) 
64.7% 
(11) 
 
As reported in the table above, in both of Holm’s experiments (with name labels and 
with gender labels) the difference in hawkish behaviour between those with a male and female 
co-participant was large. In the treatment with gender labels this was significant at p = 0.016** 
and in the treatment with name labels at p = 0.012** and thus significant at a 5% level using a 
chi-squared test. Using a (two-tailed) chi-squared test we do not find significant differences 
between behaviours dependent on the gender of a co-participant (when own gender is pooled). 
                                                 
45 Subjects were told the gender of their co-participant via fake names which related to the gender of a co-
participant. 
46 Subjects were told the gender of their co-participant directly  i.e. “female” or “male” was indicated 
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However we find that in period one there is some evidence of difference between the behaviour 
of males only dependent on the gender of a co-participant. This however lies out with the 
standard levels of significance ( = 1.7143, p = 0.190)47.  Certainly we are able to observe that, 
with regards to rankings, MF subjects are the most hawkish in both our experiment and in Holm 
(2000). Therefore if we consider only males in period one, we are able to observe some evidence 
of differences in hawkish behaviour depending on the gender of a co-participant. This provides 
some consistency with Holm’s result in which subjects are more hawkish towards women than 
men.  
 
Result 1: We have some evidence that males discriminate on the basis 
of gender of a co-participant. This is consistent with Holm (2000). As 
per Holm (2000) MF subjects rank highest in incidences of choosing the 
hawkish option. 
 
We will now consider the relevant treatment comparisons as defined above in order to 
complete our period one analysis. We will only consider hypotheses 1c and 2b in this section 
since hypotheses 1a, 1b and 2a relate to “actual” punishment rates which were too low in period 
one to conduct meaningful analysis. Let us first consider the effects of gender information on 
behaviour as described in hypothesis 2b. In order to provide a full picture of which subjects are 
driving behavioural differences due to the introduction of gender information we make the 
following set of treatment comparisons. The potential treatment effects that we can examine 
through these comparisons are shown above in table 5.2.1.2 below: 
 
  
                                                 
47 Tests about the significance of differences between MM, MF, MF and FF pairings are not reported in Holm 
(2000) 
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Table 5.1.1.2. Treatment comparisons for the effects of gender information 
Treatment Comparisons Subject subgroups analysed 
G-NP-C v. NG-NP-C 
1. All Subjects 
2. Males Only 
3. Females Only 
4. FF (G) v. Females (NG) 
5. FM (G) v. Females (NG) 
6. MM (G) v. Males (NG) 
7. MF (G) v. Males (NG) 
G-NP-NC v. NG-NP-NC 
G-P-C v. NG-P-C 
G-P-NC v. NG-P-NC 
 
Our first comparison will be between the treatments G-NP and NG-NP (both with and 
without the compromise option as defined in the table above). As such here we are examining 
where, and to whom, gender information is relevant in causing behavioural differences since 
this is the variable which varies between treatments here. In particular, first we are examining 
this effect in isolation, without the presence of a punishment technology. We find that, when 
there is no punishment present, and where there is no compromise option available, and 
examining each of the genders separately using the comparisons detailed above in table 5.1.1.2., 
we observe no difference in behaviour between those with and without gender information. 
(Table 5.1 in the appendix). 
However when subjects are given the compromise option we do find some effect of 
gender information. The addition of the option of a compromise is clearly having an effect on 
how gender information is utilised by subjects. 
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Table 5.1.1.3. Choices made with compromise (C) - Period 1 only 
 
 
Treatment 
 
Males Females 
 G-NP 
(All  
Males) 
G-NP 
(MF) 
G-NP 
(MM) 
NG-NP 
(All  
Males) 
G-NP 
(All  
Females) 
G-NP 
(FM) 
G-NP  
(FF) 
NG-NP 
(All  
Females) 
Amount  
taken 
15  
(Compromise) 
48.33%  
(29)  
43.33%  
(13) 
53.33%  
(16) 
41.38%  
(12) 
53.33%  
(32)  
50.00%  
(15) 
56.67% 
(17) 
41.94%  
(13) 
20  
(Dovish) 
25.00%  
(15)  
26.67%  
(8) 
23.33%  
(7) 
44.83%  
(13) 
 30.00%  
(18) 
36.67%  
(11) 
23.33  
(7) 
38.71%  
(12) 
30  
(Hawkish) 
26.67%  
(16)   
30.00%  
(9) 
23.33 
(7) 
13.79% 
(4) 
 16.67%  
(10) 
13.33%  
(4) 
20.00%  
(6) 
19.35%  
(6) 
 
Using a two-tailed chi-squared test we find that gender information significantly 
decreases the use of the dovish option ( = 3.6758, p = 0.055) overall (all subjects pooled) and 
that this result is driven by males ( = 3.5644, p = 0.059). In turn we find that this result for 
males is driven by MM subjects in the G-NP treatment who are significantly less dovish than 
males in the NG-NP treatment ( = 3.0403, p = 0.081). There are no significant strategy choice 
differences between treatments on other strategy options.  
We now make the same comparisons but this time we examine if the gender information 
effects we observed above manifest themselves differently in the presence of the punishment 
technology. It is important to note that when subjects made their first period decisions they were 
aware of the presence of a punishment technology, and thus the possibility of being punished, 
but had not yet had any experience of being punished as this decision was made after individual 
choices had been made. The effects of punishment here thus represent the pure “threat” of 
potential punishment.   
If we consider the effects of gender when there is the possibility of punishment we again 
find that there are no effects of gender information in the treatments without a compromise 
option (table 5.2 in the appendix). However, again it is males in the treatment with a compromise 
option who drive differences in behaviour between treatments with and without gender 
information as seen in table 5.1.1.4 below:  
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Table 5.1.1.4. Choices made with compromise (C) and punishment (P) - Period 1 only 
 
 
Treatment 
 Males Females 
 
G-P 
(All  
Males) 
G-P 
(MF) 
G-P 
(MM) 
NG-P 
(All  
Males) 
G-P 
(All  
Females) 
G-P  
(FM) 
G-P  
(FF) 
NG-P 
(All  
Females) 
Amount  
taken 
15  
(Compromise) 
46.67%  
(28) 
50.00%  
(15) 
43.33% 
(13) 
66.67%  
(20) 
60.00%  
(36) 
70.00%  
(21) 
50.00% 
(15) 
62.07%  
(18) 
20  
(Dovish) 
21.67%  
(13) 
16.67%  
(5) 
26.67%  
(8) 
16.67%  
(5) 
20.00%  
(12) 
13.33%  
(4) 
26.67% 
(8) 
24.14% 
 (7) 
30  
(Hawkish) 
31.67%  
(19) 
33.33%  
(10) 
30.00%  
(9) 
16.67%  
(5) 
20.00% 
 (12) 
16.67%  
(5) 
23.33%  
(7) 
13.79%  
(4) 
 
Whilst without punishment (and the compromise option present) we found that gender 
information decreases use of the dovish option in the treatments with gender information 
amongst MM subjects, with punishment gender information decreases the use of the equal 
option amongst males ( = 3.2143, p = 0.073). Again we find this phenomenon is driven by MM 
subjects who are significantly less likely to choose equal in the G-P-C treatment than their male 
counterparts in the NG-P-C treatment ( = 3.2997, p = 0.069). 
 
Result 2: Thus combining these outcomes in the games with compromise 
we can conclude knowing the gender of a co-participant has the greatest 
effect on males who are playing against males. We find that males 
without gender information are significantly more likely to choose one 
of the lower outcomes (dovish or equal) than their MM counterparts 
both with and without punishment with the presence of punishment 
pushing males towards the even lower and equitable payoff option.  
We therefore have some evidence to support hypotheses 2b. 
 
Thus with the introduction of gender information (and perhaps the reduction in social distance) 
males playing against males move away from using the lower payoff strategies. We therefore 
have evidence that gender information affects behaviour amongst male subjects.  
Let us now consider the effects of the presence of the punishment technology on 
behaviour in period one only. We are therefore considering hypothesis 1c. We will begin by 
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examining the effects of the addition of a punishment technology in isolation of gender 
information. We therefore make the following subject comparisons here: 
 
Table 5.1.1.5. Treatment comparisons for the effects of the punishment technology  
Treatment Comparisons Subject subgroups analysed 
G-NP-C v. G-P-C  
All pairing types (MM, MF, FF, FF), all males, all females 
G-NP-NC v. G-P-NC   
NG-NP-C v. NG-P-C  
all males, all females 
NG-NP-NC v. NG-P-NC   
 
In the treatments without a compromise option (and no gender information) we find no 
differences in behaviour for either men or women between treatments with and without 
punishment present (Table 5.3. in the appendix). However, in the treatment with compromise it 
is again males who are affected by the treatment variable (Table 5.1.1.6. below).  
 
Table 5.1.1.6. Choices made with compromise (C) - Period 1 only 
 
 
Treatment 
 Males Females 
 
NG-P 
(All Males) 
NG-NP 
(All Males) 
NG-P  
(All Females) 
NG-NP 
(All Females) 
Amount 
taken 
15  
(Compromise) 
66.67  
(20) 
41.38  
(12) 
62.07  
(18) 
41.94  
(13) 
20  
(Dovish) 
16.67  
(5) 
44.83  
(13) 
24.14  
(7) 
38.71 
(12) 
30  
(Hawkish) 
16.67  
(5) 
13.79  
(4) 
13.79  
(4) 
19.35  
(6) 
 
With compromise available, males are significantly more likely to choose an equal 
outcome when there is punishment compared to when there is no punishment opportunity ( = 
3.7990, p = 0.051). They also chose dovish less when punishment is present ( = 5.5158, p = 
0.019). Females display no such differences in behaviour between treatments. 
We now consider the same treatment effects but this time in the presence of gender 
information. We find there is no effect of punishment availability when there is no compromise 
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option for both males and females (see tables 5.4. and 5.5 in the appendix). However in the 
treatment with a compromise option we find that FM subjects are affected by the availability of 
punishment (table 5.1.1.8). Males are not significantly affected (Table 5.1.1.7). 
 
Table 5.1.1.7. Choices made by males with compromise (C) - Period 1 only 
 
 
Treatment 
 
G-P-C 
(Males) 
G-P-C   
(MM) 
G-P-C  
(MF) 
G-NP-C  
(Males) 
G-NP-C   
(MM) 
G-NP-C  
(MF) 
Amount 
taken 
15 
(Compromise) 
46.67  
(28) 
43.33  
(13) 
50.00  
(15) 
48.33 
(29) 
53.33  
(16) 
43.33  
(13) 
20 (Dovish) 
21.67 
(13) 
26.67  
(8) 
16.67  
(5) 
25.00  
(15) 
23.33  
(7) 
26.67  
(8) 
30 (Hawkish) 
31.67  
(19) 
30.00  
(9) 
33.33  
(10) 
26.67 
(16) 
23.33  
(7) 
30.00  
(9) 
 
Table 5.1.1.8. Choices made by females with compromise (C) - Period 1 only 
 
Treatment 
G-P  
(Females) 
G-P   
(FF) 
G-P  
(FM) 
G-NP  
(Females) 
G-NP   
(FF) 
G-NP  
(FM) 
Amount 
taken 
15 (Compromise) 
60.00  
(36) 
50.00  
(15) 
70.00  
(21) 
53.33  
(32) 
56.67 
(17) 
50.00  
(15) 
20 (Dovish) 
20.00  
(12) 
26.67  
(8) 
13.33 
(4) 
30.00 
(18) 
23.33  
(7) 
36.67  
(11) 
30 (Hawkish) 
20.00  
(12) 
23.33  
(7) 
16.67  
(5) 
16.67  
(10) 
20.00  
(6) 
13.33 
(4) 
 
FM subjects are more dovish when there is no punishment available. They are less likely 
to choose a dovish strategy with punishment ( = 4.3556, p = 0.037). We summarise the results 
from the effects of the presence of the punishment technology here: 
 
Result 3: Thus, in the presence of compromise, females’ behaviour is 
only changed by the presence of punishment if gender information is 
present; males are only affected by the presence of punishment if gender 
information is not present. In the converse cases differences in 
behaviour are not observed.  
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Perhaps we can conclude that behavioural changes in females are only triggered when 
they receive some kind of personal information about a co-participant. We therefore have 
evidence that supports hypothesis 1c. Also, as per the previous literature in the area of 
punishment, we also find that punishment has an effect on behaviours in some cases. The way 
in which punishment affects males and females is however different. As previously mentioned, 
one of the aims of this experiment was to investigate if punishment would affect behaviour when 
there is no free riding opportunity. As illustrated, dependent on the game type, the presence of 
punishment does indeed have an effect on behaviours. 
In order to complete our analysis of our period one data we conduct chi-squared tests to 
establish if the MSNEs calculated above bear any resemblance to the actual behaviour we 
observe in the game. We only examine period one data here because it allows us to examine 
truly independent observations as required by the chi-squared test. Using a 5% significance level 
we find that the cells shaped in grey represent behaviour which is significantly similar to that 
predicted by the MSNE. The values reported are p-values. 
It is interesting to note that in the games in which there was no gender information and 
no compromise option (i.e. the battle of the sexes game with no subject information) the MSNE 
in which subjects mix between dovish and hawkish is good predictor of actual behaviour. This 
result could be predicted by the theory above in that, in the absence of any focal outcome (for 
example an equal outcome) subjects resort to playing the MSNE.  
We also find that the MSNE All is a (weak) predictor of behaviour in games with 
compromise and no gender information for females only. However when gender information 
and compromise is present the MSNE All becomes a good predictor of behaviour for all pairing 
types expect FM subjects where behaviour is significantly different from the MSNE where 
subjects mix over all three strategy options in this game format.  
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Table 5.1.1.9. Comparisons to predicted MSNE (Period 1 only) 
Males MSNE All48 MSNE DH49 MSNE HE (P1)50 MSNE DE (P2) 
NG-NP-C 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.13 
NG-P-C 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.29 
NG-NP-NC n/a 0.93 n/a n/a 
NG-P-NC n/a 0.18 n/a n/a 
Females     
NG-NP-C 0.05 0.02 0.45 0.24 
NG-P-C 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.58 
NG-NP-NC n/a 0.93 n/a n/a 
NG-P-NC n/a 0.54 n/a n/a 
MM     
G-NP-C 0.48 0.01 0.49 0.43 
G-P-C 0.83 0.05 0.95 0.24 
G-NP-NC n/a 0.54 n/a n/a 
G-P-NC n/a 0.33 n/a n/a 
MF     
G-NP-C 0.83 0.05 0.95 0.24 
G-P-C 0.73 0.02 0.90 0.15 
G-NP-NC n/a 0.76 n/a n/a 
G-P-NC n/a 0.76 n/a n/a 
FF     
G-NP-C 0.27 0.01 0.27 0.51 
G-P-C 0.50 0.02 0.57 0.44 
G-NP-NC n/a 0.33 n/a n/a 
G-P-NC n/a 0.76 n/a n/a 
FM     
G-NP-C 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.51 
G-P-C 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.16 
G-NP-NC n/a 0.76 n/a n/a 
G-P-NC n/a 0.54 n/a n/a 
 
In summary we find the following treatment effects with regard to individual choices 
when considering period one only. We find that all significant differences between treatments 
are found when there is a compromise option available. We thus conclude that the addition of 
the compromise option is an important element in activating the treatments effects we examine 
both with regard to the availability of gender information and the presence of the  punishment 
                                                 
48 MSNE where subjects mix between all three strategy options 
49 MSNE where subjects mix between the dovish and hawkish strategy options 
50 These 2 columns represent the MSNE where one player mixes between hawkish and equal with the expectation 
that the other player mixes between dovish and equal (and vice versa) 
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technology and have evidence that hypothesis 3 can be accepted since the compromise option 
does appear to be affecting behaviour. Also males and in particular MM subjects are 
significantly affected by gender information. Finally, males’ behaviour is affected by 
punishment technology with no gender information present whereas females’ behaviour is 
affected by punishment only if gender information is present. 
 
5.2. Dynamic Models (All periods) 
 
We now move onto examining behaviour over all periods. Using a dynamic panel probit model 
run with the option of robust standard errors clustered on the individual level, we examine 
strategy choices in the games and punishment behaviour over all periods. We use the probit 
model in line with much of the literature in this area. Whilst logit models were also considered, 
the probit model provided very similar but intuitive solution and also provides a distribution 
with flatter tails than the logit model. The probit model was also chosen since it provides 
coefficients of between 0 and 1 meaning we are able to present marginal probabilities in our 
results tables. Also, in contrast to maximum likelihood models, the probit model allows us to 
avoid issues of heteroscedasticity.   
We will include a number of different demographic variables at this stage of analysis. We 
collected self-reported demographic information from subjects on gender, country of origin, 
faculty of study and level of study. With regard to country of origin, we use categories of 
Western Europe and South/South East Asian in our data analysis51. In order to categorise 
subjects into these two categories we use definitions from the CIA World Fact Book 52 
(South/South East Asian) and the UCLA Center for European and Eurasian Studies53 (Western 
Europe). 
 
 South/South East Asian: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Macau, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam 
 Western Europe: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, UK 
                                                 
51 One subject declared their country of origin as “Meida”. We were unable to identify this as a country and as 
such these subject is left out of this categorisation. 
52 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_eas.html  
53 http://www.international.ucla.edu/euro/countries/westeurope/  
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 Other declared regions: Azerbaijan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Columbia, Congo, Czech 
Republic, Ghana, Hungary, India, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Lithuania, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, 
Ukraine, USA, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
 
We provide a summary of the demographic data is shown below in table 5.2.1(a). In order to 
check for collinearity between independent demographic variables we run tests using pairwise 
correlation coefficients on all demographic variable used in the tables below. Using the standard 
range of coefficients for strongly co-linear relationships (-0.9 to 0.9) we do not find any 
collinearity between variables which would be deemed of concern using standard measures. The 
pairwise correlation coefficients are presented in the appendix for this chapter. 
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Table 5.2.1(a). Summary of Demographic Data (Without Compromise - NC)  
 NG-NP-NC NG-P-NC G-NP-NC G-P-NC 
 Males Females Males Females MM MF FF FM MM MF FF FM 
South-East 
Asian 
53.33% 53.33% 16.67% 46.67% 43.33% 40% 66.67% 63.33% 36.67% 20% 46.67% 75.86% 
Western 
European 
40% 23.33% 60% 36.67% 53.33% 50% 23.33% 23.33% 56.67% 53.33% 26.67% 20.69% 
Undergraduates 56.67% 43.33% 86.67% 50% 60% 63.33% 33.33% 43.33% 76.67% 73.33% 50% 40% 
Social Sciences 
Students 
60% 53.33% 30% 36.67% 60% 50% 50% 60% 46.67% 36.67% 56.67% 56.67% 
Humanities 
Students 
26.67% 23.33% 20% 36.67% 6.67% 16.67% 23.33% 20% 23.33% 13.33% 10% 26.67% 
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Table 5.2.1(b). Summary of Demographic Data (With Compromise - C)  
 NG-NP-C NG-P-C G-NP-C G-P-C 
 Males Females Males Females MM MF FF FM MM MF FF FM 
South-East Asian 24.14% 58.06% 20% 41.38% 23.33% 20% 33.33% 30% 30% 20% 26.67% 23.33% 
Western 
European 
68.97% 25.81% 66.67% 34.48% 66.67% 66.67% 26.67% 43.33% 56.67% 50% 43.33% 50% 
Undergraduates 82.76% 54.84% 70% 55.17% 90% 86.67% 63.33% 63.33% 86.67% 80% 73.33% 73.33% 
Social Sciences 
Students 
44.83% 51.61% 23.33% 55.17% 60% 53.33% 46.67% 40% 53.33% 40% 26.67% 50% 
Humanities 
Students 
17.24% 16.13% 20% 20.69% 13.33% 13.33% 10% 20% 20% 20% 30% 23.33% 
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We now present the results of the experiment over all periods. For reference we provide a summary of choices (strategy choices in the game and 
punishment decisions) and coordination outcomes from all periods into the two tables which follow. The first provides a summary of the data without 
compromise (NC) whilst the second provides a summary of the treatment with compromise (C). 
 
Table 5.2.2(a). Summary of Choice Data over all periods (Without Compromise - NC)54  
 NG-NP-NC NG-P-NC G-NP-NC G-P-NC 
 Males Females Males Females MM MF FF FM MM MF FF FM 
Number of 
Subjects 
3055 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Number of 
observations 
150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Coordination 
rates 
42% 
(63) 
36.67% 
(55) 
46% 
(69) 
40.67% 
(61)   
45.33% 
(68) 
54% 
(81) 
53.33% 
(80) 
54% 
(81) 
54.67% 
(82) 
43.33% 
(65) 
53.33% 
(80) 
43.33% 
(65) 
Hawkish 
57.33% 
(86)   
63.33% 
(95) 
54% 
(81) 
62.67% 
(94) 
52% 
(78) 
57.33% 
(86) 
54.67% 
(82) 
54% 
(81) 
51.33% 
(77) 
58% 
(87) 
54.67% 
(82) 
60% 
(90) 
Dovish 
42.67% 
(64) 
36.67% 
(55) 
46% 
(69) 
37.33% 
(56) 
48% 
(72) 
42.67% 
(64) 
45.33% 
(68) 
46% 
(69) 
48.67% 
(73) 
42% 
(63) 
45.33% 
(68) 
40% 
(60) 
Slap on the 
Wrist 
n/a n/a 
4% 
(6) 
10.67% 
(16) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
4.67% 
(7) 
12% 
(18) 
12.67% 
(19)   
8.67% 
(13) 
Full Monty n/a n/a 
3.33% 
(5) 
4% 
(6) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
3.33% 
(5) 
2.67% 
(4) 
2.67% 
(4) 
2% 
(3) 
                                                 
54 Key for data: Percentage (Number of observations) 
55 There are half as many total observations in this treatment as no gender information was given to students. Thus whilst we wanted to obtain 30 observations of each category 
of subject with gender information (i.e. MM, MF, FF, FM so 120 observations) we only needed 30 each for males and females in the treatment without gender information. 
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Table 5.2.2(b). Summary of Choice Data over all periods (With Compromise - C)56  
 NG-NP-C NG-P-C G-NP-C G-P-C 
 Males Females Males Females MM MF FF FM MM MF FF FM 
Number of 
Subjects 
29 31 30 29 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Number of 
observations 
145 155 150 145 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Coordination 
on unequal 
19.31% 
(28) 
15.48% 
(24) 
3.33% 
(5) 
4.83% 
(7) 
13.33% 
(20) 
17.33% 
(26) 
5.33% 
(8) 
17.33% 
(26) 
8% 
(12) 
3.33% 
(5) 
10.67% 
(16) 
3.33% 
(5) 
Coordination 
on equal 
26.21% 
(38) 
21.94% 
(34) 
40% 
(60) 
41.38% 
(60) 
20% 
(30) 
18.67%  
(28)  
36% 
(54) 
18.67% 
(28) 
22.67% 
(34) 
59.33% 
(89) 
21.33% 
(32) 
59.33% 
(89) 
Hawkish 
29.66% 
(43) 
22.58% 
(35) 
18.67% 
(28) 
17.93% 
(26) 
31.33% 
(47) 
39.33% 
(59) 
23.33% 
(35)   
25.33% 
(38) 
26.67% 
(40) 
16.67% 
(25) 
28.67% 
(43) 
12% 
(18) 
Dovish 
24.83% 
(36) 
30.32% 
(47) 
20% 
(30) 
19.31% 
(28) 
22.67% 
(34) 
15.33% 
(23) 
17.33% 
(26) 
30% 
(45) 
17.33% 
(26) 
11.33% 
(17) 
24.67% 
(37) 
8.67% 
(13) 
Equal 
45.52% 
(66) 
47.1% 
(73) 
61.33% 
(92) 
62.76% 
(91) 
46% 
(69) 
45.33% 
(68) 
59.33% 
(89) 
44.67% 
(67) 
56% 
(84) 
72% 
(108) 
46.67% 
(70) 
79.33% 
(119) 
Slap on the 
Wrist 
n/a n/a 
3.33% 
(5) 
8.28% 
(12) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
8% 
(12) 
2% 
(3) 
8% 
(12) 
8% 
(12) 
Full Monty n/a n/a 
4% 
(6) 
4.83%  
(7)  
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
14.67% 
(22) 
2% 
(3) 
2.67% 
(4) 
4% 
(6) 
 
  
                                                 
56 Key for data: Percentage (Number of observations) 
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5.2.1. The effect of repeated games on individual choices 
 
First we examine individual strategy choices made in the games defined above. In the analysis 
of individual choices which follows we use the following variables. We provide a definition and 
explanation of each here: 
 
Table 5.2.1.1. Variables in dynamic analysis 
Variable Explanation 
Gender information available Dummy on if subject was given gender information  on a co-participant 
Punishment available Dummy on if subject had access to the punishment technology  
Hawkish lag Dummy on if a subject choose hawkish in the previous period 
Dovish lag Dummy on if a subject choose dovish in the previous period 
Equal lag Dummy on if a subject choose equal in the previous period 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
Dummy on if a subject’s co-participant in the previous period choose 
hawkish 
Co-participant dovish lag Dummy on if a subject’s co-participant in the previous period choose dovish 
Co-participant equal lag Dummy on if a subject’s co-participant in the previous period choose equal 
Coordination achieved in 
previous period 
Dummy on if a subject coordinated in the previous period 
Co-participant “Full Monty” 
lag 
Dummy on if a subject’s co-participant in the previous period choose to 
punish  the subject using “Full Monty” 
Co-participant “Slap on the 
Wrist” lag 
Dummy on if a subject’s co-participant in the previous period choose to 
punish  the subject using “Slap on the Wrist” 
“Full Monty” lag 
Dummy on if a subject  choose to punish using “Full Monty” in the previous 
period  
“Slap on the Wrist” lag 
Dummy on if a subject  choose to punish using “Slap on the Wrist” in the 
previous period 
Males Dummy on if a subject was male 
South-East Asian57 Dummy on if a subject was from South/ South-East Asia58 
Western European Dummy on if a subject was from Western Europe59 
Undergraduates Dummy on if a subject was an undergraduate 
Social Sciences Students Dummy on if a subject was studying a Social Science Subject 
Humanities Students Dummy on if a subject was studying a Humanities Subject 
Science and Medicine 
Students 
Dummy on if a subject was studying a  Science or Medical Subject 
                                                 
57 In a few cases one or more of these demographic variables is not included due to that demographic not being 
adequately represented in the sub-category being examined. 
58 See definition above. 
59 See definition above. 
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As we proceeded in the period one analysis above, let us first examine the effects of gender 
information on individual choices. We will therefore make the treatment comparisons listed in 
table 5.1.1.2 above. As previously, in order to provide a full picture of behavioural patterns we 
first analyse data for all subjects before subsequently providing the same analysis for each of 
the genders (males and females) separately.  Where appropriate and interesting, and for the sake 
of brevity, we also report findings comparing behaviours by individual gender pairing types 
(MM, MF, FF and FM) to those of the same gender in the treatments without gender 
information. 
Let us first consider the games without the compromise option available (suffix -NC). 
This analysis offers some interesting results both with and without the presence of the 
punishment technology. First we consider the effects of gender information in the presence of 
the punishment technology. The analysis of treatment effects between the games G-P-NC and 
NG-P-NC is shown in table 5.6 in the appendix. We find that it is only when we look at females 
in isolation that we see the effects of gender information becoming evident: with gender 
information present female subjects are more likely to choose dovish ( = 0.461) and less likely 
to choose hawkish ( = -0.461). We therefore conclude that the marginal decrease (increase) in 
probability of choosing hawkish (dovish) is 46.1% for female subjects with gender information 
compared to females without gender information. This interpretation of the coefficients can also 
be applied to all the coefficients reported below: We find that this result is driven by FF subjects 
as shown in table 5.2.1.2 ( = 0.439 – dovish,  = -0.439 – hawkish). No such differences are 
found for males (Tables 5.6 and 5.7 in the appendix) 
Result 4: Without the compromise option, females (and in particular 
females in unisex pairings) are affected by gender information in the 
presence of punishment. Males are not. Females are therefore less likely 
to exhibit hawkish behaviour when they have gender information 
available. We therefore have evidence to support hypothesis 2b. 
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Table 5.2.1.2. The effect of gender information – G-P-NC (FF subjects) v. NG-P-NC (Female subjects)60 
 30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 
FF Subjects (with gender info) 
     Base: Females subjects without gender information 
-0.439* (0.23) 0.439* (0.23) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
0.486 (0.34) -0.486 (0.34) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base: Co-participant dovish lag 
-1.118*** (0.20) 1.118*** (0.20) 
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.074 (0.20) 0.074 (0.20) 
Co-participant “Full Monty” lag -0.658 (0.52) 0.658 (0.52) 
Co-participant “Slap on the Wrist” lag -0.362 (0.29) 0.362 (0.29) 
“Full Monty” lag -0.050 (0.29) 0.050 (0.29) 
“Slap on the Wrist” lag -0.454 (0.57) 0.454 (0.57) 
South-East Asian 0.210 (0.28) -0.210 (0.28) 
Western European -0.059 (0.27) 0.059 (0.27) 
Undergraduates 0.071 (0.20) -0.071 (0.20) 
Social Sciences Students 0.109 (0.26) -0.109 (0.26) 
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.384 (0.31) 0.384 (0.31) 
Constant 0.933** (0.41) -0.933**  (0.41) 
No. of Obs. 240 240 
Wald chi2(13) 43.50 43.50 
 
We are unable to observe any effects of the availability of gender information here without the 
punishment technology present (i.e. G-NP-NC v. NG-NP-NC as shown in table 5.8 in the 
appendix) unlike in the comparable treatments with a punishment technology available. This 
result also holds when we consider pairing types individually. We hypothesise that the presence 
of punishment is required in order to “activate” the effects of having gender information on a 
co-participant. We will see in the section that follows that this same result also appears with the 
compromise option available but we will discuss this in more detail after the appropriate results 
section.  
Therefore, let us now consider the same comparisons of treatments but with the 
compromise option available. As in the previous analysis without the compromise option we 
will first consider a comparison of treatments with punishment present. The comparison of G-
P-C and NG-P-C is shown in table 5.2.1.3(a) below.  We notice a number of interesting results 
here: We find that males are the more likely to choose the equal strategy with gender information 
available ( = 0.347)61. In order to examine this result further, in the tables which follow, we 
                                                 
60 Throughout this thesis we will use the following key to indicate significance within the tables: 
* significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
61 We note that the coefficient on “Western European” is also significant for the dependent variable “Hawkish” in 
the regression. We therefore run two further regressions restricting our sample to 1.Western European males and 
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also individually compare behaviour in the two different “types” of males pairing with gender 
information (MM and MF) with the behaviour of males in the treatments without gender 
information. We find that significant differences in behaviour are observed between males with 
a (known) female partner (MF pairings in the treatment with gender information - as shown in 
table 5.2.1.3(b)  below -  = 0.491) as compared to males without gender information. We 
observe no such significance for MM pairings (with gender information) when compared to 
those males without gender information. With the compromise option available, we also find 
that females in mixed gender pairings (FM) are more likely to choose equal than females without 
gender information as shown in table 5.2.1.3(c) below ( = 0.419).  We however do not observe 
this result when we pool all females. 
Result 5: With the compromise option and punishment technology 
available, males are more likely to choose equal if they have gender 
information available. We did not observe this effect for males in the 
same comparisons of treatments without the compromise option. We 
find that this effect is also universal to mixed gender pairings in these 
treatment comparisons. Without the compromise option available 
gender effects were only observed for FF subjects. We therefore have 
further evidence to support hypothesis 2b.  
                                                 
2. Non-western European males only. We find that the coefficient on our treatment variable (“Gender 
information available”) does not differ significantly (we report the p values from a t-test for differences between 
the reported coefficients from males only and in the two nationality subgroups) and it remains negative and 
insignificant. We view this as a robustness check of our data: 
Western Europeans Males: Coefficient(Hawkish) = -0.4030745, p = 0.4857 
Non Western European Males: Coefficient(Hawkish) = -0.2843279, p = 0.5616 
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Table 5.2.1.3(a). The effect of gender information – G-P-C v. NG-P-C 
  30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 15 (Equal) 
All subjects 
Gender information available  0.027 (0.14) -0.232* (0.13) 0.151 (0.12)    
Hawkish lag 1.756*** (0.17) 0.364** (0.17) -1.805*** (0.17)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.934*** (0.17) 1.033*** (0.16) -1.588*** (0.16)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.217 (0.17) 0.459*** (0.16) -0.648*** (0.16)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.881*** (0.17) 0.210 (0.17) -1.028*** (0.18)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period 0.202 (0.16) -0.246 (0.16) -0.232 (0.16)    
Co-participant “Full Monty” lag -0.517* (0.28) 0.400* (0.24) 0.109 (0.24)    
Co-participant “Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.444** (0.22) 0.116 (0.23) -0.531**(0.23)    
“Full Monty” lag 0.005 (0.25) -0.244 (0.26) 0.160 (0.23)    
“Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.209 (0.28) 0.049 (0.25) -0.257 (0.25)    
Males 0.117 (0.18) 0.058 (0.18) -0.147 (0.17)    
South-East Asian -0.205 (0.18) 0.054 (0.18) 0.114 (0.16)    
Western European 0.003 (0.13) -0.081 (0.13) 0.024 (0.12)    
Undergraduates 0.094 (0.16) 0.152 (0.15) -0.160 (0.14)    
Social Sciences Students -0.165 (0.16) 0.157 (0.15) 0.056 (0.14)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.042 (0.18) 0.047 (0.18) 0.029 (0.16)    
Constant -1.862*** (0.26) -1.469*** (0.25) 1.531*** (0.24)    
No. of Obs. 716 716 716 
Wald chi2(16) 157.80 77.93 230.16 
Males 
Gender information available  -0.068 (0.22) -0.454* (0.21) 0.347* (0.19)    
Hawkish lag 2.112*** (0.26) -0.029 (0.26) -2.029*** (0.29)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
1.122*** (0.26) 0.813*** (0.24) -1.682*** (0.28)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.500** (0.25) 0.389 (0.25) -1.009*** (0.29)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.863*** (0.26) 0.365 (0.25) -1.295*** (0.30)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period 0.350 (0.24) -0.291 (0.23) -0.529* (0.30) 
Co-participant “Full Monty” lag -0.430 (0.36) 0.225 (0.33) 0.233 (0.31)    
Co-participant “Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.193 (0.31) 0.280 (0.30) -0.480 (0.31)    
“Full Monty” lag 0.071 (0.42) 0079 (0.35) -0126 (0.35)    
“Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.197 (0.39) 0.437 (0.39) -0.581 (0.37)    
Males n/a n/a n/a 
South-East Asian -0.335 (0.30) 0.335 (0.30) -0.017 (0.28)    
Western European -0.630** (0.30) 0.096 (0.30) 0.367 (0.27)    
Undergraduates 0.308 (0.31) 0.349 (0.29) -0.425 (0.26)    
Social Sciences Students 0.048 (0.24) 0.308 (0.23) -0.216 (0.22)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.147 (0.28) -0.496 (0.30) 0.285 (0.24)    
Constant -2.001*** (0.38) -1.559*** (0.39) 1.829*** (0.39)    
No. of Obs. 360 360 360 
Wald chi2(15) 92.54 42.64 108.39 
Females 
Gender information available  -0.025 (0.19) -0.109 (0.19) 0.083 (0.18)    
Hawkish lag 1.528*** (0.26) 0.688*** (0.26) -1.800*** (0.25)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.843*** (0.23) 1.193*** (0.23) -1.666*** (0.23)    
Co-participant hawkish lag -0.005 (0.24) 0.344 (0.23) -0.333 (0.23)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.853*** (0.24) 0.162 (0.25) -0.995*** (0.25)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period 0.032 (0.24) -0.128 (0.23) -0.141 (0.22)    
Co-participant “Full Monty” lag -0.842* (0.51) 0.720* (0.41) -0.042 (0.43)    
Co-participant “Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.621* (0.33) -0.084 (0.37) -0.577 (0.36)    
“Full Monty” lag 0.346 (0.42) 0.235 (0.37) -0.479 (0.39)    
“Slap on the Wrist” lag -0.200 (0.34) -0.712* (0.41) 0.627* (0.32)    
Males n/a n/a n/a 
South-East Asian 0.490 (0.25) -0.192 (0.25) -0.268 (0.24)    
Western European 0.048 (0.24) -0.045 (0.23) 0.016 (0.22)    
Undergraduates 0.074 (0.20) 0.067 (0.20) -0.103 (0.19)    
Social Sciences Students -0.473 (0.23) 0.189 (0.23) 0.268 (0.22)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.191 (0.24) 0.306 (0.24) -0.107 (0.23)    
Constant -1.668*** (0.36) -1.573*** (0.35) 1.450*** (0.34)    
No. of Obs. 356 356 356 
Wald chi2(15) 72.84 50.30 121.18 
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Table 5.2.1.3(b). The effect of gender information – G-P-C (MF subjects) v. NG-P-C (Males) 
 30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 15(Equal) 
MF Subjects (with gender info) 
     Base: Males subjects without gender information 
-0.448 (0.28) -0.211 (0.27) 0.491**  (0.24) 
Hawkish lag 2.639*** (0.48) -0.091 (0.35) -1.880*** (0.36) 
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
1.863*** (0.48) 0.736** (0.32) -1.726*** (0.35) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.070 (0.38) 0.745** (0.33) -0.982*** (0.36) 
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.628* (0.38) 0.385 (0.31) -1.046*** (0.34) 
Coordination Achieved in the previous period 0.943** (0.43) -0.479 (0.33) -0.438 (0.36) 
Co-participant “Full Monty” lag 0.034 (0.64) 0.597 (0.52) -0.504 (0.49) 
Co-participant “Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.176 (0.42) 0.293 (0.38) -0.522 (0.37) 
“Full Monty” lag 0.832 (0.73) -0.326 (0.68) -0.353 (0.70) 
“Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.625 (0.93) 0.448 (0.57) -0.822 (0.54) 
South-East Asian -0.414 (0.44) 0.621 (0.44) -0.296 (0.36) 
Western European -0.774 (0.42) 0.577 (0.42) 0.021 (0.33) 
Undergraduates 0.620 (0.43) 0.026 (0.37) -0.262 (0.32)    
Social Sciences Students 0.490 (0.34) -0.037 (0.32) -0.225 (0.28) 
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.041 (0.41) -0.368 (0.34) 0.380 (0.31) 
Constant -2.746*** (0.59) -1.691*** (0.53) 1.932*** (0.47) 
No. of Obs. 240 240 240 
Wald chi2(15) 53.65 35.50 77.86 
 
Table 5.2.1.3(c). The effect of gender information – G-P-C (FM subjects) v. NG-P-C (Females) 
 30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 15(Equal) 
FM Subjects (with gender info) 
     Base: Females subjects without gender information 
-0.118 (0.27) -0.452 (0.25)  0.419* (0.23) 
Hawkish lag 1.754*** (0.40) 0.773** (0.36) -2.018*** (0.38) 
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
1.115*** (0.34) 0.994*** (0.31) -1.653*** (0.33) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.423 (0.37) 0.468 (0.32) -0.796** (0.34) 
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
1.222*** (0.36) 0.149 (0.36) -1.275*** (0.36) 
Coordination Achieved in the previous period -0.253 (0.38) -0.038 (0.32) -0.112 (0.33) 
Co-participant “Full Monty” lag -1.235* (0.72) 0.439 (0.55) 0.452 (0.56) 
Co-participant “Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.827 (0.51) -0.342 (0.63) -0.501 (0.49) 
“Full Monty” lag -0.167 (0.55) 0.595 (0.43) -0.359 (0.44) 
“Slap on the Wrist” lag -0.981* (0.53) -0.390 (0.48) 1.083** (0.45) 
South-East Asian 0.749** (0.40) -0.336 (0.34) -0.338 (0.32) 
Western European -0.068 (0.36) 0.040 (0.31) -0.085 (0.30) 
Undergraduates -0.076 (0.28) 0.084 (0.27) 0.028 (0.25) 
Social Sciences Students -0.336 (0.35) 0.128 (0.30) 0.133 (0.31) 
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.027 (0.39) -0.095 (0.35) 0.019 (0.34) 
Constant -1.936*** (0.52) -1.471*** (0.46) 1.572*** (0.47)  
No. of Obs. 236 236 236 
Wald chi2(15) 45.71 29.45 72.26 
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Table 5.2.1.3(d). The effect of gender information – G-P-C (FF subjects) v. NG-P-C (Females) 
 30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 15(Equal) 
Gender information available  0.129 (0.22) 0.108 (0.22) -0.215 (0.21) 
Hawkish lag 1.329*** (0.29) 0.772** (0.31) -1.806*** (0.31) 
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.583** (0.27) 1.235*** (0.27) -1.568*** (0.27) 
Co-participant hawkish lag -0.132 (0.28) 0.195 (0.27) -0.082 (0.27) 
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.787*** (0.27) 0.187 (0.28) -1.021*** (0.29) 
Coordination Achieved in the previous 
period 
0.077 (0.27) -0.046 (0.27) -0.290 (0.28) 
Co-participant “Full Monty” lag -0.683 (0.53) 0.872* (0.46) -0.328 (0.49) 
Co-participant “Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.573 (0.36) -0.043 (0.40) -0.595 (0.41) 
“Full Monty” lag 0.281 (0.58) 0.183 (0.52) -0.553 (0.52) 
“Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.180 (0.39) -0.509 (0.44) 0.103 (0.39) 
South-East Asian 0.371 (0.28) -0.376 (0.29) -0.037 (0.27) 
Western European -0.043 (0.27) 0.109 (0.27) -0.004 (0.26) 
Undergraduates 0.204 (0.24) -0.102 (0.24) -0.089 (0.23) 
Social Sciences Students -0.483* (0.27)62 0.398 (0.28) 0.135 (0.26) 
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.329 (0.27) 0.422 (0.27) -0.079 (0.27) 
Constant -1.526*** (0.41) -1.676*** (0.41) 1.491*** (0.41) 
No. of Obs. 236 236 236 
Wald chi2(15) 47.13 40.38 79.97 
 
Without punishment (i.e. in a comparison of G-NP-C and NG-NP-C as shown in table 5.9 in 
the appendix) we find that there are no effects of gender information on behaviour. We also 
find no effects of gender information when we separate out into individual pairing types.  
                                                 
62 As before we conduct a robustness check restricting our sample to: 1. Social Science subjects only and 2. Non- 
Social Science subjects. We find that coefficients on our treatment variable for these subject subgroups do not 
differ significantly from those in the non-restricted sample. We regard this as a robustness check of our findings.  
Social Science Subjects: Coefficient(Hawkish) =  -0.1825314, p = 0.4455 
Non Social Science Subjects: Coefficient(Hawkish) =  0.2243925, p = 0.6956 
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Result 6: With the compromise option available, effects of gender 
information disappear when not examined in conjunction with 
treatments with the punishment technology available.  
This result is interesting: Both with and without the compromise option available, it is 
also only in the treatment comparisons where the punishment technology is available that gender 
information changes behaviours between treatments with and without gender information 
present. We conclude that the presence of the punishment technology is important in motivating 
subjects to consider the gender of co-participant.  
We will next examine the effects of the availability of the punishment technology on 
individual strategy choices in the game. We make the same treatment comparisons and 
examine the same subject subgroups as shown in table 5.1.1.5 above.  
Let us first consider at comparison of G-NP-NC v. G-P-NC as shown in tables 5.10 and 
5.11 in the appendix. Thus, here we wish to examine the effects of the punishment technology 
on behaviour in the presence of gender information and without the compromise option. We are 
unable to establish a significant effect of the punishment technology on strategy choices in the 
game. The same result is found when gender information and the compromise option is not 
available (NG-NP-NC v. NG-P-NC as shown in table 5.12 in the appendix.) 
Result 7: Without the compromise option available, the punishment 
technology does not affect behaviour in the games. 
We therefore reject hypothesis 1c when the compromise option isn’t present. 
 Let us now consider the effects of punishment availability when subjects also had the 
compromise option available. First we consider this in the presence of gender information (G-
NP-C v. G-P-C) as presented in tables 5.2.1.4(a) and 5.2.1.4(b) below. Unlike in the 
comparisons of treatments without the compromise option (NC) examined above, we do find 
effects of the punishment technology here. We find that the presence of the punishment 
technology reduces hawkish behaviour amongst males ( = -0.306) that this is driven by MF 
subjects ( = -0.569) since MM subjects are not affected by the addition of a punishment 
technology when examined in isolation.  
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Result 8: With the compromise option available, MF subjects are more 
likely to choose the hawkish option without punishment and move away 
from this strategy choice with punishment. This is contrary to effects we 
found in the comparison of treatments without compromise. 
We also find that the presence of a punishment technology increases use of the equal option 
amongst both males and females ( = 0.314 and  = 0.230 respectively). However when 
investigating each subject pairing individually we find that this effect is only observed in mixed 
gender pairings (MF and FM -  = 0.467 and  = 0.617 respectively). We notice that this effect 
was also observed when we were examining the effects of gender information in treatments with 
punishment technology and the compromise option present (G-P-C v. NG-P-C). Clearly subjects 
in mixed gender pairings are the most affected by the treatment variables we define. 
Result 9: With the compromise option available, mixed gender pairings 
are more likely to choose equal in the presence of the punishment 
technology. We therefore have evidence to support hypothesis 2b in the 
game with compromise and gender information present. 
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Table 5.2.1.4(a). The effect of punishment – G-NP-C v. G-P-C 
  30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 15 (Equal) 
All subjects 
Punishment Available -0.256** (0.11) -0.069 (0.11) 0.269*** (0.10)    
Hawkish lag 1.427*** (0.16) 0.402*** (0.13) -1.655*** (0.13)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.795*** (0.14) 1.041*** (0.21) -1.606*** (0.14)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.512*** (0.12) 0.551*** (0.12) -1.005*** (0.13)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
1.089*** (0.13) 0.022 (0.14) -1.182*** (0.14)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period 0.083 (0.12) -0.205 (0.12) -0.251**  (0.13)    
South-East Asian 0.061 (0.14) 0.166 (0.15) -0.185 (0.14) 
Western European -0.102 (0.14) 0.123 (0.14) -0.027 (0.13) 
MM 0.027 (0.14) 0.198 (0.15) -0.177 (0.14) 
FM -0.195 (0.16) 0.187 (0.16) 0.005 (0.14) 
FF -0.057 (0.14) -0.295* (0.16) -0.142 (0.14) 
MF Base Base Base 
Undergraduates 0.113 (0.13) -0.152 (0.13) 0.026 (0.12) 
Social Sciences Students -0.047 (0.12) 0.120 (0.12) -0.069 (0.11) 
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.184 (0.15) -0.180 (0.17) -0.039 (0.14) 
Constant -1.588*** (0.22) -1.611*** (0.23) 1.556*** (0.21) 
No. of Obs. 960 960 960 
Wald chi2(14) 206.30 110.17 299.80 
Males 
Punishment Available -0.306* (0.17) -0.132 (0.17) 0.314** (0.16)    
Hawkish lag 1.565*** (0.23) 0.274 (0.20) -1.823*** (0.23)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.705*** (0.20) 0.862*** (0.40) -1.511*** (0.26)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.897*** (0.20) 0.353* (0.18) -1.262*** (0.23)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
1.281*** (0.20) 0.001 (0.21) -1.418*** (0.25)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period 0.160 (0.17) -0.261 (0.19) -0.405* (0.21)    
South-East Asian -0.156 (0.23) 0.196 (0.24) -0.028 (0.23)    
Western European -0.348 (0.23) -0.057 (0.25) 0.291  (0.23)    
MM Base Base Base 
FM n/a n/a n/a 
FF n/a n/a n/a 
MF -0.011 (0.15) -0.228 (0.16) 0.182 (0.14)    
Undergraduates 0.214 (0.24) 0.016 (0.23) -0.197 (0.23)    
Social Sciences Students 0.123 (0.17) 0.004 (0.17) -0.140 (0.16)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.354 (0.22) -0.636* (0.34) 0.042 (0.22)    
Constant -1.759*** (0.35) -1.143*** (0.35) 1.520*** (0.34)    
No. of Obs. 480 480 480 
Wald chi2(12) 119.17 44.21 140.05 
Females 
Punishment Available -0.190 (0.15) -0.071 (0.16) 0.230* (0.14)    
Hawkish lag 1.340***  (0.24) 0.440** (0.19) -1.501*** (0.18)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.897*** (0.20) 1.097*** (0.31) -1.679*** (0.19)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.171 (0.17) 0.707*** (0.16) -0.806*** (0.17)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.859*** (0.19) 0.036 (0.22) -0.972*** (0.20)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period -0.008 (0.17) -0.179 (0.18) -0.107 (0.17)    
South-East Asian 0.238 (0.20) 0.024 (0.20) -0.246 (0.18)    
Western European 0.041 (0.18) 0.227 (0.19) -0.225 (0.18)    
MM n/a n/a  n/a 
FM -0.124 (0.15) -0.126 (0.16) 0.168 (0.14)    
FF Base Base Base 
MF n/a n/a n/a 
Undergraduates 0.064 (0.16) -0.209 (0.17) 0.126 (0.15)    
Social Sciences Students -0.229 (0.18) 0.274 (0.20) -0.021 (0.16)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.022 (0.20) 0.049 (0.21) -0.061 (0.19)    
Constant -1.469*** (0.26) -1.480*** (0.26) 1.275*** (0.24)    
No. of Obs. 480 480 480 
Wald chi2(14) 89.77 68.73 157.13 
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Table 5.2.1.4(b). The effect of punishment – G-NP-C v. G-P-C 
  30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 15 (Equal) 
MM 
Punishment available  -0.095 (0.22) -0.276 (0.23) 0.235 (0.22)    
Hawkish lag 1.785*** (0.55) 0.311 (0.26) -2.025*** (0.35)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.612** (0.32) 0.971*** (0.40) -1.396*** (0.37)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.961*** (0.50) 0.280 (0.24) -1.293*** (0.33)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
1.283*** (0.45) -0.226 (0.29) -1.348*** (0.37)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period -0.092 (0.31) 0.067 (0.24) -0.461 (0.31)    
South-East Asian -0.580 (0.48) 0.262 (0.35) 0.255 (0.38)    
Western European -0.503 (0.54) -0.121 (0.35) 0.405 (0.37)    
Undergraduates 0.453 (0.58) -0.004 (0.32) -0.319 (0.37)    
Social Sciences Students -0.166 (0.24) 0.123 (0.25) -0.020 (0.27)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.205 (0.30) -0.943* (0.51) 0.252 (0.34)    
Constant -1.714*** (0.56) -1.171** (0.51) 1.457** (0.58)    
No. of Obs 240 240 240 
Wald chi2(11) 58.77 26.80 56.90 
MF 
Punishment available  -0.569** (0.36) 0.037 (0.25) 0.467** (0.23)    
Hawkish lag 1.358*** (0.26) 0.222 (0.29) -1.537*** (0.29)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.998***  (0.41) 0.637** (0.32) -1.615*** (0.35)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 1.039*** (0.39) 0.431 (0.29) -1.435*** (0.31)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
1.411*** (0.33) 0.208 (0.31) -1.595*** (0.31)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period 0.459* (0.27) -0.696** (0.28) -0.400 (0.30)    
South-East Asian 0.267 (0.34) 0.154 (0.37) -0.329 (0.35)    
Western European -0.335 (0.41) -0.020 (0.36) 0.342 (0.35)    
Undergraduates 0.038 (0.33) -0.008 (0.37) -0.103 (0.34)    
Social Sciences Students 0.404 (0.27) -0.178 (0.25) -0.278 (0.24)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.545 (0.40) -0.408 (0.42) -0.233 (0.34)    
Constant -1.926*** (0.49) -1.238*** (0.47) 1.699*** (0.44)    
No. of Obs. 240 240 240 
Wald chi2(11) 66.73 18.14 74.20 
FF 
Punishment available  0.062 (0.20) 0.164 (0.22) -0.161 (0.20)    
Hawkish lag 1.217*** (0.25) 0.505** (0.26) -1.439*** (0.25)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.789*** (0.26) 0.952*** (0.26) -1.461*** (0.26)  
Co-participant hawkish lag -0.143 (0.24) 0.437* (0.25) -0.280 (0.23)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.645*** (0.24) 0.184 (0.28) -0.865*** (0.27)  
Coordination Achieved in the previous period 0.064 (0.23) -0.094 (0.26) -0.152 (0.24)    
South-East Asian 0.288 (0.24) -0.109 (0.28) -0.193 (0.24)    
Western European 0.343 (0.24) 0.101 (0.25) -0.352 (0.24)    
Undergraduates 0.116 (0.22) 0.089 (0.24) -0.124 (0.21)    
Social Sciences Students -0.133 (0.23) 0.567 (0.25) -0.247  (0.22)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.356 (0.28) 0.605 (0.37) -0.111 (0.27)    
Constant -1.536*** (0.34) -1.921*** (0.42) 1.563*** (0.33)    
No. of Obs. 240 240 240 
Wald chi2(11) 39.53 29.80 70.70 
FM 
Punishment available  -0.256 (0.25) -0.683 (0.44) 0.617*** (0.78)    
Hawkish lag 1.561*** (0.32) 0.279 (0.38) -1.693*** (0.78)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
1.224*** (0.42) 0.415 (0.47) -1.797*** (0.74)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.570** (0.27) 1.030*** (0.29) -1.404*** (0.33)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
1.147*** (0.36) -0.620 (0.54) -0.976*** (0.38)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period -0.181 (0.26) -0.380 (0.30) -0.129 (0.33)    
South-East Asian 0.236 (0.33) 0.386 (0.50) -0.385  (0.36)    
Western European -0.401 (0.35) 0.642 (0.52) -0.045 (0.30)    
Undergraduates 0.050 (0.26) -0.785* (0.46)63 0.374 (0.49)    
Social Sciences Students -0.368 (0.33) 0.153 (0.43) 0.175 (0.36)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.533 (0.35) -1.431 (0.70) 0.169  (0.32)    
Constant -1.747*** (0.42) -1.026** (0.50) 1.211* (0.64)    
No. of Obs. 240 240 240 
Wald chi2(11) 48.52 29.83 80.61 
                                                 
63 In order to conduct robustness tests we also run the same regression with this sample restricted to 1. 
Undergraduates and 2. Non-Undergraduates. We find that the coefficients in our treatment variable (“Punishment 
available”) do not change significantly or become significant. We view this as a robustness check of our findings.  
Undergraduate: Coefficient (Dovish) = -.278129, p = 0.4597 
Non Undergraduate: Coefficient (Dovish) = -1.139605, p = 0.6098 
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Let us now examine the same comparisons but without gender information present (NG-NP-C 
v. NG-P-C). This is presented in table 5.13 in the appendix. In this case we are unable to 
establish any effects of punishment availability on behaviours as we did when gender 
information was present. 
Result 10: With the compromise option available, effects of the 
punishment technology are not observed when there is no gender 
information available.  
Therefore, gender information is clearly required in order to activate the effects of punishment 
technology. In the previous section relating to the effects of the addition of gender information 
we also observed the corresponding but opposite effect in treatments comparisons both with and 
without the compromise option present. That is, we observed that the presence of punishment is 
required in order to induce the effects of the addition of gender information.  
In conclusion to this section examining the effects of the availability of punishment, in 
the presence of the compromise option we find that with gender information present, the 
presence of punishment technology affects behaviour for mixed gender pairings in particular. 
However without gender information present we find that there are no effects of the presence of 
the punishment technology. In contrast, we observed no such effects of punishment availability 
when there is no compromise option available. We thus have further evidence to support 
hypothesis 3. Also we notice that we have evidence to support that the presence of a punishment 
has effects on individual decisions in a coordination game with no free riding opportunity. This 
is interesting as it contributes to the literature which has shown that punishment effects 
behaviour in games where free riding was an option. We show that punishment can also effect 
behaviours when there is no opportunity for free riding.  
5.2.2. Why punish? 
Finally, we would like to examine the motivation which lies behind punishment decisions. Since 
punishment decisions were made directly after being told the outcome of that period (i.e. own 
choice, co-participant choice, coordination outcome) in this analysis we will only consider 
variables from the current period and not the lagged variables as previously in the analysis of 
individual choice within the games in the previous section. We therefore use the following 
variables in this analysis:  
  
115 
 
Table 5.2.2.1. Additional Variables used in dynamic punishment analysis 
Variable Explanation 
Chose hawkish Subject chose hawkish in current period 
Chose dovish Subject chose dovish in current period 
Chose equal Subject chose equal in current period 
Co-participant chose hawkish Subject’s co-participant chose hawkish in current period 
Co-participant chose dovish Subject’s co-participant chose dovish in current period 
Co-participant chose equal Subject’s co-participant chose equal in current period 
Coordination achieved Subject coordinated with a co-participant in current period 
 
We initially make the following treatment comparisons here since they allow us to examine the 
effect of the addition of gender information on punishment decisions: 
Table 5.2.2.2. Treatment comparisons for the effects of the punishment technology 
Treatment Comparisons Subject subgroups analysed 
NG-P-C v. G-P-C  
1. All subjects 
2. Males Only 
3. Females Only 
4. FF (G) v. Females (NG) 
5. FM (G) v. Females (NG) 
6. MM (G) v. Males (NG) 
7. MF (G) v. Males (NG) 
NG-P-NC v. G-P-NC 
 
Let us first consider the analysis of treatments with compromise. We observe some interesting 
patterns here: First we observe no effects of the addition of gender information on a co-
participant with regard to punishment decisions when we consider males and females pooled 
(Table 5.2.2.3(a) below). However when we consider a comparison of MM subjects (i.e. with 
gender information) and males without gender information we find that males punish more when 
they know that a co-participant is a male compared to not knowing the gender of a co-participant 
as shown in table 5.2.2.3(b) below (β = 1.192). It appears that males make males more 
aggressive in punishment decisions! We therefore have evidence to support hypothesis 2a. 
However we find that the gender of a co-participant appears not to be relevant in individual 
punishment decisions for females and males in mixed gender pairings. Perhaps, in these latter 
mentioned subject subgroups, whilst decreasing the social distance (through the addition of 
gender information) makes a difference in some cases with regard to individual strategy choices 
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in the game (as illustrated above), punishment decisions are based purely on actions and not 
personal attributes of a co-participant. However, we do notice that there are effects of own 
gender on punishment decisions present. In particular, we find that males punish “Full Monty” 
more than females (β = 1.172) and “Slap on the Wrist” less than females (β = -0.460). We 
summarise this result below: 
Result 11:  With the compromise option available, the presence of 
gender information only affects males in unisex pairings in their 
punishment decisions. Own gender is also relevant in this decision: 
Males who choose to punish are more aggressive in their punishment 
decisions than females. 
We therefore find evidence to support hypothesis 1b. Males appear to exhibit more aggressive 
behaviour than females. 
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Table 5.2.2.3(a). The effects of gender information on punishment decisions - NG-P-C v. G-P-C 
  All Punishment “Slap on the Wrist” “Full Monty” 
All subjects 
Gender information available  0.178 (0.31) 0.208 (0.28) 0.196 (0.57)    
Choose Hawkish  0.331 (0.29) 0.243 (0.30) 0.356 (0.50)    
Choose Dovish  
      Base: Choose Equal  
0.083 (0.29) 0.302 (0.29) -0.676 (0.58)    
Co-participant choose hawkish  0.095 (0.29) 0.062 (0.30) -0.159 (0.51)    
Co-participant choose dovish  
    Base: Co-participant choose equal  
-0.234 (0.31) 0.005 (0.30) -1.122 (0.73)    
Coordination Achieved  0.008 (0.25) 0.113 (0.25) -0.218 (0.49)    
South-East Asian 0.466* (0.25) 0.177 (0.28) 0.874** (0.41)    
Western European 0.171 (0.22) 0.121 (0.24) 0.085 (0.39)    
Males 0.106 (0.42) 0.134 (0.36) -0.216 (0.80)    
Undergraduates 0.115 (0.41) -0.057 (0.35) 0.268 (0.78)    
Social Sciences Students 0.059 (0.29) -0.433* (0.26) 1.024* (0.58)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.084 (0.37) -0.048 (0.30) -0.374 (0.69)    
Constant 0.117 (0.36) 0.059 (0.32) 0.088 (0.61)    
No. of Obs. 716 716 716 
Wald chi2(12) 29.32 16.17 18.94 
Males 
Gender information available  0.406 (0.61) 0.187 (0.35) -0.0165 (0.42) 
Choose Hawkish  -0.335 (0.50) -0.206 (0.36) 0.124 (0.40) 
Choose Dovish  
      Base: Choose Equal  
-1.613** (0.65) -0.517 (0.51) 0.564 (0.41) 
Co-participant choose hawkish  0.385 (0.38) 0.351 (0.34) -0.209 (0.33) 
Co-participant choose dovish  
    Base: Co-participant choose equal  
0.918** (0.42) 0.267 (0.39) -0.054 (0.35) 
Coordination Achieved  -1.832*** (0.48) -0.985** (0.39) -0.527* (0.29) 
South-East Asian -0.653 (0.87) -0.619 (0.52) 0.616 (0.53) 
Western European -0.556 (0.82) -0.597 (0.48) 0.074 (0.52) 
Undergraduates 0.498 (0.86) 0.496 (0.51) -0.141 (0.42) 
Social Sciences Students 0.413 (0.67) 0.407 (0.43) -0.259 (0.49) 
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.108 (0.76) 0.941 (0.43) -0.030 (0.52) 
Constant -2.036** (0.94) -2.013*** (0.60) -2.080*** (0.72) 
No. of Obs. 360 360 360 
Wald chi2(11) 17.75 10.54 13.00 
Females 
Gender information available  0.098 (0.44) 0.263 (0.42) -0.381 (0.839)    
Choose Hawkish  -0.230 (0.40) 0.124 (0.40) -0.769 (0.882) 
Choose Dovish  
      Base: Choose Equal  
0.153 (0.39) 0.564 (0.41) -1.085 (0.873) 
Co-participant choose hawkish  -0.432 (0.34) -0.209 (0.33) -0.612 (0.951)  
Co-participant choose dovish  
    Base: Co-participant choose equal  
0.105 (0.34) -0.054 (0.35) 0.901 (0.692)  
Coordination Achieved  -0.942*** (0.30) -0.527* (0.29) n/a  
South-East Asian 0.505 (0.58) 0.616 (0.53) -1.156 (1.304) 
Western European 0.131 (0.57) 0.074 (0.52) 0.077 (1.08) 
Undergraduates -0.174 (0.46) -0.141 (0.42) -0.938 (1.027)    
Social Sciences Students -0.184 (0.53) -0.259 (0.49) 0.297 (1.162)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.352 (0.56) -0.030 (0.52) 1.479 (1.366)    
Constant -1.693** (0.73) -2.080*** (0.72) -3.146 (1.761)    
No. of Obs. 356 356 356 
Wald chi2(11) 12.87 8.41 3.76 
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Table 5.2.2.3(b). The effects of gender information on punishment decisions 
                            - NG-P-C (male subjects) v. G-P-C (MM Subjects) 
 All punishment “Slap on the wrist” “Full Monty” 
Gender information present 1.192* (0.65) 0.500 (0.40) 1.444 (1.02) 
Chose hawkish -0.297 (0.51) -0.104 (0.39) -0.294 (0.81) 
Chose dovish 
      Base: Chose equal 
-1.316** (0.67) -0.349 (0.53) -1.459 (0.96) 
Co-participant chose hawkish 0.347 (0.40) 0.255 (0.39) 0.390 (0.57) 
Co-participant chose dovish 
      Base: Co-participant chose equal 
0.955** (0.45) 0.269 (0.42) 1.289** (0.64) 
Coordination achieved in previous period -1.357*** (0.49) -0.679 (0.43) -1.394** (0.63) 
South/ South East Asian -0.841* (0.48)64 -0.846 (0.56) -1.575 (1.40) 
Western European -1.575 (0.87) -0.921 (0.56) -0.954 (1.32) 
Undergraduates -0.004 (0.82) 0.282 (0.53) -0.206 (1.26) 
Social Science students -0.063 (0.72) 0.032 (0.47) n/a 
Humanities Students 
       Base: Science and medicine students 
-0.658 (0.80) 0.712 (0.44) n/a  
Constant -0.542 (0.97) -1.581** (0.63) -1.951 (1.72) 
No. of Obs. 240 240 240 
Wald chi2(11) 13.65 7.98 9.57 
     
We also find that successful coordination decreases use of punishment for males and females 
(Table 5.2.2.3(a)). This is to be expected: Upon learning that coordination has been achieved 
subjects have had their expectations of a co-participant’s behaviour realised. There is thus no 
reason to punish. Therefore we conclude with result 12 below:  
Result 12: With the compromise option available, successful 
coordination decreases punishment 
We therefore accept hypothesis 1a. Successful coordination does indeed reduce punishment 
behaviours.  It is interesting that Dreber et al. (2008) conclude that “winners don’t punish” in 
the prisoner’s dilemma game. Here we find that those who have their behavioural expectations 
met and therefore coordinate with a co-participant are less likely to punish.  It is not only winners 
that don’t punish but also those who “win” in the sense of having expectations met and securing 
an outcome that was aimed for.  
 Due to this strong result suggesting that coordination does indeed reduce punishment 
rates we also test if this result is driven by coordination on an equal or unequal outcome. Due to 
a lack of observations in each of these coordination categories we run these regressions only 
                                                 
64 Due to significance on this on the South/ South East Asian variable we also run robustness checks using only 
the relevant sub samples to compare coefficients. When we restrict the sample to South/ South East Asians only 
the regression would not converge. However when we restrict it to non-South/ South East Asians only we find 
that the magnitude of the treatment variable does not change significantly and remains significant. 
Non South/ South East Asians: Coefficient (All Punishment) = 1.188162*, p = 0.4707 
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with all punishment decisions pooled. We observe a number of interesting phenomenon. We 
note that for all subjects pooled, as well as males and females separately, if subjects achieve 
coordination on an equal outcome, punishment decisions are reduced. However for females, 
coordination on the BOS section of the game leads to an increased in punishment decisions (β 
= 2.101).  
Table 5.2.2.3(c). The effects of gender information on punishment decisions (Punishment 
     type pooled) 
 All Subjects Males Females    
Gender information available  -0.085 (0.36) 0.224 (0.60) -0.409 (0.48)    
Choose Hawkish  -1.466*** (0.44) -1.329*(0.69) -1.595***(0.58)    
Choose Dovish  
      Base: Choose Equal  
-1.936*** (0.53) -2.069** (0.87) -1.792*** (0.67)    
Co-participant choose hawkish  -0.325 (0.40) -0.295 (0.63) -0.228 (0.54)    
Co-participant choose dovish  
    Base: Co-participant choose equal  
-1.892*** (0.51) 
-2.115*** 
(0.81) 
-1.613** (0.66)    
Coordination on BOS section achieved 1.750*** (0.51) 1.069 (0.88) 2.101*** (0.68)    
Coordination on equal achieved -3.138*** (0.56) 
-2.944*** 
(0.84) 
-3.277*** (0.76)    
South-East Asian 0.145 (0.49) -0.451 (0.89) 0.482 (0.62)    
Western European -0.117 (0.48) -0.246 (0.82) -0.216 (0.61)    
Males -0.103 (0.34) n/a n/a 
Undergraduates 0.082 (0.43) 0.654 (0.88) -0.031 (0.50)    
Social Sciences Students 0.090 (0.41) 0.242 (0.66) -0.120 (0.57)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.256 (0.47) 0.167 (0.72) 0.299 (0.62)    
Constant -0.482 (0.72) -1.191 (1.11) -0.192 (0.93)    
No. of Obs. 895 450 445 
Wald chi2(13)/ Wald chi2(12)65 61.04 25.70 (12) 37.89 (12) 
    
However without the compromise option available, we find that successful coordination in no 
longer universally a reducer of punishment behaviours for males and females. In this case 
successful coordination only reduces “Slap on the Wrist” behaviours when we pool both genders 
(β = -0.332). (see table 5.2.2.4 below – results for males and females separately at shown in the 
appendix in Table 5.2.2.4.(a)) 
                                                 
65 First value is for all students, the second value is for males/ females 
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Result 13: Without the compromise option available, coordination only 
reduces “Slap on the Wrist” behaviours (subjects pooled) but does not 
reduce overall punishment or “Full Monty” punishment 
We therefore have partial evidence to support hypothesis 1a in the game without 
compromise. 
Combining both the results from the comparisons of treatments with the compromise 
option and without, it is striking that successful coordination only reduces punishment 
universally for both genders if subjects had three strategies options available – i.e. subjects who 
had the compromise option available. When subjects were only playing two strategy options – 
i.e. the pure battle of the sexes game without the compromise option – we find that the decision 
to punish “Full Monty” is not effected by successful coordination but that “Slap on the Wrist” 
is effected  (= -0.332*) when we pool subjects.  
Table 5.2.2.4. The effects of gender information on punishment decisions - NG-P-NC v. G-P-NC 
  All Punishment 
“Slap on the 
Wrist” 
“Full Monty” 
All subjects 
Gender information present -0.024 (0.35) 0.064 (0.30) -0.083 (0.22)  
Chose hawkish 
      Base: Chose dovish 
0.080 (0.22) -0.062 (0.22) 0.247 (0.23) 
Co-participant chose hawkish 
      Base: Co-participant chose 
dovish 
-0.190 (0.20) -0.170 (0.20) 0.038 (0.21)  
Coordination achieved -0.254 (0.19) -0.332* (0.20) 0.049 (0.20) 
South/ South East Asian -0.248 (0.44) -0.420 (0.37) 0.270 (0.30)  
Western European 
-1.034** 
(0.47)66 
-0.921** (0.40) -0.331 (0.32  
Males -0.036 (0.35) -0.129 (0.31) 0.112 (0.23)  
Undergraduates -0.163 (0.37) -0.150 (0.32) 0.020 (0.24) 
Social science students -0.254 (0.38) -0.202 (0.32) -0.130 (0.25) 
Humanities students 
      Base: Science & medicine 
students 
-0.609 (0.50) -0.487 (0.43) -0.165 (0.32  
Constant -1.093* (0.57) -1.000** (0.50) 
-2.089*** 
(0.46)  
No. of Obs. 716 716 716 
Wald chi2(10) 11.32 11.43 6.05 
 
                                                 
66 Again in order to check the robustness of the insignificance of our treatment variable in this regression we run the same 
regression with Western European and non-Western European sub set of the data respectively for the dependent variables All 
Punishment and “Slap on the Wrist”. We find no significant differences between the coefficients on our treatment variable – 
“Gender information present” – when we examine these two subgroups compared to when we examine the whole population. 
We see this as evidence of the robustness of our results 
Western Europeans:  Coefficient(All Punishment) = -0.069633, p = 0.9923, Coefficient(Slap on the Wrist”) = 0.1613337, p =  0.6430 
Non Western European. Coefficient(All Punishment) = 0.0644476, p = 0.6747, Coefficient(Slap on the Wrist) = 0.0239556, p = 0.7359 
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5.3. Effects of punishment on expected payoffs 
We now consider the effects of punishment on subjects expected payoffs. When we are not 
considering losses incurred due to punishment we calculate these in the same way as detailed in 
chapter one. When we consider the expected payoffs incorporating losses from punishment 
(both from infliction of punishment itself and costs incurred inflicting punishment) we use the 
same method but also subtract from the expected payoffs the observed probability of being 
punished/ having punishment inflicted multiplied by the cost incurred. In the table below we 
present expected payoffs in the game and also the effect that the presence of a punishment 
technology has on payoffs. In the final column we present the percentage difference when 
punishment costs are factored into the calculation of final expected payoffs and in the 
penultimate column we present expected payoff differences without punishment expenditures 
being considered.  
 If we don’t consider punishment expenditures, we note that in all treatment comparisons 
apart from those with gender information and without compromise, payoffs are higher when 
punishment is present. The increase in payoffs is also most striking in the treatment where the 
compromise option was present (12.7% with gender information and 10.49% without gender 
information). However when we factor in the costs of punishment the results show that subjects 
consistently achieve much lower payoffs in the punishment treatment. Again the decrease in 
expected payoffs is particularly high in the treatments with compromise (-66.24% and -46.7% 
with and without gender information respectively). These results appear to correspond to results 
found by Abbink et al. (2010) that whilst the presence of punishment increases payoffs when 
punishment expenditures are not considered, when punishment expenditures are considered the 
positive effects of this technology are eroded.  
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Table 5.3.1. Effects of the presence of punishment on expected payoffs 
 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
Through a unique experimental design we examine at the intersection between gender 
information, punishment and payoffs structure and observe some interesting patterns of 
behaviour. We find that individual choices and behaviours not only depend on the presence of 
punishment or but also on strategy options available to subjects.  
 With regard to individual choices in the games we find some interesting effects of the 
treatment variables that we vary. We find differences in choice behaviour between treatments 
both with and without the compromise option available. We also find that the effects of the 
threat of punishment on behaviour are not realised without the presence of gender information 
and vice versa. With regard to the effects of punishment technology we find that it is when a 
subject plays against a member of the opposite gender that the effects of the punishment 
technology are realised. Both males and females playing against someone of the opposite sex 
(in the dynamic model) move towards using the equal strategy and clearly see the threat of 
punishment as motivation to choose the equal outcome. In a human resources setting this could 
suggest that the threat of punishment is only effective in bringing about equitable outcomes if 
interactions are between those of the opposite gender.   
With regard to punishment decisions we find that in the first period it is only males 
playing against males who increase rates of punishment rates compared to their male 
counterparts in the presence of the compromise option. Investigating this further in the dynamic 
                                                 
67 This column indicates the % difference in payoffs between the NP and P treatments when we do not consider 
punishment expenditure in the P treatment 
68 This column indicates the % difference in payoffs between the NP and P treatments when we do consider 
punishment expenditure in the P treatment 
 
Expected Payoffs 
(not including 
costs of 
punishment) 
Expected Payoffs 
(including costs 
of punishment) 
% difference (not 
including costs of 
punishment)67 
% difference 
(including costs 
of punishment)68 
G-NP-NC 12.40 n/a 
-0.64% -25.65% 
G-P-NC 12.32 9.58 
G-NP-C 6.76 n/a 
12.7% -66.24% 
G-P-C 7.68 3.40 
NG-NP-NC 11.97 n/a 
1.55% -27.50% 
NG-P-NC 12.15 9.07 
NG-NP-C 6.82 n/a 
10.49% -46.7% 
NG-P-C 7.57 4.24 
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model we find that it is males who are more aggressive in their punishment decisions than 
females. Gender is clearly an important element in punishment decisions with males exhibiting 
more aggressive behaviour than females.  
Finally, we find multiple evidence that the compromise option is important in how 
decisions are made as evidenced by the fact that results in comparable treatments both with and 
without compromise are found to be different with different variables found to impact on 
individual decisions in the experiment.   
We hope that this experiment has provided some interesting insights into the interaction 
between gender, punishment and game structure in the coordination game and can motivate 
further research into the relevant areas. For example it would be interesting to further investigate 
the effects of repeated games and also to investigate how punishment will affect behaviour with 
difference payoffs in the coordination game. 
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1. Introduction and literature review 
 
When faced with a coordination problem in everyday life we are often able to communicate 
with the person with whom we are trying to coordinate our behaviour. However, we may not 
know the people we are coordinating with and have no prior knowledge of their beliefs, 
expectations or behavioural patterns. For example many of us shop on classified ad sites (for 
example gumtree or freeads). In these situations we are often faced with a state of affairs in 
which we must bargain with a person of whom we have no prior knowledge. Barter also often 
takes place in a similar context. We report data from an economic bargaining experiment in 
which communication with an unknown and anonymous person is allowed in order to further 
investigate this. An additional important motivation of this paper is to understand the nature of 
an efficiency-equality trade-off. Using an experimental methodology we investigate, in various 
configurations, if subjects coordinate on an equal split of resources because they have a 
preference for it or, because it serves as a coordination device in the absence of communication. 
In the economics literature communication has been studied in a number of contexts and 
using a number of forms of communication technology.  In these experiments communication 
can take a number of forms: for example in some experiments written free-form communication 
between subjects is permitted (for example in Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) using a trust 
game, Cooper & Kühn (2014) using a collusion game, Feltovich & Swierzbinski (2011) using 
a Nash demand game). In others studies subjects are only given restricted opportunities to 
communicate. For example Cooper & Lightle (2013) use a bilateral exchange game and only 
allow one way communication, Vanberg (2008) use a dictator game and allow each subject to 
send only two messages to a co-participant with a maximum of 90 characters each, Isoni et al. 
(2014) restrict communication to mouse clicking whilst Xiao & Houser (2005) and Xiao & 
Houser (2009) use an ultimatum game and dictator game respectively and allow the recipient to 
send one message to express an emotion regarding an offer received. 
We now consider in more detail the literature combining elements of communication and 
coordination which offer some interesting results. For example, Bornstein & Gilula (2003) use 
communication both within and between groups in both a stag-hunt game and a chicken game 
and find that communication is only effective in achieving efficient outcomes in the stag hunt 
game but not in the chicken game. They conclude that communication is effective in inducing 
effective coordination if fear is a motivating factor (stag-hunt game) and not if the motivating 
factor is greed (chicken game). Duffy & Feltovich (2002) also find the same result using one 
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way communication, finding that cheap talk increases payoffs and efficiency but that relative 
increases are dependent on game structure. Brandts & Cooper (2007) use a weak-link game and 
find that communication (as opposed to incentives) by a “manager” is the most effective way to 
remove coordination failure. Moreno & Wooders (1998) find that the assumptions of Nash 
equilibrium (in particular individualistic and independent behaviour) are violated when subjects 
are able to communicate freely before the game in a matching pennies game.  
Our experiment uses coordination games and, with regard to game type, our experiments are 
most closely linked to those of Farrell (1987) and Cooper et al. (1989) who study battle of the 
sexes games with one-way communication. However our experiments provide greater insights 
into how the payoff structure of the game and unrestricted communication affects behaviour. A 
key prediction of the model proposed by Farrell (1987) is that communication raises overall 
coordination, but does not change the relative probability that a certain equilibrium coordination 
outcome will be achieved. His model predicts that in a battle of the sexes type game cheap talk 
will increase coordination, but not to 100%. We observe that cheap talk increases coordination 
to almost 100% (94.44%) in a simple battle of the sexes type game. Similarly, Cooper at al. 
(1989) use a one-shot battle of sexes game and allow either one or both subjects in a pairing to 
send a message to a co-participant stating their intended action. They find that one way 
communication is the most effective way of increasing coordination but that two way 
communication was also effective. We find coordination rates similar to Cooper et al. (1989) in 
their one-sided communication treatment but increased coordination compared to their two-
sided communication treatment.   
In our experiment we use free form communication between pairs of participants. Of 
course, our decision to use free form communication does leave us with a trade-off between 
obtaining a rich source of conversations and conversational patterns (as free communication 
naturally gives us) and the ease with which conversations can be classified for statistical 
analysis. For example, if we would have provided subjects with a limited number of fixed type 
messages which they could send to a co-participant (e.g. “I am going to take the higher 
amount”, “I think we should go equal” etc.) then we would have had a “ready-made” dataset 
from our conversations but would have sacrificed the rich, varied and natural types of 
conversations we are able to observe here. We felt that this was a trade-off worth making and 
will describe in more detail in the relevant section below how we went about coding the free 
form conversations in preparation for analysis. The following papers also provide us with the 
motivation to analyse and look deeper into the content of conversations: Ben-Ner et al. (2011) 
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find that free communication increases trust and trustworthiness in a trust game, but also find 
that the content, and not just availability per se, of chat is important to outcomes.  Zultan (2012) 
also finds the content of conversations is important: He finds that responders’ strategies in the 
ultimatum game are only affected when subjects are free to talk about strategies but not when 
talk of strategies is restricted. In the investment game Buchan et al. (2006) find that 
communication increases other regarding preferences and that even strategy irrelevant 
conversations change behaviour. In addition McGinn et al. (2012) use a collusion game and only 
allow subjects restricted chat from one of two menus/treatments – one menu contains fairness 
type messages e.g. “I would rather be fair”/ “Split or quit!” and the other contains competitive 
reasoning type chat e.g. “The stronger subjects ought to have the larger piece of the pie”/ “I just 
would like to make more money”69 They find that in the treatment where restricted fairness talk 
was permitted, equally divided but off-equilibrium payoffs were the norm. However in the 
competitive reasoning treatment subjects tend not to go for equitable payoffs. 
This paper proceeds as follows: In section two we look at the theoretical predictions of the 
effects of communication and the games we used in this experiment. In section three we describe 
the experimental design, in section four we examine our hypotheses and treatment comparisons 
and finally in section five we report the results from our experiment both with regards to choices/ 
outcomes and conversational content.  We conclude with a discussion in section six. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Cheap talk 
 
 Cheap talk has received some attention in the economics literature (For a review see 
Farrell & Rabin, 1996). In games where subjects may have trouble predicting what their co-
participant with do (for example in asymmetric coordination games where no outcome is 
considered focal) cheap talk may be particularly effective in bridging this gap in knowledge and 
expectations. Therefore if cheap talk leads to agreement on an alternative equilibrium as 
compared to when no communication is available, and in this case participants believe it is both 
in their own interest and the interest of a co-participant to proceed as they specified during cheap 
talk, then this alternative equilibrium should be achieved. In this case the Nash equilibrium is 
self-fulfilling after cheap talk has been completed as it is enforced by subjects wanting to 
                                                 
69 A full list of the menus available in each treatment can be found in McGinn et al. (2012), p.282 
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coordinate in order to achieve higher earnings as defecting may lead to lower earnings since 
mis-coordination leads to zero earnings from the game. Therefore if subjects are rational and 
profit-maximising we would expect that communication in the game will be both credible and 
truthful and expected to be as such by all subjects playing the game. We will investigate the 
effects of cheap talk further through our experimental design which will be described in the next 
section. 
 
2.2. The Games 
 
We use four games in this experiment for which we use the following abbreviations: BOS, 
BOS-E1, BOS-E2 and BOS-E3. Also, in order to differentiate between treatments using the 
same game but with and without communication we prefix the game abbreviations with C for 
games with communication and NC for games without communication.  
We will now describe the games in more specific detail and will compute both the Pure 
Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) with a more 
detailed calculation of the MSNE provided in the appendix. The amounts below were presented 
to subjects in pounds sterling (£).  Therefore whilst payoffs shown here are subjective payoffs, 
if subjects are self-interested and risk neutral, then payoffs can be represented by the money 
amounts in sterling since expected utility in not affected by linear transformations.  
Our baseline (BOS) game takes the following form: 
 
Table 2.2.1. Battle of the Sexes (BOS) 
  Subject 2 
  
Hawkish 
(2) 
Dovish 
(1-2) 
Subject 1 
Hawkish 
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (8, 6) 
Dovish 
(1-1 ) 
(6, 8) (0, 0) 
 
The BOS game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria namely {Hawkish, Dovish}{Dovish, 
Hawkish}.  
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There is another symmetric Nash equilibrium, where each player chooses Hawkish with 
probability 
4
7
 and Dovish with probability 
3
7
 . In this mixed equilibrium each player earns 
expected payoffs of £3.429.  
Our second game, BOS-E1 has three pure strategy Nash equilibria namely {Hawkish, 
Dovish} {Dovish, Hawkish} {Equal, Equal}. 
 
Table 2.2.2. Battle of the Sexes with a Pareto dominated equal split (BOS-E1) 
   Subject 2  
  Hawkish (2) Dovish (2) 
Equal 
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish 
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (8, 6) (0, 0) 
Subject 1 
Dovish 
(
1
) 
(6, 8) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Equal 
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (5, 5) 
 
There are other Nash equilibria, where each player chooses Hawkish with probability 
20
59 
 , 
Dovish with probability 
15
59
 and Equal with probability 
24
59
. In this mixed equilibrium each player 
earns expected payoffs of £2.034.  There is another symmetric Nash equilibrium – the one in 
which the players mix Dovish and Hawkish, as in the BOS, without playing Equal - for which 
the probabilities are given above in the analysis. There also exists an MSNE where subject 1 
mixes between a strategy of choosing hawkish and equal and subject 2 mixes between a strategy 
of choosing dovish and equal.  Here player 1 plays hawkish with probability 
5
11
 and equal with 
probability 
6
11
 and player 2 plays dovish with probability 
5
13
 and equal with probability 
8
13
 . The 
value of expected payoffs from playing this MSNE is £3.077  for subject 1 and £2.727  for 
subject 2. 
Our third game, BOS-E2 has, as in BOS-E1, three pure strategy Nash equilibria specifically 
{Hawkish, Dovish}{Dovish, Hawkish}{Equal, Equal}. 
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Table 2.2.3. Battle of the Sexes with a weakly Pareto dominated equal split (BOS-E2) 
   Subject 2  
  Hawkish (2) Dovish (2) 
Equal 
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish 
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (8, 5) (0, 0) 
Subject 1 
Dovish 
(
1
) 
(5, 8) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Equal 
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (5, 5) 
 
There is another symmetric Nash equilibrium, where each player chooses Hawkish with 
probability 
8
21
 , Dovish with probability 
5
21
 and Equal with probability 
8
21
. In this mixed 
equilibrium each player earns expected payoffs of £1.905.  There is another symmetric Nash 
equilibrium – the one in which the players mix Dovish and Hawkish, as in the BOS, without 
playing Equal - where each player chooses Hawkish with probability 
8
13
  and Dovish with 
probability 
5
13
. In this mixed equilibrium each player earns expected payoffs of £3.07. There 
also exists an MSNE where subject 1 mixes between a strategy of choosing hawkish and equal 
and subject 2 mixes between a strategy of choosing dovish and equal.  Here player 1 plays 
hawkish with probability  
1
2
 and equal with probability 
1
2
 and player 2 plays dovish with 
probability 
5
13
 and equal with probability 
8
13
 . The value of expected payoffs from playing this 
MSNE is £3.077  for subject 1 and £2.692 for subject 2. 
Our fourth game, BOS-E3 has, as in BOS-E1, three pure strategy Nash equilibria 
specifically {Hawkish, Dovish}{Dovish, Hawkish}{Equal, Equal}. 
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Table 2.2.4. Battle of the Sexes with a Pareto dominated equal split (BOS-E3) 
   Subject 2  
  Hawkish (2) Dovish (2) 
Equal 
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish 
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (18, 6) (0, 0) 
Subject 1 
Dovish 
(
1
) 
(6, 18) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Equal 
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (5, 5) 
 
There are other Nash equilibria, where each player chooses Hawkish with probability 
15
38
 , 
Dovish with probability 
5
38
  and Equal with probability 
18
38
. In this mixed equilibrium each player 
earns expected payoffs of £2.368.  There is another symmetric Nash equilibrium – the one in 
which the players mix Dovish and Hawkish, as in the BOS, without playing Equal - where each 
player chooses Hawkish with probability 
3
4
  and Dovish with probability 
1
4
. In this mixed 
equilibrium each player earns expected payoffs of £4.50. There also exists an MSNE where 
subject 1 mixes between a strategy of choosing hawkish and equal and subject 2 mixes between 
a strategy of choosing dovish and equal.  Here player 1 plays hawkish with probability 
5
11
 and 
equal with probability 
6
11
 and player 2 plays dovish with probability  
5
23
 and equal with 
probability  
18
23
 . The value of expected payoffs from playing this MSNE is £3.913  for subject 1 
and £2.727  for subject 2. 
It should be noted that in all games with a possible equal split the expected payoffs from 
playing a MSNE are less than those which can be achieved through achieving coordination on 
an equal spilt of earnings. Therefore if subjects in the tacit (non-communication) games are able 
to use these equal splits as a focal point in the game we would expect them to achieve higher 
expected payoffs than otherwise. This would also suggest that if communication allows subjects 
to break symmetry in the game (thus allowing them to coordinate on one of the asymmetric pure 
strategy Nash equilibria) we will see much higher payoffs for subjects in the communication 
games as compared to those without communication. 
The games are related in the following ways. In the BOS (Battle of the Sexes) game subjects 
can only coordinate on an inequitable payoff outcome (apart from the equitable outcome from 
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mis-coordination (0,0)). In BOS-E1 we add one payoff option: an inefficient yet equitable 
(hence the E prefix) split. We will show in more detail below how the unequal part of the 
distribution strictly Pareto dominates the equitable part of the game. In the BOS-E2 game the 
unequal part of the distribution only weakly Pareto dominates the equitable portion. In BOS-E3 
we increase the inequality of the unequal split.  
The ways in which the games differ and are related to one another are also shown in the 
flow diagram here: 
 
 
Figure 2.2.1. The relationship between the games   
 
A graphic representation of the games is also shown here. It illustrates how the combined 
value of the highest possible coordination payoffs (i.e. coordination on the BOS section of each 
game) changes between games with higher financial gains available represented by lines closer 
to the top right of the grid. It also shows how the dispersion of the payoffs available through 
coordination on the BOS section changes as illustrated by the distance between the two points 
on each line. The difference between these payoffs in comparison with the potential equitable 
outcome (5, 5) is also illustrated by the distance of the lines from this point: 
BOS
Add an equal 
inefficient split 
which is 
pareto 
inefficient 
compared to 
the BOS 
Section
BOS-E1
BOS section 
becomes only 
weakly pareto 
efficient
BOS-E2
Increase in the 
degree of 
inequality in 
the BOS 
section (BOS 
section 
remains 
pareto 
efficient)
BOS-E3
  
134 
 
 
Figure 2.2.2. Graphic representation of payoff differences 
 
Throughout this paper we will use the notation introduced above to describe the games. We 
will also describe the strategies used in the games as “Dovish”, “Hawkish” and “Equal” in the 
results section. Therefore if, for example, a subject is described as choosing a “Dovish” strategy, 
when the subject chose the lower of the two unequal options, “Hawkish” when the subject 
chooses the higher of the two unequal options and “Equal” when the subject chooses an 
equitable option. In addition we will describe the battle of the sexes portion of each game (i.e. 
the section which incorporates the Hawkish and Dovish Strategy) as the “BOS section”. 
 An interesting finding that we can glean from using the coordination games above is to 
investigate how, not only own payoffs, but also the payoffs of others affect behaviour (See for 
example Charness & Rabin, 2002, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). It is also worth noting here that 
whilst the gap between inequitable payoff outcomes is consistent between BOS and BOS-E1, it 
is increasing between these games and the BOS-E2 and BOS-E3 games. Therefore the total 
amount of money available to subjects is changing, as well as the degree of inequality in payoffs, 
with these two games. We would aim to further disentangle these effects in future treatments. If 
  
135 
 
players do have such a high level of inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) in partnerships 
then we would expect that, regardless of the magnitude of combined gains to be made from 
coordinating on an inequitable outcome, inequitable strategy options would remain unpopular. 
However if subjects are concerned with ”social-welfare preferences” (Charness & Rabin, 2002) 
we would expect to see subjects using the inequitable outcomes regardless of the magnitude of 
inequality, if this inequality is able to bring about a Pareto improvement in payoffs for both 
parties. We would not expect to see Pareto damaging behaviours in order to bring about 
inequality. 
We also choose these games since most other coordination games do not have an equal 
earnings outcome (apart from the degenerate zero earnings from coordination failure). However 
in previous experiments without communication it has been found that an outcome that 
efficiently equates money earnings (where this is available) is very often selected by subjects in 
tacit coordination and bargaining situations.  (See for example van Huyck et al., 1992, Nydegger 
& Owen, 1974,  Holm, 2000, Bett et al., 2013, Isoni et al., 2013, Isoni et al., 2014).  
 By a comparison of the games described above we will be able to see if these different 
distributions and payoff asymmetries affect behaviours in different ways and, more specifically, 
they allow us to investigate in some detail the interplay between Pareto domination and equality, 
and subsequently the interaction with the ability to communicate.  To our knowledge there are 
only limited studies where communication and the possibility of an equal split in a coordination 
game are studied. One paper which does look at the effects of an equal spilt is that of Herreiner 
& Puppe (2010). They allow subjects to communicate proposals to each other in an allocation 
game and find that splitting money equally is favoured even if this is Pareto dominated and that 
subjects tend to use equality as a starting point for bargaining. An unequal outcome is only 
considered as viable if there is not “too much” inequality. Interestingly Herreiner & Puppe (2010) 
do not investigate further “how” inequitable Pareto improvements are bargained for.  A 
comparison of our games above will allow us to investigate this further.  
We also believe that the framing and structure of the payoffs in the games provides us with 
some interesting insights into subjects’ social preferences in the experiment: The nature of how 
subjects discuss and choose options means that in declaring a preferred division a subject is not 
only declaring what division of the “pie” he/she would like, but also the share of the “pie” which 
he/she believes a co-participant should receive. We represent games in a very clear “£… for you, 
£…for your co-participant” fashion and so the nature of this representation of the divisions 
should be clear to subjects. We also do not directly present the £0 outcomes to subjects from 
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mis-coordination. However it was made very clear to subjects that mis-coordination or 
disagreement on distributions would lead to zero earnings from the game. We see our 
representation of the game as very different from, for example, that of Isoni et al. (2013) and 
Isoni et al. (2014), where graphic representations of bargaining type games are used. In these 
games subjects are instructed to select which “disc” (with each disc representing an amount of 
money for the subject) they would like to choose for themselves from a selection of discs. 
Subjects had to agree on a division of discs (i.e. such that each disc is chosen by one subject and 
no disc is in dispute) in order to receive the amount of money claimed for. Whilst this is also a 
bargaining type game, in the Isoni et al. (2013) design subjects are not explicitly suggesting a 
distribution between themselves and a co-participant. Our design, in contrast, allows us to 
examine the interlink between own entitlements and what a subject feels a co-participant should 
receive. It could be envisioned that there is a balance between our design and modelling many 
real bargaining problems since in real bargaining, each player often has very little information 
about the other’s utility payoffs. We also believe that our design offers very interesting insights 
into the social preference literature since we are able to analyse the extent to which the 
conversations and the resulting agreements support social preference models e.g. inequality 
aversion. The rich communication protocol in our experiment also provides us with strong 
insights into social preferences as it allows us to gain insights into examining subjects’ 
motivations and decision making processes. However, whilst the conversations allow for a 
“window” through which we can “directly” gauge people’s motivations and social preferences 
it also important to see the limitations of this since allowing people to talk may change the social 
preferences themselves, since talking may reduce the “social distance” between people.   
 
3. Experimental Design and Implementation 
3.1. Practicalities 
 
Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) using a subject pool available 
through the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science at the University of East 
Anglia which, at the time of the experiment, provided a database of over 2000 potential subjects. 
Since our experiment involved free communication we only recruited subjects who had declared 
their country of origin as one where English is the primary official language. There are various 
studies in the field of linguistics which suggest that the ability to speak a language at native level 
can be used as a method of exerting verbal power over a non-native speaker of the language and 
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that a native speaker is potentially more powerful in an interaction than a non-native speaker. 
For example Kramsch (1993) asserts that “An individual who is communicating in a second 
language is ‘in a position of uncommon subordination and powerlessness’” (Kramsch, 1993, 
p.238). We thus control for communication ability and fluency (within reason) amongst subjects 
by only recruiting native speakers (See also Bower, 1966 and Byram, 1997 for further discussion 
of communication ability). As a secondary control we also asked all subjects if they were a 
native speaker of English at the end of the experiment, and all subjects reported that English 
was indeed their native language. Upon arrival subjects were asked to draw a random number 
out of a bag in order to determine the individual partitioned computer booth each would sit it 
and then pairings were randomly assigned by the computer. Once all subjects had arrived and 
settled, instructions were put on a computer screen in front of each subject and were also read 
aloud by an experimenter in order to ensure understanding and instructions were common 
knowledge amongst participants. The experimenter clearly explained how subjects could earn 
money and the one-shot nature of the game after which questions were encouraged and 
subsequently answered appropriately and publically. After the instructions had been completed 
subjects were shown a screen on which the game was displayed. The payoff options were 
presented in text form (£... for Person 1 and £… for Person 2) and the order in which the options 
were presented was randomised in order to control for order effects. However pairs of subjects 
always saw the options in the same order (and were aware of this) in order to facilitate ease of 
communication.  Therefore, each subject had complete information about their own and a co-
participant’s possible payoffs. This is illustrated in the screen shot taken from the experiment 
(in this case from the BOS game treatment) below: 
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Figure 3.1.1. Screen shot from the game screen 
 
In addition, in the communication treatments, we had to introduce subjects to the 
communication protocol. Since we allowed free form communication we allowed subjects to 
decide on the content of messages and to decide how many messages to write.  Each matched 
pair of subjects had 120 seconds (as in Feltovich & Swierzbinski, 2011) to freely exchange as 
many written messages as they wished. There were no constraints on the content, except that 
subjects were not allowed to identify themselves or use abusive language. This was made clear 
in the instructions. (See Roth, 1995 for further discussion on the importance of anonymous 
communication in experiments, Buchan et al., 2006 for a discussion of the effect of personal 
identifying conversation on game play and Dawes et al., 1977 for evidence of how uncontrolled 
conversation can lead to threats and name calling). A screen shot of the chat screen (together 
with a theoretical conversation for illustration purposes only) is shown below: 
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Figure 3.1.2. Screen shot for the chat screen 
 
As can be seen from the figure above the chat box made it very clear to subjects how 
payoffs could be distributed with regard to payoffs. That is, on the top left subjects were again 
reminded which player  number they were and also in the chat box subjects saw “you” in 
brackets next to their own person number when they entered and sent text. We felt that this was 
important to aid the flow of conversations and to ensure payoffs were clearly understood and 
indeed in the experiment subjects seemed very comfortable and clear about this (as can be 
evidenced by examining the full conversation scripts in the appendix of this paper). The timer 
in the top right of the screen also counted down the amount of time subjects had left in this stage. 
In the sessions without communication, subjects had 120 seconds to silently consider what to 
do but the layout of the screen remained exactly the same minus the chat elements of the screen 
shot above. In all treatments the screen automatically timed out after 120 seconds after which 
subjects’ screens were moved onto the pre-decision screen (a reminder of the game). After all 
decisions had been made subjects were shown the results of the game.  
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4. Treatments and Hypotheses 
 
Our experiment thus consisted of a 2x4 factorial design with two communication types 
and four game types. These treatments allow us to assess how rich communication effects 
behaviour in the games described above and are presented together with subject numbers in 
table 4.1 below.  
 
Table 4.1. Treatment table with subject numbers 
 Game 
 BOS BOS-E1 BOS-E2 BOS-E3 
Without 
communication  
(NC-treatment) 
36 38 34 40 
With communication  
(C-treatment) 
36 52 38 40 
 
4.1. Treatment Comparisons 
 
The following treatment comparisons can thus easily be made in either the 
communication or no communication treatments: 
 
BOS v. BOS-E1 – The effects of an equitable alternative 
By comparing these two treatments we can observe the effects of adding an inefficient yet 
equitable payoff option. If subjects are very inequality adverse (as in Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) we 
may expect that subjects will be attracted to an equitable outcome despite its inefficiency. 
 
BOS-E1 v. BOS-E2 – The effects of making the BOS only weakly Pareto dominant 
By comparing these two treatments we can observe differences in behaviour if only one subject 
can gain from moving onto the BOS section of the game as in BOS-E2 
 
BOS-E1 v. BOS-E3 – The effects of increased inequality in the BOS section 
By comparing these two treatments we can observe the effects of an increase in inequality of 
the BOS section.  
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It is also clear that a comparison of the effects of communication on all treatments individually 
between C-BOS v. NC-BOS; C-BOS-E1 v. NC-BOS-E1; C-BOS-E2 v. NC-BOS-E2 and C-
BOS-E3 v. NC-BOS-E3 is also possible. 
 
4.2. Hypotheses 
 
We will explore the following hypotheses in the results section. 
 
Hypothesis 1: (Schelling Play) A focal outcome will be used more when there is no 
communication 
 
We hypothesise that in the game without communication subjects will 
seek a way in which to solve the coordination game successfully by choosing an 
outcome which is focal. In our games, subjects have a mutual interest in 
coordinating as coordination leads to greater financial gain than if mis-
coordination occurs and thus subjects have an interest in identifying a 
coordinating strategy with a co-participant. We would hypothesise that this will 
be validated in situations where a symmetric and equitable outcome is available 
since the equitable properties of this outcome may make it focal to subjects, i.e. 
in BOS-E1, BOS-E2 and BOS-E3.  We would therefore expect to see higher 
coordination on an equitable strategy in the game without communication as 
compared to games with communication since it serves as a focal yet inefficient 
coordination device relative to a non-focal inequitable outcome. To elaborate, a 
certain outcome may be deemed to be focal even in the absence of 
communication: Schelling illustrated this point in his seminal 1960 work “The 
Strategy of Conflict” in which he asserts that participants in a coordination game 
may be able to solve a coordination game even without communication if a 
coordination outcome seems “special” or “unique” to them and the participants 
believe that this “knowledge” will be salient to a co-participant as well.   
 
Comparisons: NC-BOS v. C-BOS, NC-BOS-E1 v. C-BOS-E1, NC-BOS-E2 v. C-BOS-
E2, NC-BOS v. C-BOS  
 
  
142 
 
Hypothesis 2: (Testing Conditional Pareto Improvement from Equal Split)  
Subjects will use an equitable strategy more when abandoning it leads to higher inequality 
 
Herreiner & Puppe (2010) suggest that subjects will only abandon an 
equitable strategy if it does not induce too much inequality. Thus we would 
expect that we will see more coordination on the equitable outcome in BOS-E3 
compared to BOS-E1 since, whilst the equitable coordination outcome remains 
the same in both games, the degree of inequality in the inequitable outcome 
increases substantially in BOS-E3.  
 
Comparisons: NC-BOS-E1 v. NC-BOS-E3 and C-BOS-E1 v. C-BOS-E3 
 
Hypothesis 3: (Cheap talk) The existence of communication will increase coordination. 
 
Farrell (1987) show that cheap talk will increase coordination. Thus we 
would expect that in the communication treatments coordination (and as a result 
payoffs) will be higher. 
 
Comparisons: C-BOS v. NC-BOS, C-BOS-E1 v. NC-BOS-E1, C-BOS-E2 v. NC-BOS-E2 and 
C-BOS-E3 v. NC-BOS-E3 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Summary 
 
We first provide a summary of subject demographics in each treatment. Based on which 
demographic variables have sufficient variation across all treatments, in our probit analysis we 
will use dummies on males (54.78%), single subjects (51.02%), those who declared a religion 
(31.53%), and those aged 21 and over (37.58%). 
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Table 5.1.1. Summary of Demographic Data (Percentage/ average, number of subjects/ Standard deviation70) 
 
BOS BOS-E1 BOS-E2 BOS-E3 
C NC C NC C NC C NC 
No of Subjects 36 36 52 38 38 34 40 40 
United Kingdom71 100% (36) 94.44% (34) 86.54% (45) 86.84% (33) 97.37% (37) 91.18% (31) 80% (32) 95% (38) 
Male  58.33% (21) 50% (18) 69.23% (36) 36.84% (14) 52.63% (20) 44.12% (15) 57.5% (23) 62.5% (25) 
Average age  20.64(3.44) 21.08(7.63) 21.2(3.14) 20.79(2.18) 21.37(4.28) 20.79(2.74) 21.45(4.62) 19.95(2.4) 
Economics  16.67% (6) 8.33% (3) 15.39% (8) 5.26% (2) 13.16% (5) 11.77% (4) 5% (2) 12.5% (5) 
Postgraduate  2.78% (1) 5.56% (2) 19.23% (10) 7.9% (3) 7.9% (3) 8.82% (3) 17.5% (7) 5% (2) 
Undergraduate  97.22% (35) 94.44% (34) 80.77% (42) 92.11% (35) 92.11% (35) 91.18% (31) 82.5% (33) 95% (38) 
Caucasian72  94.44% (34) 94.44% (34) 90.39% (47) 86.11% (31) 89.47% (34) 94.12% (32) 87.18% (34) 94.87% (37) 
Any religion73 27.78% (10) 30.55% (11) 28.85% (15) 34.21% (13) 26.32% (10) 32.35% (11) 37.5% (15) 35% (14) 
Facebook users  97.22% (35) 97.22% (35) 98.08% (51) 100% (38) 100% (38) 100% (34) 95% (38) 92.5% (37) 
Smokers  19.44% (7) 27.78% (10) 9.62% (5) 18.42% (7) 7.9% (3) 8.82% (3) 15% (6) 10% (4) 
In a relationship  50% (18) 38.89% (14) 50% (26) 50% (19) 65.79% (25) 52.94% (18) 37.5% (15) 37.5% (15) 
Single 50% (18) 61.11% (22) 50% (26) 50% (19) 34.21% (13) 47.06% (16) 62.5% (25) 62.5% (25) 
                                                 
70 Where %  are reported we include the number of subjects present in each category. Where we report averages we include the standard deviation in brackets. 
71 Other nationalities were Australian, Nepalese, American (USA), Irish, Tanzanian and Canadian 
72 Other declared ethnicities were Other Asian Background, Asian British-Nepalese, Black or Black British-Caribbean, Chinese, Mixed-White and Asian, Guatemalan, Mixed-
White and Black Caribbean, Asian or Asian British-Indian, Other Ethnic Background, Hispanic, Black or Black British-African, Middle Eastern, Asian or Asian British-
Pakistani 
73 The following religions were declared: Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Other, Jewish, Catholic, Muslim and Pagan. Subjects who declared themselves as Atheist, No Religion 
and Agnostic were coded as having no religion. 
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We now also provide a similar summary of choice and outcome data from the experiment. A more detailed analysis of the data is provided in the 
next section. 
 
Table 5.1.2. Summary of Outcomes and Choices (Percentage, number of subjects)74, 75 
 
BOS BOS-E1 BOS-E2 BOS-E3 
C NC C NC C NC C NC 
No of Subjects 36 36 52 38 38 34 40 40 
Total Coordination  
94.44% 
(34)* 
44.44% (16) 92.31% (48)*# 68.42% (26) 100% (38) 88.24% (30) 85% (34)# 45% (18) 
Coordination on (5, 5)  n/a n/a 7.69% (4)¶ 57.9% (22) 47.37% (18)¶ 88.24% (30) 0% (0) 30% (12) 
Coordination on BOS Section  94.44% (34) 44.44% (16) 84.62% (44) 10.53% (4) 52.63% (20) 0% (0) 85% (34) 15% (6) 
Coordination on higher amount  47.22% (17) 22.22% (8) 42.31% (22) 5.26% (2) 26.32% (10) 0% (0) 
42.5% 
(17) 
7.5% (3) 
Coordination on lower amount 47.22% (17) 22.22% (8) 42.31% (22) 5.26% (2) 26.32% (10) 0% (0) 
42.5% 
(17) 
7.5% (3) 
Chose Hawkish  52.78% (19) 44.44% (16)† 42.31% (22) 18.42% (7)† 26.32% (10) 5.88% (2) 
57.5% 
(23) 
20% (8) 
Chose Dovish  47.22% (17) 55.56% (20)‡ 46.15% (24) 10.53% (4)‡ 26.32% (10) 0% (0) 
42.5% 
(17) 
25% (10) 
Chose Equal  n/a n/a 11.54% (6) 71.05% (27)§Δ 47.37% (18) 94.12% (32)§ 0% (0) 55% (22)Δ 
                                                 
74 Coordination rates reported in this table are actual coordination rates. We report these as a guide. However in the analysis below we will look at expected coordination rates 
in the games without communication  
75 Pairs of symbols placed next to values in this table indicate that (non)significant differences were found between these two values in the analysis which follows. All pairs are 
significant aside from those indicated by a * and a #. 
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5.2. Main results 
5.2.1. A note on data presented 
 
Before we present our findings it is important to note that although subjects were randomly 
labelled as person 1 and person 2 in the experiment we find no effect of these labels on choices 
or coordination outcomes76, 77. We thus pool individual choices and outcomes regardless of 
player labels. This is similar to the result obtained by Cooper et al. (1989) who also pooled row 
and column subject results from their experiment. It should also therefore be noted when reading 
the results section of this paper that, for example, the outcome “Coordination on BOS section” 
describes the percentage of subject pairs who coordinated on the BOS section of the game and 
naturally it follows that within this outcome half of individuals left with the dovish payoff and 
half with the hawkish payoff. 
Furthermore, we need to consider choices in a slightly different way when looking at 
treatments with communication as compared to those without communication. In the games 
with communication, we describe the joint distribution of outcomes, since behaviour is highly 
correlated and as such, the marginal distributions (individual decisions) are not as informative 
since they ignore this correlation. That is, normally (in a coordination game without 
communication), the probability that a subject makes a certain decision is independent of his/ 
her co-participant’s choice. However this is no longer true when communication is present as 
there is now a correlation between a subject’s choice of strategy and their co-participant’s choice 
of strategy. For example, the probability that a subject chooses “Dovish” is higher if a co-
participant announces their intention to choose “Hawkish” than if the co-participant announced 
an intention to choose “Equal”. In other words, the probability that a communicated signal of 
intended strategy choice takes a certain value determines the payoff to the subject from the 
strategies that the subjects choose conditional on that signal.  Furthermore, due to the same 
issues of correlated behaviour described above we are not able to calculate the expected 
coordination rates (ECRs) in the usual way in the communication treatments. Thus in the games 
                                                 
76 In the communication treatments (see discussion of why we use outcomes in the communication treatment 
results in the following sections) 
77 Results of tests for this are shown in the appendix. Due to the correlation of behaviour which is bound to occur 
in the communication we test both differences in individual choice behaviour and final combined outcomes 
between persons 1 and 2. 
We do find some order effects on behaviour. However due to low subject numbers in each of the 6 possible 
orderings (in games with 3 strategy options) we believe this is a subject for future research where more subjects 
are available in each ordering. We discuss this further in the appendix. 
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with communication we will use actual coordination rates (ACRs). Also in our probit analysis 
of game with communication we cluster standard errors on pairs of subjects for the same reason. 
Doing this relaxes the independence assumption as required by the probit estimator to instead 
imply independence between clusters. 
 
5.2.2. Coordination, Payoffs and Communication 
 
We first consider the effects of communication on coordination outcomes. Following 
Farrell’s (1987) predictions we would expect that cheap talk will aid and increase coordination 
and as expected, the large difference in coordination and, correspondingly, expected payoffs are 
distinctive. In general, we find that the presence of communication is very effective in raising 
total coordination rates, and does so dramatically, in the BOS, BOS-E1 and BOS-E3 games. 
Communication increases coordination in BOS by 45.06 percentage points, in BOS-E3 by 44.75 
percentage points, in BOS-E1 by 37.94 percentage points but by only 11.42 percentage points 
in BOS-E2. 
 
Result 1: Communication increases coordination rates in all game types 
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Table 5.2.2.1. Coordination rates and difference (ACR-ECR) with and without communication 
  
 
Total 
Coordination 
Coordination 
on  
equal 
Coordination 
on  
BOS section 
Coordination 
 on  
high78 
Coordination  
on  
low 
BOS 
With Comm (C)79 
(ACR) 
94.44% n/a80 94.44% 47.22% 47.22% 
Without Comm 
(NC)81   
(ECR) 
49.38% n/a 49.38% 24.69% 24.69% 
Difference 45.06% n/a 45.06% 22.53% 22.53% 
BOS-
E1 
With Comm (C) 
(ACR) 
92.31% 7.69% 84.62% 42.31% 42.31% 
Without Comm 
(NC)   
(ECR) 
54.36% 50.48% 3.88% 1.94% 1.94% 
Difference 37.94% -42.79% 80.74% 40.37% 40.37% 
BOS-
E2 
With Comm (C)  
(ACR) 
100% 47.37% 52.63% 26.32% 26.32% 
Without Comm 
(NC) 
(ECR) 
88.58% 88.58% 0% 0% 0% 
Difference 11.42% -41.21% 52.63% 26.32% 26.32% 
BOS-
E3 
With Comm (C) 
(ACR) 
85.00% 0% 85.00% 42.50% 42.50% 
Without Comm 
(NC) 
(ECR) 
40.25% 30.25% 10% 5% 5% 
Difference 44.75% -30.25% 75.00% 37.50% 37.50% 
 
This increase in coordination outcomes is also reflected in the expected payoffs that 
subjects receive, with subjects in the communication treatments receiving higher expected 
payoffs on average than those in the treatments without communication. It is interesting to note 
that increases in expected payoffs are much higher than increases in coordination outcomes 
overall when communication is available reflecting that it is not just coordination per se which 
increases with communication but also that coordination on higher payoff outcomes is achieved 
with communication. Thus we can conclude, that particularly in games with an equal but strictly 
Pareto-dominated outcome (BOS-E1 and BOS-E3), communication not only raises the overall 
                                                 
78 Coordination on high implies that this reported % of subjects left with the “hawkish” payoff from successful 
coordination. The percentage reported is therefore the same as the percentage of subject who left with the dovish 
payoffs (i.e. coordination on low) and half of the total percentage of those in “coordination on BOS section”. 
79 With communication – the chat window was available to subjects and they were able to feely coordinate with a 
co-participant. 
80 Data on Coordination on equal is not available in the BOS game since an equitable coordination outcome was 
not available here. 
81 Without communication – the chat window was not available to subjects and they were unable to coordinate 
with a co-participant. 
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coordination rate, but also strongly changes the probability with which an equilibria comes 
about. 
Looking at table 5.2.2.2 below we notice a counter intuitive result: In the tacit game, 
when asymmetric equilibria payoffs are at their highest (i.e. in NC-BOS-E3) expected payoffs 
are the lowest, whilst when asymmetries are at their lowest (i.e. in NC-BOS-E2) expected 
payoffs are the highest. Thus, whilst in chapter 1 we kept the inequitable outcome constant and 
varied the rate of inefficiency in the equal outcome, in this comparison we keep the equal 
outcome constant and vary the “financial distance” between the equal outcome and the 
inequitable outcome. Whilst in chapter 1 this resulted in the subjects largely abandoning the 
equal outcome when “financial distance” was high (and therefore achieving higher expected 
payoffs in these games), in this chapter increasing the “financial distance” between inequitable 
and equitable outcome via increasing the inequitable outcome has had the opposite effect. This 
can be explained by looking at choice rates between the three strategies: In NC-BOS-E2 the vast 
majority of subjects (94.12%) choose equal leading the high levels of coordination (88.24%) 
whilst in the NC-BOS-E3 far fewer subjects use this option (55%) leading the subsequent low 
coordination rates (45%). We are however unable to establish any statistical significant 
difference between the two payoffs (p = 0.3). These individual behaviours will be discussed in 
more detail in a later section. 
 
Table 5.2.2.2. Observed expected payoffs from the game 
 Expected Payoffs 
BOS 
C £6.61 
NC £3.46 
Diff. 62.66% 
BOS-E1 
C £6.31 
NC £2.80 
Diff. 77.16% 
BOS-E2 
C £5.79 
NC £4.43 
Diff. 26.63% 
BOS-E3 
C £10.20 
NC £2.71 
Diff. 115.97% 
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Let us now look at each of the individual games in more detail. In the BOS game it seems 
natural that communication should greatly increase coordination and expected payoffs since in 
the game without communication subjects are faced with a situation in which a focal outcome 
is not present. Thus we might expect that subjects return with lower payoffs than if an outcome 
had been focal as explained above. If communication is able to make one outcome more focal 
or allows subjects to come to an agreement of a mutually acceptable coordination outcome then 
we would naturally expect subjects to earn more in the game with communication. Indeed, we 
observe an increase of 45.06% in coordination and 62.56% in expected payoffs. Actually our 
94.44% coordination rate comes very close to the 95% coordination rates found by Cooper et 
al. (1989) when the using one way communication in the Battle of the Sexes game. This result 
also corresponds to Farrell’s suggestion that, even with communication, subjects will still 
experience some degree of mis-coordination in a Battle of Sexes type game due to too many 
subjects choosing to use the hawkish strategy option. 
 
Result 2: Communication increases coordination and payoffs in the 
BOS game where there is no focal outcome. We can accept Hypothesis 
3 in the BOS game. 
 
However since we also observe the same phenomenon in the BOS-E1 and BOS-E3 
games we can conclude that the effect of communication availability endures even when there 
is a focal outcome which in Pareto dominated by a non-focal outcome.  
 
Result 3: Communication increases coordination and payoffs in the 
BOS-E1 and BOS-E3 games where the BOS section Pareto dominates 
the equitable/focal outcome. We can accept Hypothesis 3 in the BOS-E1 
and BOS-E3 game 
 
Finally, we notice that whilst there is a large increase in expected payoffs and 
coordination in BOS-E1, there is only a relatively small increase in the same measures in BOS-
E2. It appears that the inability of subjects to coordinate on the equitable outcome in the C-BOS-
E1 game when communication is available (Only 7.69% of subjects coordinate on this outcome 
compared to 84.62% on the BOS section of the game) is shown in the increase in expected 
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payoffs in this treatment compared to BOS-E2 (where, with communication, 47.37% coordinate 
on the equitable outcome, compared to 52.63% on the BOS section). 
 
Result 4:  In the BOS-E2 game the equitable outcome remains popular 
in both the communication and non-communication treatments and thus 
expected payoff differences between treatments are not as severe. 
Coordination is only 11.42 percentage points higher and payoffs 26.63 
percentage points higher with communication. Therefore, although we 
can also accept Hypothesis 3 in the BOS-E2 game the evidence is much 
weaker in this game. 
 
Thus summing up the last three results, we find that payoff structure is important with 
regards to the effects that communication has on outcomes. This supports the findings of 
Bornstein & Gilula (2003) who also conclude that the effectiveness of communication in 
improving outcomes is dependent on game structure. We also note that our results are very 
different from those obtained by Cooper et al. (1989). They observe 95% coordination rates in 
a treatment where only one-sided communication is permitted with this falling to 80% (similar 
to the figure predicted by Farrel, 1987) in a treatment with 2-sided communication. We observe 
coordination rates more similar to those obtained by Cooper et al. (1989) in their one-way 
communication treatments despite using two-way communication. We conjecture that this is 
due to rich communication protocol that we allow whereas Cooper et al. (1989) only allow for 
one simple announcement to be made. 
Additionally, Herreiner & Puppe (2010) find that Pareto damaging behaviour is 
observed systemically in the treatment in which payoffs to a subject and their co-participant are 
commonly known. We however only observe this in the treatments without communication. 
Without communication, the equitable and Pareto dominated outcome becomes salient and thus 
Pareto damaging behaviour occurs. However with communication subjects are largely able to 
coordinate on a Pareto dominant outcome.  
Let us now have a closer look at the theoretical predications we gleaned from the 
calculations of MSNE in the context of our observed results in the games. Firstly in the BOS 
game we notice that in the game with communication, rates of choosing hawkish are slightly 
lower than predicted by the MSNE (Observed: 52.78%, Predicted: 57.14%). This is contrary to 
Farrell (1987) who predicts inflated use of the hawkish option (compared to the MSNE) in the 
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battle of the sexes game. We also notice that, in the tacit (NC-BOS) game, observed use of the 
hawkish option is less than would have been predicted by the MSNE (Observed: 44.44%). This 
is line with the findings of Cooper et al. (1989).  Furthermore when we consider all the other 
tacit games (NC-BOS-E1, NC-BOS-E2, NC-BOS-E3) we notice that use of the hawkish option 
is lower in all of the tacit games compared to the MSNE prediction when mixing over all 
strategies (observed: 18.42%, 5.88%, 20%, & predicted: 33.9%, 38.1%, 39.47% respectively 
for BOS-E1, BOS-E2, BOS-E3). Additionally, in all games with an equal split play of the equal 
split option is higher than the MSNE All (mixing over all 3 strategies) predicts (Observed: 
71.05%, 94.12%, 55%; Predicted: 40.68%, 40.68%, 47.37% respectively for BOS-E1, BOS-E2, 
BOS-E3). The equal split is clearly providing a focal point in the game without communication.  
 We now test if the strategy choices we observe are accurately predicted by the MSNEs 
we calculated previously as a whole we notice a number of interesting results. P-values 
calculated from the chi squared tests are show in the two tables which follow. If we consider 
significant at a 5% level, a p-value of greater than 0.05 (as shaded in grey) represents observed 
play significantly similar to that predicted by a particular MSNE. Unsurprising the MSNE All 
is not a good predictor of play in games with 3 strategy options. This is presumably because of 
the high use of the focal equal outcome in these games, in the absence of communication.  
However in the absence of a focal outcome (NC-BOS) we find that an MSNE where subjects 
mix between a strategy of choosing dovish and equal is a good predictor of behaviour. This 
seems intuitive – in the absence of any method of coordinating (either player label, 
communication or a focal outcome) subjects resort to mixing between the strategy options. 
 
Table 5.2.2.3(a). Comparison of observed behaviour to MSNEs – No Communication 
 BOS BOS-E1 BOS-E2 BOS-E3 
MSNE All n/a 0.00 0.00 0.01 
MSNE DH 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MSNE HE (P1) n/a 0.02 0.00 0.06 
MSNE DE (P2) n/a 0.02 0.00 0.23 
 
If we consider the calculated MSNE in the context of games with communication we find that 
the MSNE DH continues to be good predictor of behaviour in the C-BOS game. This outcome 
reflects the small degree of mis-coordination we observe in this game and also follows on from 
Farrell’s prediction that even in the presence of communication subjects will be “too” hawkish 
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to achieve full coordination. We also notice that in BOS-E2 use of the Equal option has fallen 
to a level which makes it compatible with the MSNE All but that in BOS-E1 and BOS-E3 
incidences of choosing the Equal strategy option have fallen to levels below those compatible 
with this MSNE. However in C-BOS-E1 those who mix between dovish and hawkish only do 
so at levels significantly similar to MSNE DH. This finding combined with the finding that the 
same MSNE does not accurately predict behaviour in C-BOS-E3 reflect the high rate of hawkish 
behaviour predicted by the MSNE DH for this game (75%). Therefore although observed levels 
of hawkish behaviour are only 57.5% in this game, they do not drop to levels required for full 
coordination on an inequitable outcome leading to some mis-coordination (equal is not used at 
all in this game). 
 
Table 5.2.2.3(b). Comparison of observed behaviour to MSNEs – Communication 
 BOS BOS-E1 BOS-E2 BOS-E3 
MSNE All n/a 0.00 0.06 0.00 
MSNE DH 0.87 0.34 0.01 0.04 
MSNE HE (P1) n/a 0.00 0.12 0.00 
MSNE DE (P2) n/a 0.00 0.26 0.00 
 
It is also interesting to note here that expected payoffs in the games without 
communication appear very close to those predicted by the MSNE play over all strategies 
available in the game. When we test for significant differences we find that payoffs in NC-BOS, 
NC-BOS-E1 and NC-BOS-E3 are all statistically similar to the payoffs predicted by the MSNE. 
Under a null hypothesis that payoffs are statistically the same we find p-values of 0.99, 0.59 and 
0.83 respectively. We are therefore able to accept the null hypothesis.  When we consider games 
with communication, expected payoffs certainly do not appear similar to those predicted by the 
MSNE. Our tests confirm this with p values of 0.09, 0.00, 0.00 and 0.00 respectively. We saw 
above that the MSNE where subjects mix over dovish and hawkish in the BOS game (both with 
and without communication) are statistically the same as behaviour which is observed in our 
treatments. Whilst we note that, as a result, the expected payoffs are indeed also shown to be 
statistically similar in this game without communication (NC-BOS), we can only conclude this 
in the game with communication (C-BOS) if we consider results at a 5% level (p = 0.09). More 
surprising is that since the MSNE where subjects mix over all three strategy options does not 
accurately predict behaviour in the NC-BOS-E1 or NC-BOS-E3 games, expected payoffs do 
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appear to be statistically similar. Looking at the observed choice data we can observe that the 
reason for this similarity in payoffs is purely coincidental: Whilst play of the MSNE would have 
predicted a 16.55% and 22.44% coordination rate on the equitable option in the NC-BOS-E1 
and NC-BOS-E3 games respectively we observed a 57.9% and 30% rate in reality. However in 
the NC-BOS-E1 the predicted rate of coordination on the BOS section of game would be 17.24% 
but in reality only 10.53% of subjects manage to coordination on an asymmetric outcome. This 
increase in coordination on an equal outcome and decrease in coordination on an inequitable 
outcome compare to the prediction appear to balance each other out to reach an expected payoff 
similar to the predicted one.  The story seems a little more complicated with the NC-BOS-E3 
game. Actual coordination on both an equal outcome and on the BOS section of the game (15%) 
are higher than what would have been predicted by the MSNE (10.39% on the BOS section for 
BOS-E3). However these deviations from the predicted coordination rates of the MSNE are not 
as high as those found in the NC-BOS-E1 perhaps reflecting the lack for change from predicted 
the MSNE and that calculated in reality.  
 
Table 5.2.2.4. MSNE Expected payoffs v. Observed Expected payoffs 
 
Expected Payoffs 
(EP) in the experiment 
Expected payoffs from MSNE 
play (Over all strategies) 
BOS 
C £6.61 
£3.43 
NC £3.46 
BOS-E1 
C £6.31 
£2.03 
NC £2.8 
BOS-E2 
C £5.79 
£1.91 
NC £4.43 
BOS-E3 
C £10.20 
£2.37 
NC £2.71 
 
5.2.3. Focality and Communication  
 
We notice the large differences in both use of the equal strategy option and 
subsequently (and naturally) coordination on the equitable outcome between the 
treatments with and without communication. 
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Table 5.2.3.1. The equal strategy between treatments 
  
 
Coordination on Equal Choose Equal 
BOS-E1 
With Comm (C) 7.69% 11.54% 
Without Comm (NC) 50.48% 71.05% 
Difference -42.79% -53.85% 
BOS-E2 
With Comm (C) 47.37% 47.37% 
Without Comm (NC) 88.58% 94.12% 
Difference -41.21% -63.12% 
BOS-E3 
With Comm (C) 0% 0% 
Without Comm (NC) 30.25% 55% 
Difference -30.25% -55% 
 
In the treatments with communication we notice that use of the equal strategy is far lower than 
in the corresponding treatment without communication in the BOS-E1, BOS-E2 and BOS-E3 
games. (Reductions of 42.79%, 41.21% and 30.25% respectively in coordination and 53.85%, 
63.12% and 55% respectively in choices). We therefore accept hypothesis 1.  
 
Result 5: Subjects are more likely to choose and coordinate on an 
equal outcome when there is no communication available compared to 
when there is. We see evidence of “Schelling Play” when there is no 
communication available with subjects more likely to choose the focal 
outcome. 
 
5.2.4. Inequality Aversion 
 
In this section we wish to examine if the addition of an equitable but Pareto dominated 
outcome affects behaviour, and more specially coordination, on the BOS section of two 
comparable games. For this we consider a comparison of the proportion of subjects coordinating 
on the BOS section of the game in the C-BOS-E1 and C-BOS games. We notice a 9.82% 
increase in coordination on the BOS section in C-BOS as compared to C-BOS-E1 when 
referring the table 5.2.4.1 below. This difference is however not significant using a chi-squared 
test – ((1) = 2.0404, p = 0.153).   
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Table 5.2.4.1. Coordination Outcomes (C-BOS v. C-BOS-E1) 
 
Coordination 
on BOS section 
Coordination 
on Equal section 
BOS 94.44% n/a82 
BOS-E1 84.62% 7.69% 
 
This is further reinforced by the probit analysis where we also find no significant 
difference in coordination on the BOS section of the game. It should be noted that we present 
marginal probabilities in all probit tables that follow: 
 
Table 5.2.4.2. Coordination outcomes (C-BOS v. C-BOS-E1) – Probit analysis 
Variable  
Coordination  
on BOS section 
C-BOS-E1  
    (Base: C-BOS) 
-0.648 
(0.57) 
Male 
    (Base: Females) 
0.196 
(0.39) 
Single 
    (Base: In a relationship) 
-0.674 
(0.36) 
Any religion declared 
    (Base: Non-religious) 
-0.260 
(0.36) 
Age over 20 years 
    (Base: Age 20 years & under) 
0.422 
(0.38) 
Constant 
1.887*** 
(0.70) 
Number of Obs. 88 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1272 
                                                 
82 No equal split was available in the BOS game 
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Result 6: The addition of an equitable outcome in the C-BOS-E1 is not 
affecting coordination behaviour compared to the C-BOS game when 
communication is available.   
 
However we notice a very different result when there is no communication available.  
 
Table 5.2.4.3. Choices Made (NC-BOS v. NC-BOS-E1) 
 Choose Hawkish Choose Dovish Choose Equal 
NC-BOS 44.44% 55.56% n/a 
NC-BOS-E1 18.42% 10.53% 71.05% 
 
We notice that the proportion of subjects making strategy choices within the BOS section 
(i.e. hawkish or dovish) is very different between NC-BOS and NC-BOS-E1. Differences in 
subjects choosing a hawkish or a dovish strategy between the two games is also significant 
(Hawkish: (1) = 5.8445, p = 0.016; Dovish: (1) = 17.1051, p = 0.000).  We can further confirm 
this result with a probit analysis below. We therefore find that the marginal probability of an 
individual choosing hawkish is reduced by 78.6% for those in the NC-BOS-E1 game compared 
to the NC-BOS game. Similarly the marginal probability of an individual choosing dovish is 
reduced by 180.9% for those in the NC-BOS-E1 game compared to the NC-BOS game. This 
interpretation can be applied to all the probit results which follow: 
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Table 5.2.4.4. Choices made (NC-BOS v. NC-BOS-E1) 83– Probit analysis 
Variable 
Chose  
Hawkish 
Chose  
Dovish    
NC-BOS-E1  
    (Base: NC-BOS) 
-0.786** 
(0.35) 
-1.809*** 
(0.43)    
Male 
    (Base: Females) 
0.023 
(0.35) 
-0.391    
(0.38)    
Single 
    (Base: In a relationship) 
-0.807** 
(0.37) 
0.133    
(0.37)    
Any religion declared 
    (Base: Non-religious) 
-0.149 
(0.36) 
0.439    
(0.38)    
Age over 20 years 
    (Base: Age 20 years & under) 
-0.884** 
(0.39) 
0.915**  
(0.41)    
Constant 
0.602 
(0.39) 
-0.105    
(0.39)   
Number of Obs. 74 74 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1647 0.2721 
 
Since we also observe significance on some of the demographic variable in this 
analysis we perform a robustness check on this data. We therefore also run the same 
regressions those age over 20 years and those 20 years and under, as well as those who were 
single and in a relationship repressively and do not find that the magnitude or significance of 
these coefficients changes significantly84. We thus have further evidence for the robustness of 
our results. 
 
                                                 
83 Throughout this paper we will use the following code to denote the significance level at which a coefficient is 
significant: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
84 Due to the significance on “Age over 20 years” and “single” in this regression we also report here, coefficients 
on the NC-BOS-E1 variable when we examine each of the following subgroups in turn. Significance and chi-
squared statistics indicating the probability of difference between coefficients on this variable with all subjects 
included (as in the main text) and in each of the subgroups are shown after each reported coefficient. We note 
that no significance difference in coefficient magnitude is found. Coefficients also remain significant. We view 
this as a further robustness check of our result : 
Age over 20 years (Coefficient(Hawkish) = -0.45*, p = 0.34, Coefficient(Dovish) = -2.584447***, p = 0.3493) 
20 years and under (Coefficient(Hawkish) = -1.200477***, p =  0.3322, Coefficient(Dovish) =  -1.231968**, p = 
0.2517) 
Single: Coefficient(Hawkish)  = -1.543834**,   p =  0.2249, 
In a relationship: Coefficient(Hawkish)  =  -0.5034857*, p = 0.34 
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Result 7: The addition of an equitable outcome in the NC-BOS-E1 is 
affecting behaviour compared to the NC-BOS game when 
communication is not available.  
 
Combining these two results we see that the addition of an equitable outcome has very 
different effects depending on if communication is available or not. With communication we 
see very similar proportions of subjects coordinating on the BOS section in both games 
suggesting that, with communication, subjects largely dismiss the equitable outcome in C-BOS-
E1 despite its equitable properties. However when we compare the same two treatments with 
no communication subjects largely choose the equal/ focal outcome whilst abandoning the BOS 
section of the game when this option is available (NC-BOS-E1). Thus we conclude that it is not 
a preference for equality that is driving subjects to choose the equitable outcome when there is 
no communication available, but instead the fact that the equal allocation serves as a focal 
coordination device. We conclude that it is merely the focality of this outcome as a coordination 
device which is appealing to subjects and not its inherent equality. 
 
5.2.5. Weak v. Strong Pareto domination 
 
In this section we examine if the salience of the equitable outcome is affected if the BOS 
section of the game weakly or strictly dominates it. Thus we examine a comparison of BOS-E1 
and BOS-E2.  
First we provide a summary of choices made in the experiment with no communication. 
In the table below we present a measure of choices as a percentage of total choices made.  
 
Table 5.2.5.1. Choices Made (NC-BOS-E1 v. NC-BOS-E2) 
 Choose Hawkish Choose Dovish Choose Equal 
NC-BOS-E1 18.42% 10.53% 71.05% 
NC-BOS-E2 5.88% 0.00% 94.12% 
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We notice how the form of the game is changing behaviour:  In the NC-BOS-E2 game 
94.12% of subjects chose the equal outcome whereas this falls to only 71.05% in the NC-
BOS-E1 game. This difference is significant using a chi-squared test ( = 6.45, p = 0.011) 
showing that the small change in the form of the game is making an equitable outcome much 
less focal.  This result is also supported by the probit analysis: 
 
Table 5.2.5.2. Choices Made (NC-BOS-E1 v. NC-BOS-E2) – Probit analysis 
Variable 
Choose  
Equal    
NC-BOS-E2  
    (Base: NC-BOS-E1) 
1.001**  
(0.42)    
Male 
    (Base: Females) 
0.364    
(0.43)    
Single 
    (Base: In a relationship) 
0.774*   
(0.41)    
Any religion declared 
    (Base: Non-religious) 
-0.210    
(0.43)    
Age over 20 years 
    (Base: Age 20 years & under) 
0.199    
(0.41)    
Constant 
0.092    
(0.41)    
Number of Obs. 72 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1899 
 
Result 8: If no communication is available and only one member of a 
partnership could benefit from abandoning equality then subjects are 
less willing to do so than if both could gain.  
 
However, we have some evidence to doubt the robustness of this result: As in previous 
analysis, due to the significance on the “Single” dummy in the table above we run separate 
regressions were we only include single subjects and subject who declared themselves in a 
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relationship in the experiment. We find that when the sample is restricted to singles only the 
coefficient on NC-BOS-E1 becomes non-significant at β = 0.306 which is found to be 
significantly different from 1.001 at a 10% level (p = 0.052). Furthermore when we run the same 
regression with only the non-single subjects the coefficient on NC-BOS-E1 becomes positive 
and significant at a 1% level. (β = 1.631***). This coefficient is found to be significantly 
different from 1.001 at a 1% level (p = 0.0000). 
 However, the difference in coordinating on an equal outcome is significant between the 
same two games (C-BOS-E1 - 7.69% and C-BOS-E2 - 47.37%) in treatments with 
communication ( = 18.71, p = 0.000). The probit analysis also supports this result and this 
result remains robust to demographic variables: 
 
Table 5.2.5.3. Coordination outcomes (C-BOS-E1 v. C-BOS-E2) – Probit analysis 
Variable 
Coordination  
on equal outcome 
C-BOS-E2  
    (Base: C-BOS-E1) 
1.303*** 
(0.46)    
Male 
    (Base: Females) 
-0.518    
(0.38)    
Single 
    (Base: In a relationship) 
-0.085    
(0.34)    
Any religion declared 
    (Base: Non-religious) 
-0.336    
(0.35)    
Age over 20 years 
    (Base: Age 20 years & under) 
-0.092    
(0.23)    
Constant 
-0.931**  
(0.38)     
Number of Obs. 90 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.2199 
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Result 9: As in the game without communication, if communication is 
available and only one member of a partnership could benefit from 
abandoning equality then subjects are less willing to do so than if both 
could gain.  
 
It is also interesting to note that the addition of communication appears to be having the 
same magnitude of effect in the BOS-E1 game and BOS-E2 game with, as already previously 
noted, communication largely decreasing the use of the equal payoff outcome in both games (In 
both the BOS-E1 game and the BOS-E2 game not having communication available increases 
coordination on the equal outcome by about 40 percentage points compared to the treatments 
with communication).  
 
Table 5.2.5.4. Coordination rates on an equal outcome (BOS-E1 v.  BOS-E2) 
 C NC 
BOS-E1 7.69% 50.48% 
BOS-E2 47.37% 88.58% 
 
Therefore, combining this with the two results above, we sum this up in the result below: 
 
Result 10: Although we see significant increases in the use of an equal 
division of payoffs as a focal coordination device in the no 
communication treatment in both the BOS-E1 and BOS-E2 treatments 
as compared to with communication, coordination on an equitable 
outcome is significantly higher in both the communication and no 
communication treatments in BOS-E2 in a comparison with BOS-E1.  
 
We provide the following interpretation of this result: We believe that subjects are 
working on a commonly held norm: “If we both can benefit from abandoning an equal outcome, 
then we should do so. If only one of us benefits, this is not so good, so we should perhaps not 
abandon the equal outcome“.  In other words, when both subjects can strictly gain from 
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abandoning equality, subjects are willing to do so, even if the other subject benefits more than 
them. But when only one subject can benefit from moving away from an equal outcome, subjects 
are less willing to do so. So subjects are jointly willing to sacrifice equality for higher payoffs, 
especially when both can benefit (when equality is strictly Pareto-dominated as in BOS-E1), but 
less so when inequality only benefits one person (as in BOS-E2). We will see later in this 
chapter, when discussing the chat transcripts that this interpretation is supported by the chat data 
in that proposal to choose the equal split are much higher in the BOS-E2 game whilst suggestion 
to take part of the asymmetric split as much higher in the BOS-E1 game. 
These two findings show there is a difference in how communication affects the salience 
of an inefficient equal option depending on whether the equal outcome is weakly or strictly 
dominated. Whilst communication decreases the use of these options in both BOS-E1 and BOS-
E2, in BOS-E2 the equal outcome remains robustly more popular than in the BOS-E1 both with 
and without communication.  
We depict this behavioural process in figure 5.1.5.1 below: 
 
 
Figure 5.2.5.1. Behavioural processes in games with a possible equal outcome (with communication) 
 
5.2.6. Varying the extent of inequality 
 
We now wish to examine if the extent of inequality in the BOS section of the game effects 
behaviour. Herreiner & Puppe (2010) hypothesise that subjects will not be prepared to try to 
coordinate on an unequal outcome if the inequality present in that outcome is too high. We 
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would thus expect that use of the equal outcome will increase as inequality in the BOS section 
increases. 
 
Table 5.2.6.1. Choices Made (NC-BOS-E1 v.  NC-BOS-E3) 
 Choose Hawkish Choose Dovish Choose Equal 
NC-BOS-E1 18.42% 10.53% 71.05% 
NC-BOS-E3 20.00% 25.00% 55.00% 
 
First we compare NC-BOS-E1 and NC-BOS-E3 and see that subjects actually move away 
from the equitable outcome as the inequality between the unequal outcomes increases: 71.05% 
choose this option in NC-BOS-E1 but only 55% in NC-BOS-E3. This result is just beyond the 
bounds of significance when we consider the non-parametric test ((1) = 2.1500, p = 0.143). 
However in a probit analysis we do find significance on the result that use of the equal outcome 
is significantly higher in the NC-BOS-E1 game compared to the BOS-E3 game. 
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Table 5.2.6.2. Choices Made (NC-BOS-E1 v. NC-BOS-E3) – Probit analysis 
Variable 
Choose  
Hawkish 
Choose  
Dovish 
Choose  
Equal    
NC-BOS-E1 
    (Base: NC-BOS-E3) 
-0.217 
(0.38) 
-0.603 
(0.40) 
0.564*   
(0.34)    
Male 
    (Base: Females) 
-0.432 
(0.39) 
0.030 
(0.39) 
0.317    
(0.35)    
Single 
    (Base: In a relationship) 
-0.894**85 
(0.38) 
-0.244 
(0.36) 
0.871*** 
(0.33)    
Any religion declared 
    (Base: Non-religious) 
-0.081 
(0.37) 
0.673* 
(0.35) 
-0.462    
(0.32)    
Age over 20 years 
    (Base: Age 20 years & under) 
-0.453 
(0.42) 
-0.168 
(0.43) 
0.507    
(0.37)    
Constant 
0.009 
(0.40) 
-0.780* 
(0.42) 
-0.547    
(0.38)    
Number of Obs. 78 78 78 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1205 0.1005 0.1374 
 
Thus in NC-BOS-E1 a strategy of choosing the hawkish or dovish option is largely 
abandoned (only 28.93% of subjects choose these options), just under half (45%) choose a 
hawkish or dovish strategy in the NC-BOS-E3 game and we have some evidence that this is 
significantly effecting choices. The extent of inequality is making subjects change their 
behaviour.  
 
Result 11: The larger the inequality (and consequently the potential 
gains in overall earnings appear to be) the more subjects appear to see 
                                                 
85 Again due to significance on the “single” demographic variable in this table we also run the same regression with 
the “single” sub-group. The numbers reported below are coefficients on the NC-BOS-E1. Significance and 
probability of difference between these coefficients and the ones reported above as shown as previously. No 
significant difference in magnitude or significance of the coefficient on the treatment variable are found. We view 
this as a robustness check of our findings. 
Single (Coefficient(Hawkish) = -0.359684,   p =  0.8338 , Coefficient(Equal) = .9611468*, p = 0.4354) 
In a relationship (Coefficient(Hawkish) =  -0.1390809, p = 0.4754, Coefficient(Equal) = 0.2737685, p = 0.5508) 
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choosing an inequitable strategy as “worth the risk” due to the possible 
large financial gains which could be made.  
 
We also note another interesting coefficient which become significant when we consider only 
subjects with and without a declared religion respectively. With dovish as the dependent 
variable we find that for subjects who did declare a religion the coefficient on NC-BOS-E1 does 
not change significantly in magnitude from the regression where we include all participants (β 
= -1.054449 , p = 0.4531) but become significant at a 10% level. . However the coefficient on 
equal is robust. All coefficients on NC-BOS-E1 are however robust to the result above when we 
consider only those who declared a religion. 
Now let us consider a comparison of C-BOS-E1 and C-BOS-E3 to consider how the degree 
of inequality affects behaviour in the presence of communication.  A summary is provided in 
the table below: 
 
Table 5.2.6.3. Coordination outcomes (C-BOS-E1 v. C-BOS-E3) 
 
Coordination 
on BOS Section 
Coordination 
on Equal 
BOS-E1 84.62% 7.69% 
BOS-E3 85% 0% 
 
We see that coordination on the BOS section is very similar in C-BOS-E1 and C-BOS-E3 
(84.62% and 85.00% respectively which is found to be an insignificant difference - (1) = 0.0026, 
p = 0.959). Furthermore we observe no difference in coordination outcomes86 using a probit 
model.  
 
  
                                                 
86 We only examine coordination on the BOS section here as 0% of subjects coordinated on an equal outcome in 
the BOS-E3 game. 
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Table 5.2.6.4. Coordination outcomes (C-BOS-E1 v. C-BOS-E3) – Probit analysis 
Variable 
Coordination  
on BOS Section 
C-BOS-E1 
    (Base: C-BOS-E3) 
-0.028 
(0.46) 
Male 
    (Base: Females) 
0.291 
(0.29) 
Single 
    (Base: In a relationship) 
-0.003 
(0.38) 
Any religion declared 
    (Base: Non-religious) 
0.217 
(0.38) 
Age over 20 years 
    (Base: Age 20 years & under) 
0.411 
(0.27) 
Constant 
0.648 
(0.43) 
Number of Obs. 92 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0259 
 
We thus draw the following conclusion. 
 
Result 12: Coordination outcomes are very similar between C-BOS-E1 
and C-BOS-E3 where there is communication available. 
 
We can reject Hypothesis 2 in the game in which communication is available. The degree 
of inequality in the BOS section does not affect behaviour when subjects can communicate. If 
we consider this in the context of the result found in the previous section on individual choices 
in the NC treatments we see the differences in behaviour dependent on the presence of 
communication.  
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Let us consider this result further in the context of Herreiner & Puppe (2010). They state the 
following principle which they name a “Conditional Pareto Improvement from Equal Split 
(CPIES)”: 
 
First, determine the most equal distribution of rewards. If this allocation 
is Pareto optimal, then choose it. Otherwise, if there is the possibility to 
make everyone better off, implement such a Pareto improvement 
provided that this does not create “too much” inequality (Herreiner & 
Puppe, 2010,  p.239) 
 
We also illustrate this important principle in the figure below: 
 
Figure 5.2.6.1. Conditional Pareto Improvement from Equal Split (CPIES)  
 
We find a different result to the one depicted above by Herreiner & Puppe (2010) with 
communication. With communication the vast majority of subjects stick to the BOS game 
despite vast increases in inequality.   
 
5.3. Analysis of chat data 
 
The analysis of chat data which follows here is also a key element of the research presented 
in this paper. In this vein, and for the sake of brevity, we provide the full chat scripts in the 
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appendix and here we only provide two types of chat data analysis: The first is to look at the 
numerical values relating to chat behaviour which are directly available. The second is to look 
more closely at the content of conversations. 
With regard to the first category of analysis we provide averages of: 
 
 The time at which conversations started  
 The time at which conversations ended  
 Average chat time  
 Number of lines of chat used.  
 
These initial categories of analysis are relevant because they provide us with some 
interesting initial insights into how conversations differ depending on game type. For example, 
the average time at which subjects started a conversation allows us to see if subjects were more 
hesitant or keen to start a conversation in one treatment compared to another i.e. if in one game 
type we were to observe that subjects are more hesitant to start then we might assume that 
subjects feel they could get a better outcome for themselves by not being the first mover87. 
Similarly, differences in time ended and started and consequently chat time give us insights into 
if subjects find it “easier” or are quicker to come to an agreement in certain games. The number 
of lines of chat could also give us insights into how “intensively” subjects chatted. This data is 
presented below, both in table and graphical form, together with the standard deviations in order 
to provide an indication of the dispersion of observations: 
 
                                                 
87 In order to illustrate this point in the world outside the lab, we could imagine a situation in which a person was 
to delay offering to buy drink in a bar in the hope that someone else will be “generous” first and buy the drinks 
round! 
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Table 5.3.1. Summary of chat behaviour – averages (standard deviation) 
  
BOS 
(8, 6)(6, 8) 
BOS-E1 
(8, 6)(6, 8) 
(5, 5) 
BOS-E2 
(8, 5)(5, 8) 
(5, 5) 
BOS-E3 
(18, 6)(6, 18) 
(5, 5) 
Average time started (secs) 
10.78 
(8.50) 
11.12 
(9.20) 
12 
(9.9) 
9.45 
(10.23) 
Average time ended (secs) 
99.83 
(25.99) 
106.81 
(19.32) 
94 
(27.48) 
115.65 
(3.89) 
Number of lines of 
conversation in total (in pairs) 
10.22 
(4.67) 
11.62 
(6.08) 
9.89 
(4.89) 
17.93 
(15.31) 
Total Chat Time (secs) 
89.06 
(27.0) 
95.69 
(24.3) 
82 
(31.85) 
103.98 
(19.69) 
 
It also seems natural to present this data in graphical form: The wide bars represent the 
averages whilst the vertical lines represent the dispersion of results and the vertical axis shows 
the number of seconds that each measure took on average. 
Figure 5.3.1. Graphical summary of chat behaviour 
 
We notice the following main points in the conversations. Whilst in all games the average 
time taken to begin chatting is similar (between 9.45 and 12 seconds), the time which subjects 
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used to chat varies widely between treatments (From almost the complete duration of chat time 
in BOS-E3 - 103.98 seconds – to only 82 seconds in BOS-E2). The quickest decisions are 
reached in the C-BOS-E2 game suggesting that subjects find it easier to come to a consensus in 
this game. The choice data above would suggest that this is because the equitable outcome 
remains relatively more focal in this game than in other games with an equitable outcome (C-
BOS-E1 and C-BOS-E3) making coming to a consensus with a co-participant easier. 
Also interesting is that whilst in the C-BOS-E2 game the lowest average end time, lowest 
number of lines of chat and lowest total chat time (supporting the assertion about this game 
made above) and the highest start time are observed, in C-BOS-E3 the complete opposite is 
observed with the highest average end time, highest number of lines of chat and highest total 
chat time and the lowest start time. These two game structures and the larger amounts of money 
at stake in C-BOS-E3 are clearly having opposite effects on chat behaviour. The greater 
inequality in the inequitable section of the C-BOS-E3 games seems to generate a lot more 
discussion and difficulties in reaching a decision. We also notice the low standard deviation in 
the average time ended in C-BOS-E3 showing that there is not much dispersion in end times 
and that most subjects are finishing conversations towards the later stages of the time available. 
The notable differences between the data obtained in these categories and analysis in C-BOS-
E3 (aside from “Average time started”) and the rest of the games is in fact interesting in itself  
with these difference all being in the same direction, although the biggest differences are 
observed in a comparison with C-BOS-E2. 
To continue our analysis of conversations into the second category of chat analysis, we test 
our hypothesis that is it not just the mere presence of communication which is causing changes 
in behaviour but that the content of conversations will also differ when we see behavioural 
differences. We will therefore now look more closely and specifically at the types of 
communication employed by our subjects in each of the games. In previous studies a number of 
different methods of coding have been used and there have been two main elements of the 
coding method which tend to vary: The first is the choice between whether experimenters 
directly involved in the experiment code chat protocols or if research assistants who have had 
no previous involvement in the experiment are used. The second is whether coding categories 
are fixed or if coders are free to combine and add categories as they wish during the coding 
process. The following table illustrates how previous studies have elected to code chat 
messages: 
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Table 5.3.2. Coding strategies 
 Coders used 
 Experimenters Research Assistants 
Category 
types 
Fixed 
 
 Ben-Ner et al. (2011) 
 Brandts & Cooper (2007)88 
 Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) 
 Gneezy (2005) 
 
 Cooper & Kagel 
(2013) 
 McGinn et al. (2012) 
 Vanberg (2008) 
 Xiao & Houser (2009) 
 Xiao & Houser (2005) 
Non 
Fixed 
None89 
 Cooper & Kühn 
(2014) 
 
We decided to use the same protocol as Cooper & Kühn (2014) to code our data, i.e. 
categories were not fixed by the experimenters and research assistants were used to code the 
data. This was because we believe that using research assistants who have had no previous 
involvement with the experiments avoids problems of demand effects on coding outcomes as 
they had no notion of the aims or hypotheses of the experiment as opposed to if the 
experimenters themselves were to code the data (for a deeper discussion on the issue of demand 
effects in economics experiments see Zizzo, 2010). Also we wanted to let coders add or merge 
categories since this would give us the richest insights into the communication protocols and 
practices. Nevertheless we decided to designate a short section of the coding sheet as 
“compulsory” because we wanted to ensure that only one (and not zero) categories would apply 
in these cases in order to give us an initial board measure of conversation types.  There were 
four compulsory and fixed categories from which subjects had to choose one for each 
conversation (including an “Other” category which subjects could use if they did not feel any 
of the three other possible compulsory categories were a good fit).  However all other categories 
in a “non-compulsory” section which followed the “compulsory” could be merged and added 
to. These categories are described in more detail below. 
Categories were decided upon using the following method which mimics that of Cooper & 
Kühn (2014): Two experimenters independently went through the conversations and wrote 
down categories that they felt fitted the data. The experimenters then met to discuss and agree 
on categories. Subsequently, two research assistants who had previously had no involvement in 
                                                 
88 Fixed categories were agreed by 2 experiments and 2 RAs before coding 
89 It seems natural that we did not find any papers where the experimenters coded the data and where categories 
were unfixed. Since the experimenter are usually the ones to propose the original categories then it follows that if 
the same people code the conversations these categories should hold. In contrast if a research assistant codes 
conversations he/ she may provide a different perspective on the categories required to adequately code the data. 
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the experiment (either as experimenters or subjects) were hired as coders to categorise the 
conversations. We did not tell them anything about our research questions or hypotheses and 
told them to use their best judgment when coding.  Coders were told that any given conversation 
could be put in one, several, or no categories in the non-compulsory section and must be put 
into one of the categories in the compulsory section. Each coder then classified all the 
conversations independently. Coders are not allowed to talk with each other90 during this phase 
but were encouraged to ask the experimenters questions if there was anything they are not sure 
about. Coders were also encouraged to merge categories if they could not see the difference 
between some categories suggested by the experimenters and we did not require coders to agree 
on categorisation. After both coders had finished coding we combined the results from both and 
report the averages below.  
In the compulsory section coders were asked to select a category that described how the 
majority of the conversation could be defined or how the conservation could be “summed up”. 
It was compulsory to choose one of the following categories: 
 
Table 5.3.3(a). Compulsory Coding Categories 
1. Efficiency talk 
o Use this category if subjects recognise that although one person will get more than 
the other if the unequal outcome is chosen, both (or one participant in the case of 
BOS-E2) will get more in an unequal outcome compared to getting (5, 5) or nothing 
at all in the case of non-coordination 
o Example: “One of us can get 6 and the other 8, and that is better for each of thus 
than if we each get 5” 
2. Fairness/equality talk 
o Use this category if people refer to the fairness and/or equality of the equal outcome, 
(5, 5). Example: “We can get the same, and that is fair” 
3. Conflict 
o Use this category if subjects cannot agree on an outcome 
4. Other (if possible please give brief explanation why you think none of 1,2,3 apply) 
 
Below are the non-compulsory categories which coders received and of which coders could 
choose as many or as few (including zero) categories as they wished.  
 
  
                                                 
90 Coders were not known to each other and were studying on different courses. 
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Table 5.3.3(b) Non-Compulsory Coding Categories 
1. Greeting 
 
2. Open first offer Question 
o e.g. “What shall we do?”. This category is used if no specific offer is made at the start of negotiations. There is merely an opening 
question such as the example. 
 
Categories 3 and 4 relate to discussion purely based on deciding which of the two unequal allocations they should settle on. 
3. First offer generous 
o The category is used if the person to open negotiations offers their co-participant the higher amount of the unequal outcome. 
Example: “You can get 8, I am happy to get 6.” 
 
4. First offer non-generous 
o The category is used if the person to open negotiations offers their co-participant the lower amount of the unequal outcome. 
Example: “You can get 6, I then get 8.” 
 
Category 5 relates to discussions such as those above but where the discussion also includes mentions of the fact that subjects will get more earnings in 
total if they coordinate on an unequal outcome. 
5. “Better than nothing” 
o This category is used if a subject agrees on an outcome because coordinating is better than not coordinating.  
Example: “I am OK with this proposal, because it is gives something which is better than nothing (=0)” 
 
6. First mover proposes  equal outcome 
 
7. Counter offer equal 
o Use this category if one person suggests an unequal outcome and the other person proposes the equal outcome instead. 
 
8. Random 
o Use this category if people try to find a random way (a methods based on chance) to decide on an allocation  
o e.g. Rock, paper, scissors 
 
9. Counter offer “no I want more” 
o This category is used if an offer made by a co-participant of a lower amount is not accepted 
Example: “No, I will not accept 6, I want 8.” 
 
10. Counter offer “no you have more!” 
o This category is used if an offer made by a co-participant of a higher amount is not accepted 
Example: “No, I will not accept 8, I want 6. You have the 8” 
 
11. Assurance of offer made or received 
o e.g. “Are you sure?” This category is used if a co-participant asks for confirmation of a previous offer. 
 
12. Appealing to better nature (sympathy etc.) 
o e.g. “I’m a bit skint this weekend so can I have the higher amount?” 
 
13. no firm agreement reached (ran out of time) 
o Use the category if it seems that subjects did not keep an eye on the time and ran out of time 
14. no firm agreement reached (fighting for last word) 
o Use this category if subjects did not reach an explicit agreement but instead fought for the last word in the negotiations, e.g. a subject 
waits till the last second to claim an amount so that his/her partner couldn’t make a counter offer 
15. Sticking to guns when disagreement 
o Use this category if a subject refuses to move on an offer despite disagreement. 
16. One subject indifferent 
o when one subject "claim" they are happy to take either outcome, "I don't mind which we go for" 
17.   Both subjects indifferent 
o "I don't mind either!" 
18.  Necessity of Coordination 
o "We need to pick the same one in order to earn money" "Let's both agree to pick this option" 
 
First we will summarise the data from the compulsory section. In general, we find that the game 
structure has some interesting effects on conversation content as shown in table 5.3.4 and figure 
5.3.2 below: 
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Table 5.3.4. Results for Compulsory Coding Categories 
 C-BOS C-BOS-E1 C-BOS-E2 C-BOS-E3 
Efficiency talk 50% 55.77% 18.42% 35.00% 
Fairness/equality  n/a91 5.77% 34.21% 0.00% 
Conflict 0.00% 11.54% 2.63% 17.5% 
Other 50% 26.92% 44.74% 45% 
 
Figure 5.3.2. Compulsory Coding Categories 
 
As may be naturally expected we find that conversational categories match closely with 
choice outcomes in the games which we observed above. In order to examine this further we 
will first provide a summary of these results and in the next section we will provide a more 
detailed and structured comparison between games.  
Efficiency talk is much higher in C-BOS-E1 as compared to C-BOS-E2 reflecting the 
outcomes we observed above where the equal split was coordinated on significantly more 
frequently in the C-BOS-E2 game. This is also reflected in the high proportion of subjects 
discussing fairness in C-BOS-E2 as compared to C-BOS-E1. Clearly large proportions of 
conversations are being driven by some element of social preferences (in this case fairness) and 
                                                 
91 An equitable coordination outcome was not available in the BOS game and so this type of conversation could 
not be observed here. 
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not just through a desire to coordinate and subjects are using social preferences to aid 
coordination. The percentage of conversations being coded as other is also interesting: Where 
the category other was chosen coders were encouraged to write a short comment on how they 
would sum up the conversational interaction between the subjects. In the vast majority of other 
cases, coders reported that conversations had been purely “we must find a way to coordinate in 
order to earn money” nature i.e. subjects had not mentioned efficiency or fairness but had simply 
come to an agreement that one subject would take one amount of money and the other subject 
the corresponding amount to achieve coordination. If we call this kind of behaviour 
“coordination talk” and interpret this as no expression of social preferences then we notice big 
differences between games. For example we see a lot of this kind of “Coordination talk” in C-
BOS-E3. The higher proportion of subjects using this kind of strategy in C-BOS-E3 appears to 
suggest that subjects in these games are more “matter-of-fact” in their approach to coordination. 
Furthermore we notice that conflict arises most often in the C-BOS-E3 game suggesting that the 
larger amounts of money are causing conflicts to arise. 
We now looked deeper into conversational content by providing coders with non-
compulsory categories of which they could choose as many or as few categories as they wished. 
In this section of the coding sheet subjects could select as many or a few (including zero) 
categories as they liked per conversation.
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Table 5.3.5. Results for Non-Compulsory Coding Categories 
 C-BOS C-BOS-E1 C-BOS-E2 C-BOS-E3 
Greeting 44.44% 51.92% 55.26% 47.50% 
Open first Question 36.11% 23.08% 28.95% 60.00% 
First offer generous 69.44% 34.62% 18.42% 45.00% 
First offer non-generous 19.44% 25.00% 13.16% 27.50% 
“Better than nothing” 30.56% 0.00% 5.26% 0.00% 
First mover proposes  equal outcome n/a 30.77% 63.16% 17.50% 
Counter offer equal n/a 5.77% 2.63% 5.00% 
Random 11.11% 15.38% 5.26% 12.50% 
Counter offer “no I want more” 5.56% 13.46% 5.26% 17.50% 
Counter offer “no you have more!” 2.78% 3.85% 13.16% 10.00% 
Assurance of offer made or received 16.67% 21.15% 7.89% 15.00% 
Appealing to better nature 
(sympathy etc.) 
11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 
no firm agreement reached (ran out 
of time) 
5.56% 7.69% 0.00% 17.50% 
no firm agreement reached (fighting 
for last word) 
0.00% 7.69% 0.00% 17.50% 
Sticking to guns when disagreement 0.00% 5.77% 2.63% 7.50% 
One subject indifferent 16.67% 13.46% 0.00% 5.00% 
Both subjects indifferent 11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 2.50% 
Necessity of Coordination 47.22% 11.54% 10.53% 15.00% 
 
We notice some interesting points here which give us more insights in the observations 
made in the compulsory categories above. Firstly we notice that in C-BOS-E3 the prevalence of 
conflict type conversations, as also observed in the compulsory categories above, is reflected in 
the relatively high percentage of  subjects who make alternate counter offers as recorded in the 
categories Counter offer “no I want more” and Counter offer “no you have more!” above. 
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Particularly when these two categories are summed; the prevalence of this kind of conversation 
is much higher in BOS-E3 as compared to other games. Also interesting is how the prevalence 
of the use of a “random” method of choosing a division is different between games: Whilst this 
hovers around a similar percentage for BOS, BOS-E1 and BOS-E3 it is much lower in BOS-E2 
suggesting that this method of decision making is not necessary in this game92. This could 
suggest that coordination outcomes in the BOS-E2 are much more focal and easy to agree upon 
than in the other games (particularly in a comparison with BOS-E1). Finally we notice that in 
all games with communication the probability that the first offer is a generous one (“First offer 
generous”) is higher than the probability of non-generous offers (“First offer non-generous”) 
by 50%, 16.62% 5.26% and 17.5% in the BOS, BOS-E1, BOS-E2 and BOS-E3 games 
respectively. The fact that these levels differ so dramatically between games, particularly 
between those with and without an equal split (BOS v. all other games) and also between those 
with a weakly (BOS-E2) or strongly dominated equal split (BOS-E1 and BOS-E3), suggests 
that it is not only out of politeness that subjects take this course of action – otherwise we would 
have been fairly consistent behaviour between the games. Changes in potential payoffs clearly 
effect subject’s methods of gaining payoffs and the subsequent willingness to engage in “you 
first” type of behaviours. However let us now consider an analysis between games in a more 
formal fashion. 
 
5.3.1. Analysis between games 
 
In this section we look at chat data in a similar fashion to the choice and outcome data we 
reported above. That is we will now examine conversational differences in a comparison of the 
following games: BOS v. BOS-E1, BOS-E1 v. BOS-E2, BOS-E1 v. BOS-E3: an explanation of 
why we compared these particular games is provided in a previous section. This will also 
provide us with a more scientific and systematic method of analysing some of the observations 
made of the chat data above. The following table shows where significant differences were 
found between incidences of behaviour described by that category between the two relevant 
                                                 
92 This tended to involve subjects playing a form of “Rock, paper, scissors”. 
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games using a chi squared test93. Where significant differences in conversation styles were 
found, the percentage of subjects using this kind of language in each game is reported94:  
 
Table 5.3.1.1. Conversation content between games with compulsory categories 
  C-BOS v. C-BOS-E1 
C-BOS-E1 v.  
C-BOS-E2 
C-BOS-E1 v.  
C-BOS-E3 
Efficiency talk  = 0.285, p = 0.594 
BOS-E1=55.77% 
BOS-E2=18.42% 
 = 12.7606, p = 0.000 
BOS-E1=55.77% 
BOS-E3=35% 
 = 3.92, p = 0.048 
Fairness/equality  n/a95 
BOS-E1=5.77% 
BOS-E2=34.21% 
Fisher’s Exact = 0.001 
Fisher’s Exact = 0.255 
Conflict n/a (zero value) 96 Fisher’s Exact = 0.231  = 0.66, p = 0.416 
Other  
BOS=50% 
BOS-E1=26.92% 
 = 4.90, p = 0.027 
BOS-E1=26.92% 
BOS-E2=44.74% 
 = 3.09, p = 0.079 
BOS-E1=26.92% 
BOS-E3=45.00% 
 = 3.26, p = 0.071 
 
Let us first consider incidences of efficiency talk. The first thing we notice is that the 
prevalence of efficiency talk does not appear to be affected by the addition of an equitable 
outcome (C-BOS v. C-BOS-E1) but instead its prevalence is affected by the structure of the 
payoffs in the BOS section of the game (C-BOS-E1 v. C-BOS-E2 and C-BOS-E1 v. C-BOS-
E3). This result also reflects the results achieved on coordination outcomes as reported above. 
There we find that coordination on the BOS section of the game is not significantly different 
between C-BOS and C-BOS-E1 and it appears that much of this similarity in outcomes is also 
reflected in similar conversational styles. It should also be noted that efficiency talk in the C-
BOS game can only relate to a comparison of the C-BOS section of the game with a (0, 0) 
outcome from mis-coordination. However in the C-BOS-E1 game efficiency could refer to 
either a comparison of an efficient outcome with (0, 0) as a result of mis-coordination or 
                                                 
93 Or, where there were less than seven observations, a Fisher’s exact test as is standard in this type of statistical 
analysis. 
94 Due to the statistical limitations of the chi squared and Fishers exact tests, results obtained where zero 
observations were recorded in a category for one game cannot be compared with non-zero results obtained in a 
comparable game. We therefore do not report these comparisons but could potentially analyse this further in 
further work. 
95 As discussed previously we would not expect fairness talk to arise in BOS since there was no equitable 
outcome available (aside from zero earnings from mis-coordination) and thus we do not make the comparison 
between BOS and BOS-E1 (where an equitable outcome was available) 
96 Since a zero value was observed here in the BOS game the fishers exact test does not provide us with a valid 
result here.  
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coordination on (5, 5). The result that efficiency talk is used significantly more and fairness/ 
equality talk is used significantly less in C-BOS-E1 as compared to C-BOS-E2 is also 
unsurprising since we observe significantly greater coordination on the C-BOS section of the 
game in C-BOS-E1 than C-BOS-E2 above. Perhaps more surprising is the significant drop in 
efficiency talk in C-BOS-E3 as compared to C-BOS-E1. In the previous section relating to 
coordination outcomes we reported that coordination outcomes between C-BOS-E1 and C-
BOS-E3 were very similar and not statistically significantly different. However the 
conversational methods by which subjects are agreeing on these very similar coordination 
outcomes are different with subjects in C-BOS-E1 being much more inclined toward efficiency 
talk than their C-BOS-E3 counterparts.  Subjects’ bargaining techniques are clearly changing 
depending on the payoffs structure of the BOS section.  
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Table 5.3.1.2. Conversation content between games with non-compulsory categories 
  BOS v. BOS-E1 BOS-E1 v. BOS-E2 BOS-E1 v. BOS-E3 
Greeting  = 0.48, p = 0.490  = 0.10, p = 0.754  = 0.18, p = 0.674 
Open first Question  = 1.78, p = 0.183  = 0.398, p = 0.528 
BOS-E1=23.08% 
BOS-E3=60.00% 
 = 12.94, p = 0.000 
First offer generous 
BOS=69.44% 
BOS-E1=34.62% 
 = 10.33, p = 0.001 
BOS-E1=34.62% 
BOS-E2=18.42% 
 = 2.87, p = 0.090 
 = 1.024, p = 0.312 
First offer non-generous  = 0.374, p = 0.541 Fisher’s Exact = 0.192  = 0.073, p = 0.787 
“Better than nothing” n/a (zero value)97  n/a (zero value) 
Not used in  
either game 
First mover proposes  equal 
outcome 
n/a 
BOS-E1=30.77% 
BOS-E2=63.16% 
 = 9.328, p = 0.002 
 = 2.12, p = 0.145 
Counter offer equal n/a Fisher’s Exact = 0.635 Fisher’s Exact = 1.000 
Random 
Fisher’s Exact= 
0.754 
Fisher’s Exact = 0.181 Fisher’s Exact = 0.770 
Counter offer “no I want more” 
Fisher’s Exact= 
0.299 
Fisher’s Exact = 0.293  =0.2858, p = 0.593 
Counter offer “no you have more!” 
Fisher’s Exact= 
1.000 
Fisher’s Exact = 0.128 Fisher’s Exact = 0.398 
Assurance of offer made or 
received 
 = 0.27, p = 0.600 Fisher’s Exact = 0.140  = 0.57, p = 0.451 
Appealing to better nature  
(sympathy etc.) 
n/a (zero value) 
Not used in  
either game 
n/a (zero value) 
no firm agreement reached  
(ran out of time) 
Fisher’s Exact=1.000 n/a (zero value) Fisher’s Exact = 0.199 
no firm agreement reached  
(fighting for last word) 
n/a (zero value) n/a (zero value) Fisher’s Exact = 0.199 
Sticking to guns when 
disagreement 
n/a (zero value) Fisher’s Exact = 0.635 Fisher’s Exact = 1.000 
One subject indifferent  = 0.17, p = 0.677 n/a (zero value) Fisher’s Exact = 0.290 
Both subjects indifferent n/a (zero value) 
Not used in  
either game 
n/a (zero value) 
Necessity of Coordination 
BOS=47.22% 
BOS-E1=11.54% 
 = 14.03, p = 0.000 
Fisher’s Exact = 1.000  = 0.24, p = 0.625 
 
Let us now again look at the conversations in more detail by examining a comparison of 
chat data between games in the non-compulsory categories. First we consider C-BOS-E1 and 
C-BOS-E2. It is unsurprising that given the choice results that in C-BOS-E2 a first mover is 
significantly more likely to propose the equal outcome (First mover proposes equal outcome). 
Is it however interesting to note just how opposed the frequency of incidences of this kind of 
chat behaviour are between C-BOS-E1 and C-BOS-E2. In C-BOS-E2 it would appear that it is 
                                                 
97 See note regarding zero value and the viability of chi squared/ fisher tests above. 
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not discussion that is leading to the equal outcome being chosen but rather that the equal 
outcome is largely proposed from the outset of discussions. We also see significant differences 
in the opposite direction with regards to those first movers proposing that a co-participant 
received a greater share of a possible endowment than themselves (First offer generous).   
 In a comparison of C-BOS and C-BOS-E1 we see that the absence of the equitable option 
is making first movers more likely to propose that a co-participant gets the larger amount (First 
offer generous). Perhaps the presence of the equal outcome makes subjects more willing to let 
a co-participant have the higher amount (£8) since the inefficient equitable amount makes the 
lower amount of the unequal distribution (in the case of BOS-E1 £6 as compared to £5) more 
attractive than if the unequal distribution was viewed in isolation (as in BOS). It is also 
interesting that although the presence of the equitable outcome is changing the prevalence of 
this kind of conversation, the difference in this type of conversation is not significant between 
BOS-E1 and BOS-E3. Clearly it is a comparison with an equitable outcome which affects this 
type of conversation and not an increase in inequality in the BOS section. 
In conclusion of this overview of the types of conversation used by subjects in each of the 
games we observe that there are some interesting differences in how subjects approach 
negotiations in each game and that game structure appears to have some interesting effects. We 
also note that we appear to have evidence of social preferences being used. We believe that the 
rich communication protocol used gives us an excellent opportunity to examine this.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
In our experiment subjects are given the opportunity to play a one-shot coordination game in 
which the payoffs available to them and a co-participant and the availability of a communication 
technology are varied. We hypothesised that game type and whether communication is available 
or not should affect the behaviour of subjects. 
We observe that communication has significant effects on behaviour contrary to basic 
theoretical models of cheap talk. Importantly, we also find that communication affects the 
relative salience of different equilibria. We also find that the payoff structure of the game can 
drastically change how, and to what degree, communication affects behaviour and find that the 
structure of the game also changes conversation content. More specifically, our results show 
that when there is no opportunity to communicate subjects use an equitable outcome as a 
coordination device rather than having an intrinsic preference for equality. We also show that 
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equality is much more attractive to subjects if the alternative of inequality only benefits one 
subject financially. Finally we show that, conflicting with the hypothesis of Herreiner & Puppe 
(2010), subjects are not adverse to increasing inequality and that, on the contrary, they respond 
to a drastic increase in equality with a greater desire to attempt coordination on the inequitable 
outcome.  
 We believe that these results provide some interesting and stimulating insights into the 
effects of the interaction between payoff structures in coordination games and the presence or 
absence of communication. We hope that our research will stimulate further research into the 
interaction between game type and cheap talk. We believe that one extension of our research 
could for example be to increase the inequality of the payoffs. Also we would be interested in 
examining if our findings are primarily due to the richness of our communication or primarily 
due to the frequency with which messages can be sent. We would also like to consider elements 
of nationality and culture in bargaining and negotiating situations in future work. Also, with 
regard to game structure it would be interesting to see what happens if the compromise is 
efficient but still not total payoff maximizing. 
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1. Calculations of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria 
 
1.1. The Simple Battle of the Sexes Game 
 
Table 1.1.1. The Battle of the Sexes Game  
  Player 2 
  
Hawkish  
(α2) 
Dovish  
(1 − 2) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(α1) 
(0, 0) (30, 20) 
Dovish 
(1 − 1) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 30 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  30 − 301(2) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 20 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
30 − 301 = 201 ⇒ 1 =
3
5
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
2
5
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
3
5
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
2
5
 
 
 
Expected payoffs  
 
2
5
∗
3
5
∗ 30 +
2
5
∗
3
5
∗ 20 = 12
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1.2. The Equal Split Game 
 
Table 1.2.1. The Equal Split Game 
   Player 2  
  Hawkish (2) 
Dovish 
(
2
) 
Compromise 
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish 
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (30, 20) (0, 0) 
Player 1 
Dovish 
(
1
) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Compromise 
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (25, 25) 
 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 30 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  30ß1(2) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 20 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(3) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 25 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2
=  25 − 251 − 25ß1(4) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
30ß1 = 201 ⇒ ß1 =
2
3
1 (5) 
 
From (1) and (3) and (4) 
 
201 = 25 − 251 − 25ß1 (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 (5)) 
 
⇒  201 =  25 − 251 − 25 ∗
2
3
1   
 
⇒ 
185
3
1 =  25  
 
⇒ 1 =  
15
37
 (6) 
 
Replace (6) into (5) 
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⇒ ß1 =
2
3
∗
15
37
 
⇒ ß1 =
10
37
 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 =
12
37
 
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
15
37
  
 
⇒ ß2 =
10
37
 
 
⇒ 1 − 2 − ß2 =
12
37
 
 
Expected Payoffs 
 
15
37
 ∗
10
37
∗ 30 +
10
37
∗
15
37
 ∗ 20 +
12
37
∗
12
37
∗ 25 = 8
4
37
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1.2.1. Alternative MSNE 
 
Table 1.2.1.1. The Equal Split Game (Alternative MSNE) 
  Player 2 
  
Dovish 
(2) 
Compromise 
(1-2) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(30, 20) (0, 0) 
Compromise 
(1-1 ) 
(0, 0) (25, 25) 
 
Equations 
 
Player 2 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 20 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(2) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 25 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  25 − 251(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
 25 − 251 = 201 ⇒ 1 =
5
9
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
4
9
 
 
Player 1 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 0 + 2 ∗ 30 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 =  302(2) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 25 + 2 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  25 − 252(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
25 − 252 = 302 ⇒ 2 =
5
11
 
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
6
11
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Expected payoffs  
 
EP1 =  
5
9
∗
5
11
∗ 30 +
4
9
∗  
6
11
∗ 25 = 13.64 
 
EP2 =   
5
9
∗
5
11
∗ 20 +
4
9
∗  
6
11
∗ 25 = 11.11 
 
 
These calculation can also be calculated in the same way reversing the possible actions for 
players 1 and 2 
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1.3. The High Compromise Game 
 
Table 1.3.1. The High Compromise Game 
   Player 2  
  
Hawkish  
(2) 
Dovish 
(
2
) 
Compromise 
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish 
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (30, 20) (0, 0) 
Player 1 
Dovish 
(
1
) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Compromise 
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (15, 15) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 30 + 1 × 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  30ß1(2) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 20 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(3) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 15 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2
=  15 − 151 − 15ß1(4) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
30ß1 = 201 ⇒ ß1 =
2
3
1 (5) 
 
From (1) and (3) and (4) 
 
201 = 15 − 151 − 15ß1 (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 (5)) 
 
⇒  201 =  15 − 151 − 15 ∗
2
3
1   
 
⇒  451 =  5  
 
⇒ 1 =  
1
3
 (6) 
 
Replace (6) into (5) 
 
⇒ ß1 =
2
3
∗
1
3
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⇒ ß1 =
2
9
 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 = 1 −
1
3
−
2
9
 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 =
4
9
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
1
3
  
 
⇒ ß2 =
2
9
 
 
⇒ 1 − 2 − ß2 =
4
9
 
 
Expected Payoffs 
 
 
1
3
∗
2
9
∗ 30 +
1
3
∗
2
9
∗ 20 +
4
9
∗
4
9
∗ 15 = 6
2
3
 
  
  
203 
 
1.3.1. Alternative MSNE 
 
Table 1.3.1.1. The High Compromise Game (Alternative MSNE) 
  Player 2 
  
Dovish 
(2) 
Compromise 
(1-2) 
Player 1 
Hawkish 
(1 ) 
(30, 20) (0, 0) 
Compromise 
(1-1 ) 
(0, 0) (15, 15) 
 
Equations 
 
Player 2 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 20 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(2) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 15 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  15 − 151(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
 15 − 151 = 201 ⇒ 1 =
3
7
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
4
7
 
 
Player 1 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 0 + 2 ∗ 30 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 =  302(2) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 15 + 2 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  15 − 152(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
15 − 152 = 302 ⇒ 2 =
1
3
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
2
3
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Expected payoffs 
 
EP1 =  
1
3
∗
3
7
∗ 30 +
2
3
∗  
4
7
∗ 15 = 10 
 
EP2 =   
1
3
∗
3
7
∗ 20 +
2
3
∗  
4
7
∗ 15 = 8.57 
 
 
These calculation can also be calculated in the same way reversing the possible actions for 
players 1 and 2 
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1.4. The Medium Compromise Game 
 
Table 1.4.1. The Medium Compromise Game 
   Player 2  
  
Hawkish  
(2) 
Dovish  
(
2
) 
Compromise  
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (30, 20) (0, 0) 
Player 1 
Dovish  
(
1
) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Compromise  
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (12, 12) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 30 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  30ß1(2) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 20 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(3) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 12 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2
=  12 − 121 − 12ß1(4) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
30ß1 = 201 ⇒ ß1 =
2
3
1 (5) 
 
From (1) and (3) and (4) 
 
201 = 12 − 121 − 12ß1 (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 (5)) 
 
⇒  201 =  12 − 121 − 12 ∗
2
3
1   
 
⇒  401 =  12  
 
⇒ 1 =  
3
10
 (6) 
 
Replace (6) into (5) 
 
⇒ ß1 =
2
3
∗
3
10
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⇒ ß1 =
1
5
 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 = 1 −
3
10
−
1
5
 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 =
1
2
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
3
10
  
 
⇒ ß2 =
1
5
 
 
⇒ 1 − 2 − ß2 =
1
2
 
 
Expected Payoffs 
 
 
3
10
∗
1
5
∗ 30 +
1
5
∗
3
10
∗ 20 +
1
2
∗
1
2
∗ 12 = 6 
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1.4.1. Alternative MSNE 
Table 1.4.1.1. The Medium Compromise Game (Alternative MSNE) 
  Player 2 
  
Dovish 
(2) 
Compromise 
(1-2) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(30, 20) (0, 0) 
Compromise 
(1-1 ) 
(0, 0) (12, 12) 
 
Equations 
 
Player 2 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 20 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(2) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 12 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  12 − 121(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
 12 − 121 = 201 ⇒ 1 =
3
8
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
5
8
 
 
Player 1 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 0 + 2 ∗ 30 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 =  82(2) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 12 + 2 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 52(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
12 − 122 = 302 ⇒ 2 =
6
21
 
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
15
21
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Expected payoffs 
 
EP1 =  
3
8
∗
6
21
∗ 30 +
15
21
∗  
5
8
∗ 12 = 8.57 
 
EP2 =  
3
8
∗
6
21
∗ 20 +
15
21
∗  
5
8
∗ 12 = 7.5 
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1.5. The Low Compromise Game 
 
Table 1.5.1. The Low Compromise Game 
   Player 2  
  
Hawkish  
(2) 
Dovish  
(
2
) 
Compromise  
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (30, 20) (0, 0) 
Player 1 
Dovish  
(
1
) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Compromise  
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (5, 5) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 30 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  30ß1(2) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 20 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(3) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 5 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 51 − 5ß1(4) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
30ß1 = 201 ⇒ ß1 =
2
3
1 (5) 
 
From (1) and (3) and (4) 
 
201 = 5 − 51 − 5ß1 (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 (5)) 
 
⇒  201 =  5 − 51 − 5 ∗
2
3
1   
 
⇒ 
85
3
1 =  5  
 
⇒ 1 =  
3
17
 (6) 
 
Replace (6) into (5) 
 
⇒ ß1 =
2
3
∗
3
17
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⇒ ß1 =
2
17
 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 = 1 −
3
17
−
2
17
 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 =
12
17
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
3
17
  
 
⇒ ß2 =
2
17
 
 
⇒ 1 − 2 − ß2 =
12
17
 
 
Expected Payoffs 
 
 
3
17
∗
2
17
∗ 30 +
2
17
∗
3
17
∗ 20 +
12
17
∗
12
17
∗ 5 = 3
9
17
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1.5.1. Alternative MSNE 
 
Table 1.5.1.1. The Low Compromise Game (Alternative MSNE) 
  Player 2 
  
Dovish 
(2) 
Compromise 
(1-2) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(30, 20) (0, 0) 
Compromise 
(1-1 ) 
(0, 0) (5, 5) 
 
Equations 
 
Player 2 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 20 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(2) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 5 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 51(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
 5 − 51 = 201 ⇒ 1 =
1
5
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
4
5
 
 
Player 1 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 0 + 2 ∗ 30 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 =  302(2) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 5 + 2 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 52(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
5 − 52 = 302 ⇒ 2 =
1
7
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
6
7
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Expected payoffs 
 
EP1 =  
1
7
∗
1
5
∗ 30 +
6
7
∗  
4
5
∗ 5 = 4.29 
 
EP2 =  
1
7
∗
1
5
∗ 20 +
6
7
∗  
4
5
∗ 5 = 4 
 
 
These calculation can also be calculated in the same way reversing the possible actions for 
players 1 and 2 
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2. Instructions (Paper Based) 
 
NB. These instructions were presented to subjects before the games were presented on the 
screen. Whilst subjects were reading these instructions and completing the practice question 
contained at the end, their computers were blank. Once everyone had completed the practice 
questions the games were presented to the subjects. The way in which the games were 
presented on the computer in shown in the next section of the appendix. 
 
Instructions are based on the translation from Holm (2000). 
 
2.1. Gender labelled (GL) treatment 
 
Welcome to this experiment! 
 
By looking at the slip of paper on your desk you will see the name that has been assigned to 
your co-participant. In order to protect anonymity this is not your co-participant’s real name. 
However all male subjects have been given a male name and all female subjects a female 
name. Your co-participant has been given a similar slip of paper with a fake name for you so 
they will also be unable to identify you. Your co-participant has the same instructions as you 
have. 
 
You will have the same co-participant throughout the experiment. 
 
1. Please write the name of your co-participant in the space provided below 
 
2. Please write your desk number in the space provided below. 
 
3. Please read through the instructions and example questions on the following pages. Once 
you have finished reading through the example questions you should complete the practice 
questions on the last page. 
 
3. Once you have completed the practice questions, the experimenter will come round and 
check your answers. Once everyone’s answers have been checked you will be able to 
complete the tasks on your computer screen. 
 
The Co-participant’s “Name”: Your desk number: 
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Instructions 
 
You have been paired with an anonymous co-participant. You will face four strategic 
situations, where your earnings (in terms of points) depend partly on your choices and partly 
on the co-participant’s choices. If you and your co-participant are able to coordinate your 
choices, you will earn points in the experiment. However, the two of you will make your 
choices at the same time, so your co-participant’s choices will be unknown to you and she/he 
will not know your choices. 
 
Based on your choices you collect points that will be exchanged at a rate of 6p per point. The 
result will be available as soon as your choices are combined with those of your co-participant 
after you have both completed all four strategic situations. You will be paid based on the 
number of points you have earned in the experiment and you will also receive a £5 show-up 
fee. 
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Below are two examples of the type of task you will see in the experiment.  Please read 
them through and if you have any questions please raise your hand.  
These tasks do not count towards your experimental earnings and you are not 
required to answer the questions. 
 
Example one 
 
In some questions you will see a screen like this and you will be asked to share out 50 points: 
 
 
 
If you see this screen, your co-participant is seeing a similar screen but with their payoffs 
shown first. 
Like this: 
 
 
Using your mouse, you will be asked how you would like to share the 50 points. 
 
Explanation and Examples: Notice that, for any option that you might choose, there is 
exactly one choice by your co-participant which leads to an agreement on how to share the 
money. 
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Example: 
If you have chosen the top option, then agreement requires that your co-participant also 
chooses the top option. (In this case, you will get 30 points and your co-participant will get 20 
points)  
Your screen 
→ 
       
Your co-participant’s screen 
→ 
 
If you have chosen the middle option, then agreement requires that your co-participant has 
chosen the middle option. (In this case, you will both get 25 points.) 
Your screen 
 
→ 
Your co-participant’s screen 
→ 
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If you have chosen the bottom option, then agreement requires that your co-participant also 
chooses the bottom option. (In this case, you will get 20 points and your co-participant will get 
30 points.) 
 
Your screen 
 
→ 
Your co-participant’s screen 
Y 
→ 
 
 
 
 
Now please turn the page for example 2 
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Example 2 
In some tasks you will have a choice over the number of points you can choose to share 
out. An example of this kind of task is shown here: 
 
As before if you see this screen:  
 
 
....your co-participant is seeing a similar screen but with their payoffs shown first. 
Like this: 
 
 
 
Using your mouse, you will again be asked how you would like to share the points. 
 
Explanation and Examples: Again, notice that, for any option that you might choose, there is 
exactly one choice by your co-participant which leads to an agreement on how to share the 
money. 
 
Example: 
If you have chosen the top option, then agreement requires that your co-participant also 
chooses the top option. (In this case, you will get 30 points and your co-participant will get 20 
points.) 
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Again, if you have chosen the middle option, then agreement requires that your co-participant 
has chosen the middle option. (In this case, you will both get 15 points.) 
 
And again, if you have chosen the bottom option, then agreement requires that your co-
participant also chooses the bottom option. (In this case, you will get 20 points and your co-
participant will get 30 points.) 
 
 
 
Now, please complete the practice questions 
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Practice Questions 
 
1) Please look at the task below and answer the question. 
 
 
If you and you anonymous co-participant both chose the bottom option how much will 
you both earn? 
 
Your screen 
 
 
 
Your co-participant’s screen 
 
 
 
 
□  We will both get 20 points  
□ We will both get zero points 
□  
 
I will get 20 points and my co-participant will get 30 points.  
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2) Please look at the task below and answer the question. 
 
 
If you choose the top option and your anonymous co-participant chooses the bottom 
option how much will you both earn? 
 
Your screen 
 
 
 
Your co-participant’s screen 
 
 
 
 
□  We will both get 30 points  
□ We will both get zero points 
□  I will get 30 points and my co-participant will get 20 points.  
 
 
3 ) How do you earn points? 
 
□ By coordinating my answers with those of my anonymous co-participant 
□ By choosing the same answer as the majority of all co-participants 
 
4) How much will I be paid? 
 
□ Nothing 
□ 5 pounds 
□ 
 5 pounds plus any earnings I earn as a result of decisions made by myself and my 
anonymous co-participant in the experiment. 
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Once you have finished answering the practice questions please wait quietly. We will 
come round and check your answers. 
 
Once everyone has answered all the practice question correctly you will be asked to 
complete the tasks as shown on your computer screen. Please remain in your seat once 
you have finished. 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive your show-up fee as indicated and will also 
be paid based on your experimental earnings. Once you have received your payment you 
are free to leave. 
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2.2.Non Gender labelled (NGL) treatment 
 
 
Welcome to this experiment! 
 
Your co-participant has the same instructions as you have. 
 
You will have the same co-participant throughout the experiment. 
 
1. Please write your desk number in the space provided below. 
 
2. Please read through the instructions and example questions on the following pages. Once 
you have finished reading through the example questions you should complete the practice 
questions on the last page. 
 
3. Once you have completed the practice questions, the experimenter will come round and 
check your answers. Once everyone’s answers have been checked you will be able to 
complete the tasks on your computer screen. 
 
 
Your desk number: 
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Instructions 
 
You have been paired with an anonymous co-participant. You will face four strategic 
situations, where your earnings (in terms of points) depend partly on your choices and partly 
on the co-participant’s choices. If you and your co-participant are able to coordinate your 
choices, you will earn points in the experiment. However, the two of you will make your 
choices at the same time, so your co-participant’s choices will be unknown to you and she/he 
will not know your choices. 
 
Based on your choices you collect points that will be exchanged at a rate of 6p per point. The 
result will be available as soon as your choices are combined with those of your co-participant 
after you have both completed all four strategic situations. You will be paid based on the 
number of points you have earned in the experiment and you will also receive a £5 show-up 
fee. 
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Below are two examples of the type of task you will see in the experiment.  Please read 
them through and if you have any questions please raise your hand.  
These tasks do not count towards your experimental earnings and you are not 
required to answer the questions. 
 
Example one 
 
In some questions you will see a screen like this and you will be asked to share out 50 points: 
 
 
 
If you see this screen, your co-participant is seeing a similar screen but with their payoffs 
shown first. 
 
Like this: 
 
 
 
Using your mouse, you will be asked how you would like to share the 50 points. 
 
Explanation and Examples: Notice that, for any option that you might choose, there is 
exactly one choice by your co-participant which leads to an agreement on how to share the 
money.  
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Example: 
If you have chosen the top option, then agreement requires that your co-participant also 
chooses the top option. (In this case, you will get 30 points and your co-participant will get 20 
points.) 
Your screen 
→ 
       
Your co-participant’s screen 
→ 
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If you have chosen the middle option, then agreement requires that your co-participant has 
chosen the middle option. (In this case, you will both get 25 points.) 
Your screen 
 
→ 
Your co-participant’s screen 
 
→ 
If you have chosen the bottom option, then agreement requires that your co-participant also 
chooses the bottom option. (In this case, you will get 20 points and your co-participant will get 
30 points.) 
Your screen 
 
→ 
Your co-participant’s screen 
 
→  
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Example 2 
In some tasks you will have a choice over the number of points you can choose to share 
out. An example of this kind of task is shown here: 
 
As before If you see this screen:  
 
 
....your co-participant is seeing a similar screen but with their payoffs shown first. 
Like this: 
 
 
 
Using your mouse, you will again be asked how you would like to share the points. 
 
Explanation and Examples: Again, notice that, for any option that you might choose, there is 
exactly one choice by your co-participant which leads to an agreement on how to share the 
money. 
 
Example: 
If you have chosen the top option, then agreement requires that your co-participant also 
chooses the top option. (In this case, you will get 30 points and your co-participant will get 20 
points.) 
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Again, if you have chosen the middle option, then agreement requires that your co-participant 
has chosen the middle option. (In this case, you will both get 15 points.) 
 
And again, if you have chosen the bottom option, then agreement requires that your co-
participant also chooses the bottom option. (In this case, you will get 20 points and your co-
participant will get 30 points.) 
 
Now, please complete the practice questions 
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Practice Questions 
 
1) Please look at the task below and answer the question. 
 
 
If you and you anonymous co-participant both chose the bottom option how much will 
you both earn? 
 
Your screen 
 
 
 
Your co-participant’s screen 
 
 
 
 
□  We will both get 20 points  
□ We will both get zero points 
□  
 
I will get 20 points and my co-participant will get 30 points.  
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2) Please look at the task below and answer the question. 
 
If you choose the top option and your anonymous co-participant chooses the bottom 
option how much will you both earn? 
 
Your screen 
 
 
 
Your co-participant’s screen 
 
 
 
 
□  We will both get 30 points  
□ We will both get zero points 
□  I will get 30 points and my co-participant will get 20 points.  
 
 
3 ) How do you earn points? 
 
□ By coordinating my answers with those of my anonymous co-participant 
□ By choosing the same answer as the majority of all co-participants 
 
 
4) How much will I be paid? 
 
□ Nothing 
□ 5 pounds 
□ 
 5 pounds plus any earnings I earn as a result of decisions made by myself and my 
anonymous co-participant in the experiment. 
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Once you have finished answering the practice questions please wait quietly. We will 
come round and check your answers. 
 
Once everyone has answered all the practice questions correctly you will be asked to 
complete the tasks as shown on your computer screen. Please remain in your seat once 
you have finished. 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive your show-up fee as indicated and will also 
be paid based on your experimental earnings. Once you have received your payment you 
are free to leave. 
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3. Screen Shots 
 
Figure 3.1. Presentation of the Equal Split Game 
Figure 3.2. Presentation of the High Compromise Game 
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Figure 3.3. Presentation of the Medium Compromise Game 
Figure 3.4. Presentation of the Low Compromise Game 
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Figure 3.5. Screen seen by subjects upon completion of the games 
 
Figure 3.6. The results screen   
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1. Paper instructions  
 
NB.  These paper instructions were placed on subjects desks before they arrived at the 
experiment. Once all subjects had read the instructions and completed the practice questions 
games were displayed on computer screens.  
NB. Text in italics was only included in the treatments where punishment was available and 
game screen shots were tailored to the game used in that treatment 
 
Welcome to this experiment! 
 
Please read through the instructions and example questions on the following pages. Once you have 
finished reading through the example questions you should complete the practice questions on the last 
page. 
 
Once you have completed the practice questions, you will be able to complete the tasks on your 
computer screen. 
 
Instructions 
 
In each period you will be paired with a different anonymous co-participant.  
 
You will face a strategic situation, where your earnings (in terms of points) depend partly on your 
choices and partly on your co-participant’s choices. If you and your co-participant are able to 
coordinate your choices, you will earn points in the experiment. However, the two of you will make 
your choices at the same time, so your co-participant’s choices will be unknown to you and she/he will 
not know your choices. 
 
Based on your choices you collect points that will be exchanged at a rate of 6p per point. The result 
will be available as soon as your choices are combined with those of your co-participant in each period 
after you have both completed the strategic situation.  
 
Each participant will also receive a lump-sum payment of 84 experimental points at the beginning each 
period. This lump-sum payment can be used to pay for any eventual losses in the experiment. 
 
There will be 5 periods in this experiment. 
 
At the end of the experiment you will be paid based on the number of points you have earned in a 
randomly selected period. 
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On the next page is an example of the type of task you will see in the experiment.  Please read it 
through and if you have any questions please raise your hand.  
This task does not count towards your experimental earnings and you are not required to 
answer the questions. 
 
Example 
 
You will see a screen like this and you will be asked to share out 50 points: 
 
 
 
 
 
If you see this screen, your co-participant is seeing a similar screen but with their payoffs shown first. 
Like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
Using your mouse, you will be asked how you would like to share the 50 points. 
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Explanation and Examples: Notice that, for any option that you might choose, there is exactly one 
choice by your co-participant which leads to an agreement on how to share the money. 
 
 
Example: 
If you have chosen the top option, then agreement requires that your co-participant also chooses the top 
option. (In this case, you will get 30 points and your co-participant will get 20 points.) 
 
 
Your screen 
 
      
Your co-participant’s screen 
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If you have chosen the bottom option, then agreement requires that your co-participant also chooses the 
bottom option. (In this case, you will get 20 points and your co-participant will get 30 points.) 
 
Your screen 
 
Your co-participant’s screen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you do not coordinate your answers with your co-participant you and your co-participant will 
both earn zero. 
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In the start of the second stage of each period you will see if you and your co-participant have 
coordinated and how many points you won in the previous stage.  
  
You then have to decide whether to reduce your partner’s earnings or to leave it as it is. Reducing your 
co-participant’s earnings will cost you either 2 or 10 experimental points. By paying 10 experimental 
points, you can reduce your co-participant’s earnings by 50 experimental points. By paying 2 
experimental points, you can reduce your co-participant’s earnings by 10 experimental points. Your 
co-participant makes this decision at the same time as you do. He/ she can also choose between 
leaving your earnings unaltered, reducing them by 50 experimental points or reducing them by 10 
experimental points. Your co-participant will incur the same cost – 10 or 2 experimental points 
respectively – if he or she chooses to reduce your earnings. 
 
 
 
Now, please complete the practice questions 
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Practice Questions 
 
3) Please look at the task below and answer the question. 
 
 
If you and you anonymous co-participant both chose the bottom option how much will you both 
earn? 
 
Your screen 
 
 
 
 
Your co-participant’s screen 
 
 
 
□ We will both get 20 points  
□ We will both get zero points 
□ I will get 20 points and my co-participant will get 30 points.  
 
  
  
244 
 
4) Please look at the task below and answer the question. 
 
 
If you choose the top option and your anonymous co-participant chooses the bottom option how 
much will you both earn? 
 
Your screen 
 
 
 
 
Your co-participant’s screen 
 
 
 
□  We will both get 30 points  
□ We will both get zero points 
□ I will get 30 points and my co-participant will get 20 points.  
  
 
3) How much would it cost you to reduce your co-participant’s earnings by 50 points? 
□ 0 points 
□ 10 points 
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4) If you allocate 2 points to your co-participant, how many points will it reduce his/her earnings 
by? 
□ 10 points 
□ 50 points 
 
5) If YOU allocate 10 points to your co-participant, how many points will it reduce YOUR earnings 
by? 
□ 10 points 
□ 50 points 
 
6 ) How do you earn points? 
 
□ By coordinating my answers with those of my anonymous co-participant 
□ By choosing the same answer as the majority of all co-participants 
 
7) Which period will the amount you are paid at the end of the experiment be based on? 
 
□ The sum of earnings from all periods 
□ A randomly selected period 
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8) How much will I be paid? 
 
□ Nothing 
□ The lump-sum (84 points) 
□ Anything remaining from my initial lump-sum plus any earnings I earn as a result of decisions 
made by myself and my anonymous co-participant in the experiment. 
 
9) Does your anonymous co-participant change in every period? 
 
□ Yes – I will be partnered with a different co-participant every period. 
□ No – I will be partnered with the same co-participant every period. 
□ Yes – But I may be partnered with the same co-participant again in later periods. 
 
 
 
Once you have finished answering the practice questions please turn to the next page and check 
your answers. If you have any questions please raise your hand. 
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Answers to Practice Questions 
 
1) If you and you anonymous co-participant both chose the bottom option how much will you 
both earn? 
The correct answer is: I will get 20 points and my co-participant will get 30 points 
 
2) If you choose the top option and your anonymous co-participant chooses the bottom option 
how much will you both earn? 
The correct answer is: We will both get zero points 
 
3) How much would it cost you to reduce your co-participant’s earnings by 50 points? 
The correct answer is: 10 points 
 
4) If you allocate 2 points to your co-participant, how many points will it reduce his/her earnings 
by? 
The correct answer is: 10 points 
 
5) If YOU allocate 10 points to your co-participant, how many points will it reduce YOUR earnings 
by? 
The correct answer is: 10 points 
 
6) How do you earn points? 
The correct answer is: By coordinating my answers with those of my anonymous co-participant 
 
7) Which period will the amount you are paid at the end of the experiment be based on? 
The correct answer is: A randomly selected period 
 
8) How much will I be paid? 
The correct answer is: Anything remaining from my initial lump-sum plus any earnings I earn as a 
result of decisions made by myself and my anonymous co-participant in the experiment. 
 
9) Does your anonymous co-participant change in every period? 
The correct answer is: Yes – I will be partnered with a different co-participant every period. 
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Once everyone has answered all the practice questions you will be asked to complete the tasks as 
shown on your computer screen. Please remain in your seat once you have finished. 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive your experimental earnings as indicated.  
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2.  Screen Shots 
 
Figure 2.1. The Welcome Screen 
 
Figure 2.2 The Game/ Decision Screen 
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Figure 2.3. Results from Game and Punishment Decision Screen 
OR 
 
Figure 2.4. Results from Game (without Punishment Decision) Screen 
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Figure 2.5. Calculation of earnings screen (without Punishment) 
OR 
 
Figure 2.6. Calculation of earnings screen  
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Figure 2.7. Summary of Period Earnings and Period Selection Screen 
 
Figure 2.8. Final Earnings Screen 
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3. Calculation of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium  
3.1. Battle of the Sexes with Compromise  
 
Table 3.1.1. The Battle of the Sexes Game with Compromise 
   Player 2  
  
Hawkish  
(2) 
Dovish  
(
2
) 
Compromise  
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (30, 20) (0, 0) 
Player 1 
Dovish  
(
1
) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Compromise  
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (15, 15) 
 
Equations 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 30 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  30ß1(2) 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 20 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(3) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 15 
⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  15 − 151 − 15ß1(4) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
30ß1 = 201 ⇒ ß1 =
2
3
1 (5) 
 
From (1) and (3) and (4) 
 
201 = 15 − 151 − 15ß1 (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 (5)) 
⇒  201 =  15 − 151 − 15 ∗
2
3
1   
 
⇒  451 =  15   
 
⇒ 1 =  
1
3
 (6) 
 
Replace (6) into (5) 
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⇒ ß1 =
2
3
∗
1
3
 
 
⇒ ß1 =
2
9
 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 = 1 −
1
3
−
2
9
 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 =
4
9
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
1
3
  
 
⇒ ß2 =
2
9
 
 
⇒ 1 − 2 − ß2 =
4
9
 
 
Expected Payoffs 
 
 
1
3
∗
2
9
∗ 30 +
1
3
∗
2
9
∗ 20 +
4
9
∗
4
9
∗ 15 = 6
2
3
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3.1.1. Alternative MSNE 
 
Table 3.1.1.1. Battle of the Sexes with a Compromise Option (Alternative MSNE) 
  Player 2 
  
Dovish 
(2) 
Compromise 
(1-2) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(30, 20) (0, 0) 
Compromise 
(1-1 ) 
(0, 0) (15, 15) 
 
Equations 
 
Player 2 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 20 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(2) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 15 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  15 − 151(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
 15 − 151 = 201 ⇒ 1 =
3
7
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
4
7
 
 
Player 1 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 0 + 2 ∗ 30 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 =  302(2) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 15 + 2 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  15 − 152(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
15 − 152 = 302 ⇒ 2 =
1
3
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
2
3
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Expected payoffs 
 
EP1 =  
1
3
∗
3
7
∗ 30 +
2
3
∗  
4
7
∗ 15 = 10 
 
EP2 =   
1
3
∗
3
7
∗ 20 +
2
3
∗  
4
7
∗ 15 = 8.57 
 
 
These calculation can also be calculated in the same way reversing the possible actions for 
players 1 and 2 
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3.2. Battle of the Sexes Game  
 
Table 3.2.1. Battle of the Sexes Game 
  Player 2 
  
Hawkish  
(2) 
Dovish  
(1-2) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (30, 20) 
Dovish  
(1-1 ) 
(20, 30) (0, 0) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑘𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) × 30 + 1 × 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  30 − 301(2) 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) × 0 + 1 × 20 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  201(3) 
 
Using (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
30 − 301 = 201 ⇒ 1 =
3
5
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
2
5
 
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
3
5
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
2
5
 
 
Expected payoffs 
 
3
5
∗
2
5
∗ 30 +
3
5
∗
2
5
 * 20 = 12 
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4. Pairwise Correlation Matrices 
 
A matrix is presented for each probit table in chapter 2. The correlation coefficient is present 
together with the (2-tailed) p value in brackets after each. 
 
Table 4.1. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Table. 5.2.1.2  
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.6368 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates -0.2673  
0.2508 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.3304 
(0.0000) 
-0.2777 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000  1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
0.1158 
(0.0450) 
0.0480 
(0.4074) 
-0.0788 
(0.1734) 
-0.5160 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
  
 
Table 4.2. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Table 5.2.1.3(a). 
- All Subjects  
 
South 
East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Males Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000       
Western 
European 
-0.6087 
(0.0000) 
1.0000      
Males 
-0.0790 
(0.0180) 
0.1508 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.1175 
(0.0004) 
0.3313 
(0.0000) 
0.1295 
(0.0001) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.3625 
(0.0000) 
-0.3677 
(0.0000) 
-0.0501 
(0.1345) 
-0.2345 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.2036 
(0.0000) 
0.3189 
(0.0000) 
-0.0566 
(0.0904) 
0.0523 
(0.1182) 
-0.4503 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
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- Males Only 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.6453 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
0.0279 
(0.5551) 
0.3295 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.2605 
(0.0000) 
-0.3333 
(0.0000) 
-0.3134 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.1445 
(0.0021) 
0.2587 
(0.0000) 
0.1225 (0.0093) 
-0.3989 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
 
- Females Only 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.5696 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.2191 
(0.0000) 
0.3093 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.4516 
(0.0000) 
-0.3961 
(0.0000) 
-0.1591 
(0.0008) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.2648 
(0.0000) 
0.4006 
(0.0000) 
0.0094 (0.8438) 
-0.5061 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
  
 
Table 4.3. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Table 5.2.1.3(b).  
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.5916 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.3708 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.1971(0.0006) 
-0.2968 
(0.0000) 
-0.3517 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.0417 
(0.4721) 
0.1690 
(0.0033) 
0.0962 (0.0962) 
-0.3404 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
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Table 4.4. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Table 5.2.1.3(c). 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.5910 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.2453 
(0.0000) 
0.3509 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.5097 
(0.0000) 
-0.4214 
(0.0000) 
-0.1394 
(0.0166) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.2789 
(0.0000) 
0.3717 
(0.0000) 
0.0536 (0.3593) 
-0.5594 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
 
Table 4.5. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Table 5.2.1.3(d). 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.5724 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.2903 
(0.0000) 
0.3764 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.5003 
(0.0000) 
-0.4497 
(0.0000) 
-0.3212 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.3359 
(0.0000) 
0.4112 
(0.0000) 
0.1089 (0.0619) 
-0.4835 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
 
Table 4.6. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Table 5.2.1.4(a).  
- All Subjects 
  
South 
East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Males Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000       
Western 
European 
-0.5951 
(0.0000) 
1.0000      
Males 
-0.0571 
(0.0479) 
0.1917 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.0632 
(0.0285) 
0.2920 
(0.0000) 
0.2082 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.2353 
(0.0000) 
-0.1999 
(0.0000) 
0.1086 
(0.0002) 
-0.1901  
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.1616 
(0.0000) 
0.2842 
(0.0000) 
-0.0534 
(0.0645) 
0.0841  
(0.0035) 
-0.4456 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
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- Males Only 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.6757 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.0019  
(0.9633) 
0.3024 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.1787 
(0.0000) 
-0.1770 
(0.0000) 
-0.2495 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.1938 
(0.0000) 
0.2739 
(0.0000) 
0.1817 
(0.0000) 
-0.4624 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
 
- Females Only 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.5223 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.0888 
(0.0297) 
0.2375 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.3054 
(0.0000) 
-0.2762 
(0.0000) 
-0.1998 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.1404 
(0.0006) 
0.3253 
(0.0000) 
0.0404 
(0.3228) 
-0.4262 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
 
Table 4.7. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Table 5.2.1.4(b). 
- MM Subjects 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.7648 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.0157 
(0.7871) 
0.1406 
(0.0148) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.1470 
(0.0108) 
-0.2052 
(0.0003) 
-0.3178 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.1685 
(0.0034) 
0.1686 
(0.0034) 
0.1625(0.0048) 
-0.5114 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
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- MF Subjects 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.5916 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
0.4384 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.2004 
(0.0005) 
-0.1581 
(0.0061) 
-0.2092 
(0.0003) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.2236 
(0.0001) 
0.3780 
(0.0000) 
0.2000 (0.0005) 
-0.4183 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
 
- FF Subjects 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.4804 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.0235 
(0.6858) 
0.1239 
(0.0319) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.1811 
(0.0016) 
-0.1958 
(0.0006) 
-0.2255 
(0.0001) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.1455 
(0.0116) 
0.3320 
(0.0000) 
-0.0179 
(0.7573) 
-0.3804 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
 
- FM Subjects 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.5641 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.1566 
(0.0066) 
0.3495 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.4394 
(0.0000) 
-0.3761 
(0.0000) 
-0.1764 
(0.0022) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.1342 
(0.0201) 
0.3190 
(0.0000) 
0.0971 (0.0931) 
-0.4757 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
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Table 4.8. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Table 5.2.2.3(a). 
- All Subjects 
 
South 
East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Males Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000       
Western 
European 
-0.6087  
(0.0000) 
1.0000      
Males 
-0.0790 
(0.0180) 
0.1508 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.1175 
(0.0004) 
0.3313 
(0.0000) 
0.1295 
(0.0001) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.3625 
 
-0.3677 
(0.0000) 
-0.0501 
(0.1345) 
-0.2345 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.2036 
(0.0000) 
0.3189 
(0.0000) 
-0.0566 
(0.0904) 
0.0523 
(0.1182) 
-0.4503 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
 
- Males Only 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.6453 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
0.0279 
(0.5551) 
0.3295 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.2605 
(0.0000) 
-0.3333 
(0.0000) 
-0.3134 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.1445 
(0.0021) 
0.2587  
(0.0000) 
0.1225 
(0.0093) 
-0.3989 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
 
- Females Only 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.5696 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates -0.2191  
0.3093 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.4516 
(0.0000) 
-0.3961 
(0.0000) 
-0.1591 
(0.0008) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.2648 
(0.0000) 
0.4006 
(0.0000) 
0.0094 
(0.8438) 
-0.5061 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
 
  
264 
 
 
Table 4.9. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Table 5.2.2.3(b). 
 
South East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000      
Western 
European 
-0.7323 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.0701 
(0.2262) 
0.2510 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.2573 
(0.0000) 
-0.3655 
(0.0000) 
-0.3342 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.0962 
(0.0962) 
0.1371 
(0.0175) 
0.0607 (0.2948) 
-0.3942 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
  
Table 4.10. Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Table 5.2.2.4.  
 
South 
East 
Asian 
Western 
European 
Males Undergraduates 
Social 
Science 
Students 
Humanities 
Students 
South East 
Asian 
1.0000       
Western 
European 
-0.7046 
(0.000) 
1.0000      
Males 
-0.3236 
(0.000) 
0.2891 
(0.000) 
1.0000     
Undergraduates 
-0.3413 
(0.000) 
0.3988 
(0.000) 
0.3333 
(0.000) 
1.0000    
Social Science 
Students 
0.3264 
(0.000) 
-0.2855 
(0.000) 
-0.1231 
(0.0002) 
-0.1296 
(0.0001) 
1.0000   
Humanities 
Students 
-0.0358 
(0.2847) 
0.1069 
(0.0014) 
-0.0674 
(0.0431) 
-0.0693 
(0.0377) 
-0.4651 
(0.000) 
1.0000  
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5. Additional Regressions 
 
Table 5.1. Choices made without compromise (NP-NC) - Period 1 only 
 
 
Treatment 
 
Males Females 
 G-NP 
(All  
Males) 
G-NP 
(MF) 
G-NP 
(MM) 
NG-NP 
(All  
Males) 
G-NP 
(All  
Females) 
G-NP 
(FM) 
G-NP  
(FF) 
NG-NP 
(All  
Females) 
Amount  
taken 
20  
(Dovish) 
41.67  
(25)  
33.33  
(10) 
50.00  
(15) 
43.33  
(13) 
50.00   
(30) 
46.67 
(14) 
53.33  
(16) 
43.33  
(13) 
30  
(Hawkish) 
58.33 
 (35)   
66.67  
(20) 
50.00  
(15) 
56.67  
(17) 
50.00   
(30) 
53.33  
(16) 
46.67  
(14) 
56.67  
(17) 
 
Table 5.2. Choices made without compromise (P-NC) - Period 1 only 
 
 
Treatment 
 Males Females 
 
G-P  
(All  
Males) 
G-P  
(MF) 
G-P  
(MM) 
NG-P 
(All  
Males) 
G-P 
(All  
Females) 
G-P  
(FM) 
G-P 
(FF) 
NG-P 
(All  
Females) 
Amount  
taken 
20  
(Dovish) 
50.00  
(30) 
46.67  
(14) 
53.33  
(16) 
56.67  
(17) 
38.33  
(23) 
30.00  
(9) 
46.67  
(14) 
50.00  
(15) 
30 
(Hawkish) 
50.00  
(30) 
53.33  
(16) 
46.67  
(14) 
43.33  
(13) 
61.67  
(37) 
70.00  
(21) 
53.33  
(16) 
50.00  
(15) 
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Table 5.3. Choices made without compromise (NG-NC) - Period 1 only 
 
 
Treatment 
 Males Females 
 
NG-P  
(All Males) 
NG-NP 
(All Males) 
NG-P  
(All Females) 
NG-NP 
(All Females) 
Amount 
taken 
20  
(Dovish) 
56.67   
(17) 
43.33  
(13) 
50.00  
(15) 
43.33  
(13) 
30  
(Hawkish) 
43.33  
(13) 
56.67  
(17) 
50.00  
(15) 
56.67 
(17) 
 
Table 5.4. Choices made by males without compromise (G-NC) - Period 1 only 
 
 
Treatment 
 
G-P-NC 
(Males) 
G-P-NC  
(MM) 
G-P-NC  
(MF) 
G-NP-NC  
(Males) 
G-NP-NC  
(MM) 
G-NP-NC  
(MF) 
Amount 
taken 
20 (Dovish) 
50.00  
(30) 
53.33  
(16) 
46.67  
(14) 
41.67  
(25) 
50.00  
(15) 
33.33  
(10) 
30 (Hawkish) 
50.00  
(30) 
46.67  
(14) 
53.33  
(16) 
58.33  
(35) 
50.00  
(15) 
66.67  
(20) 
 
Table 5.5. Choices made by females without compromise (G-NC) - Period 1 only 
 
 
Treatment 
 
G-P-NC  
(Females) 
G-P-NC   
(FF) 
G-P-NC 
(FM) 
G-NP-NC  
(Females) 
G-NP-NC  
(FF) 
G-NP-
NC  
(FM) 
Amount 
taken 
20 (Dovish) 
38.33  
(23) 
46.67  
(14) 
30.00  
(9) 
50.00  
(30) 
53.33  
(16) 
46.67  
(14) 
30 (Hawkish) 
61.67  
(37) 
53.33  
(16) 
70.00  
(21) 
50.00  
(30) 
46.67  
(14) 
53.33  
(16) 
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Table 5.6. The effect of gender information – G-P-NC v. NG-P-NC 
  30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 
All subjects 
Gender information available  -0.194 (0.14) 0.194 (0.14) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
0.754*** (0.25) -0.754*** (0.25) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base: Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.792*** (0.11) 0.792*** (0.11) 
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.048 (0.11) 0.048 (0.11)   
Co-participant “Full Monty” lag -0.438 (0.31) 0.438 (0.31)    
Co-participant “Slap on the Wrist” lag -0.359*(0.19) 0.359* (0.19)    
“Full Monty” lag -0.118 (0.33) 0.118 (0.33) 
“Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.018 (0.19)    -0.018 (0.19)    
Males -0.091(0.13) 0.091 (0.13)    
South-East Asian 0.109 (0.18) -0.109 (0.18)    
Western European 0.030 (0.18) -0.030 (0.18)    
Undergraduates 0.038 (0.14) -0.038 (0.14)    
Social Sciences Students 0.006 (0.15) -0.006 (0.15)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.212 (0.18) 0.212 (0.18)    
Constant 0.478* (0.29) -0.478* (0.29)    
No. of Obs. 716 716 
Wald chi2(13) 70.13 70.13 
Males 
Gender information available  -0.070 (0.16) 0.070 (0.16)    
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
1.278*** (0.16) -1.278*** (0.16) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base: Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.707*** (0.15)    0.707*** (0.15)    
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.003 (0.15)    0.003 (0.15)    
Co-participant “Full Monty” lag -0.816* (0.44) 0.816*  (0.44)    
Co-participant “Slap on the Wrist” lag -0.414 (0.30) 0.414 (0.30)    
“Full Monty” lag -0.183 (0.28) -0.074 (0.44) 
“Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.074 (0.44) 0.183 (0.28)      
South-East Asian 0.022 (0.24) -0.022 (0.24)    
Western European 0.085 (0.22) -0.085 (0.22)    
Undergraduates -0.080 (0.20) 0.080 (0.20)    
Social Sciences Students -0.109 (0.18) 0.109 (0.18)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.091 (0.20) 0.091 (0.20)    
Constant 0.076 0.28) -0.076 (0.28)    
No. of Obs. 360 360 
Wald chi2(13) 84.90 84.90 
Females 
Gender information available  -0.461** (0.23) 0.461** (0.23)    
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
0.170 (0.28)    -0.170 (0.28)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base: Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.928*** (0.17) 0.928*** (0.17) 
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.122 (0.17)    0.122 (0.17)    
Co-participant “Full Monty” lag 0.127 (0.47) -0.127 (0.47)    
Co-participant “Slap on the Wrist” lag -0.340 (0.25) 0.340(0.25)    
“Full Monty” lag 0.063 (0.27)  0.422 (0.50)    
“Slap on the Wrist” lag -0.422 (0.50)  -0.063 (0.27) 
South-East Asian 0.431 (0.31) -0.431 (0.31)    
Western European -0.075 (0.31) 0.075 (0.31)    
Undergraduates 0.208 (0.22) -0.208 (0.22)    
Social Sciences Students 0.107 (0.25) -0.107 (0.25)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.499 (0.31) 0.499 (0.31)    
Constant 0.904** (0.42) -0.904** (0.42)    
No. of Obs. 356 356 
Wald chi2(13) 44.40 44.40 
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Table 5.7. The effect of gender information – G-P-NC (MM subjects) v. NG-P-NC (Male subjects) 
 30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 
Gender information available  -0.158 (0.24) 0.158 (0.24) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
1.034*** (0.39) -1.034*** (0.39) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base: Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.597*** (0.20) 0.597*** (0.20) 
Coordination achieved in previous period 0.050 (0.20) -0.050 (0.20) 
Co-participant “Full Monty” lag -0.999* (0.59) 0.999* (0.59) 
Co-participant “Slap on the Wrist” lag -0.550 (0.43) 0.550 (0.43) 
“Full Monty” lag -0.421 (0.43) 0.421 (0.43) 
“Slap on the Wrist” lag 0.030 (0.57) -0.030 (0.57) 
South-East Asian -0.100 (0.41) 0.100 (0.41) 
Western European 0.048 (0.36) -0.048 (0.36) 
Undergraduates -0.339 (0.38) 0.339 (0.38) 
Social Sciences Students -0.039 (0.28) 0.039 (0.28) 
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.301 (0.32) 0.301 (0.32) 
Constant 0.460(0.59) -0.460 (0.59) 
No. of Obs. 240 240 
Wald chi2(13) 29.55 29.55 
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Table 5.8. The effect of gender information – G-NP-NC v. NG-NP-NC98 
  30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 
All 
Subjects 
Gender information available -0.181 (0.13) 0.181 (0.13)  
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
0.322** (0.15) -0.322** (0.15) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base: Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.497*** (0.11) 0.497*** (0.11) 
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.245 (0.21) 0.123 (0.11) 
Males -0.074 (0.12) 0.074 (0.12)  
South-East Asian 0.094 (0.20) -0.094 (0.20) 
Western European -0.083(0.22) 0.083 (0.22) 
Undergraduates -0.006 (0.14) 0.006 (0.14)  
Social Sciences Students -0.016 (0.15) 0.016 (0.15) 
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and Science Students 
0.010 (0.18) -0.010 (0.18) 
Constant 0.496* (0.27) -0.496* (0.27)  
No. of Obs. 720 720 
Wald chi2(10) 30.51 30.51 
Males 
Gender information available -0.132 (0.16) 0.132 (0.16)    
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
0.818*** (0.15)    -0.818*** (0.15)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base: Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.708*** (0.15)    0.708*** (0.15)    
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.082 (0.29) 0.041(0.15)    
South-East Asian 0.015(0.30) -0.015 (0.30)    
Western European -0.077 (0.31) 0.077 (0.31)    
Undergraduates -0.105 (0.16) 0.105 (0.16)    
Social Sciences Students 0.179(0.18) -0.179 (0.18)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and Science Students 
-0.155(0.23) 0.155 (0.23)    
Constant 0.204 (0.38) -0.204 (0.38)    
Wald chi2(9) 53.09 53.09 
No. of Obs. 360 360 
Females 
Gender information available -0.270 (0.19) 0.270 (0.19) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
-0.022 (0.20) 0.022 (0.20) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base: Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.392** (0.15)   0.392** (0.15)   
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.457 (0.31) 0.229 (0.15)  
South-East Asian 0.185 (0.26) -0.185 (0.26)  
Western European -0.053 (0.31) 0.053 (0.31) 
Undergraduates 0.064 (0.22) -0.064 (0.22) 
Social Sciences Students -0.260 (0.22) 0.260 (0.22)  
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and Science Students 
0.190 (0.27) 0.190 (0.27) 
Constant 0.751** (0.36) -0.751**(0.36)  
No. of Obs. 360 360 
Wald chi2(9) 15.55 15.55 
 
                                                 
98 We also run regressions with an interaction term between gender information and gender but find no 
significant effects of gender information 
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Table 5.9. The effect of gender information – G-NP-C v. NG-NP-C 
  30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 15 (Equal) 
All subjects 
Gender information available  0.148 (0.12) -0.103 (0.12) -0.084 (0.12)    
Hawkish lag 1.112*** (0.13) 0.490*** (0.14) -1.459*** (0.14)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.668***  (0.14) 0.980*** (0.14) -1.503*** (0.15)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.623*** (0.13) 0.586*** (0.13) -1.155*** (0.14)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.976*** (0.13) 0.098 (0.15) -1.117*** (0.14)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period -0.067  (0.12) -0.139 (0.12) -0.156    (0.13)    
Males 0.194* (0.12) -0.126 (0.12) -0.063 (0.12)    
South-East Asian 0.019 (0.16) 0.215 (0.17) -0.215 (0.16)    
Western European 0.010 (0.16) 0.339** (0.17) -0.300* (0.16)    
Undergraduates 0.135 (0.14) -0.420*** (0.14) 0.251* (0.14)    
Social Sciences Students 0.040 (0.12) -0.048 (0.13) -0.025 (0.12)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.283* (0.16) -0.205 (0.18) -0.099 (0.16)    
Constant -1.837*** (0.22) -1.169*** (0.23) 1.487*** (0.22) 
No. of Obs. 720 720 720 
Wald chi2(12) 129.50 90.49 214.14 
Males 
Gender information available  0.098 (0.17) -0.072 (0.18) -0.033 (0.17)    
Hawkish lag 1.318*** (0.19) 0.428** (0.20) -1.618*** (0.20)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.802***  (0.20) 0.794*** (0.20) -1.413*** (0.21)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 1.020*** (0.20) 0.300 (0.20) -1.297*** (0.21)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
1.218*** (0.19) -0.063 (0.20) -1.178*** (0.19)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period -0.181 (0.18) -0.166 (0.18) -0.038 (0.19)    
Males  n/a  n/a  n/a 
South-East Asian -0.051 (0.30) 0.310 (0.32) -0.190 (0.30)    
Western European 0.131 (0.27) 0.221 (0.30) -0.319 (0.27)    
Undergraduates 0.095 (0.24) -0.211 (0.24) 0.067 (0.24)    
Social Sciences Students 0.160 (0.18) -0.245 (0.18) -0.010 (0.18)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.422* (0.24) -0.302 (0.26) -0.155 (0.24)    
Constant -1.993*** (0.41) -1.104*** (0.41) 1.604*** (0.40) 
No. of Obs. 356 356 356 
Wald chi2(11) 78.63 25.20 106.07 
Females 
Gender information available  0.194 (0.17) -0.167 (0.17) -0.116 (0.17)    
Hawkish lag 0.969*** (0.19) 0.527** (0.21) -1.328*** (0.20)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.594*** (0.19) 1.126*** (0.19) -1.596***  (0.21)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.336* (0.18) 0.842*** (0.18) -1.109*** (0.19)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.777*** (0.20) 0.246 (0.22) -1.096*** (0.22)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period -0.027 (0.17) -0.103 (0.18) -0.237 (0.19)    
Males  n/a  n/a  n/a 
South-East Asian 0.119 (0.20) 0.090 (0.22) -0.246 (0.20)    
Western European -0.094 (0.21) 0.436* (0.22) -0.270 (0.21)    
Undergraduates 0.168 (0.18) -0.517*** (0.18) 0.301* (0.17)    
Social Sciences Students -0.077 (0.18) 0.153 (0.20) -0.038 (0.18)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
0.195 (0.22) -0.097 (0.26) -0.074 (0.23)    
Constant -1.626*** (0.29) -1.374*** (0.30) 1.473*** (0.30)    
No. of Obs. 364 364 364 
Wald chi2(11) 45.25 66.37 105.60 
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Table 5.10. The effect of punishment – G-NP-NC v. G-P-NC  
  30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 
All subjects 
Punishment Available 0.089 (0.12) -0.089 (0.12) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
0.229 (0.16) -0.229 (0.16) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base:  Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.603*** (0.10) 0.603*** (0.10) 
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.197** (0.10) 0.197** (0.10) 
South-East Asian 0.321* (0.19) -0.321* (0.19) 
Western European -0.066 (0.20) 0.066 (0.20) 
MM -0.199 (0.17) 0.199 (0.17) 
FM -0.174 (0.17) 0.174 (0.17) 
FF -0.138 (0.17) 0.138  (0.17) 
MF Omitted Omitted 
Undergraduates 0.011  (0.13) -0.011 (0.13) 
Social Sciences 0.066 (0.14) -0.066 (0.14) 
Humanities 
      Base: Science and Medicine Students 
0.006 (0.18) -0.006 (0.18) 
Constant 0.379 (0.25) -0.379 (0.25) 
No. of Obs. 956 956 
Wald chi2(12) 58.04 58.04 
Males 
Punishment Available 0.119 (0.13) -0.119 (0.13) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
0.892* (0.47) -0.892* (0.47) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base:  Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.634*** (0.13) 0.634*** (0.13) 
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.134 (0.13) 0.134 (0.13) 
South-East Asian 0.140 (0.24) -0.140 (0.24) 
Western European -0.054 (0.23) 0.054 (0.23) 
MM n/a n/a 
FM n/a n/a 
FF n/a n/a 
MF 0.129 (0.14) -0.129 (0.14) 
Undergraduates -0.116 (0.16) 0.116 (0.16) 
Social Sciences 0.068 (0.15) -0.068 (0.15) 
Humanities 
      Base: Science and Medicine Students 
0.047 (0.20) -0.047 (0.20) 
Constant -0.050 (0.36) 0.050 (0.36) 
No. of Obs. 480 480 
Wald chi2(10) 36.70 36.70 
Females 
Punishment Available 0.055 (0.16) -0.055(0.16) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
-0.137 (0.21) 0.137 (0.21) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base:  Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.654*** (0.14) 0.654*** (0.14) 
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.300** (0.14) 0.300** (0.14) 
South-East Asian 0.543** (0.26) -0.543** (0.26) 
Western European -0.037 (0.29) 0.037 (0.29) 
MM n/a n/a 
FM -0.057 (0.16) 0.057 (0.16) 
FF n/a n/a 
MF n/a n/a 
Undergraduates 0.185 (0.18) -0.185 (0.18) 
Social Sciences 0.056 (0.20) -0.056 (0.20) 
Humanities 
      Base: Science and Medicine Students 
-0.025 (0.25) 0.025 (0.25) 
Constant 0.352 (0.32) -0.352 (0.32) 
No. of Obs. 476 476 
Wald chi2(10) 34.58 34.58 
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Table 5.11. The effect of punishment – G-NP-NC v. G-P-NC  
  30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 
MM 
Punishment Available 0.052 (0.23) -0.052 (0.23) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
0.426 (0.31) -0.426 (0.31) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base:  Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.579*** (0.19) 0.579*** (0.19) 
Coordination achieved in previous period 0.028 (0.19) -0.028 (0.19) 
South-East Asian 
-0.021 (0.56) 0.021 (0.56) 
Western European -0.355 (0.56) 0.355 (0.56) 
Undergraduates 
-0.288 (0.27) 0.288  
(0.27) 
Social Sciences 0.114 (0.26) -0.114 (0.26) 
Humanities 
      Base: Science and Medicine Students 
0.045 (0.36) -0.045 (0.36) 
Constant 0.460 (0.62) -0.460 (0.62) 
No. of Obs. 240 240 
Wald chi2(9) 16.82 16.82 
MF 
Punishment Available 0.164 (0.19) -0.164 (0.19) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
1.140*** (0.18) -1.140*** (0.18) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base:  Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.652*** (0.18) 0.652*** (0.18) 
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.270 (0.18) 0.270 (0.18) 
South-East Asian 
0.135 (0.28) -0.135 (0.28) 
Western European 0.036 (0.29) -0.036 (0.29) 
Undergraduates -0.089 (0.25) 0.089 (0.25) 
Social Sciences 0.069 (0.22) -0.069(0.22) 
Humanities 
      Base: Science and Medicine Students 
0.056 (0.28) -0.056 (0.28) 
Constant -0.083 (0.35) 0.083 (0.35) 
No. of Obs. 240 240 
Wald chi2(9) 53.58 53.58 
FM 
Punishment Available 0.065 (0.22) -0.065 (0.22) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
0.104 (0.29) -0.104 (0.29) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base:  Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.333* (0.19) 0.333* (0.19) 
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.284 (0.19) 0.284 (0.19) 
South-East Asian 
0.561 (0.43) -0.561 (0.43) 
Western European -0.244 (0.45) 0.244 (0.45) 
Undergraduates 0.466 (0.33) -0.466 (0.33) 
Social Sciences 0.279 (0.31) -0.279 (0.31) 
Humanities 
      Base: Science and Medicine Students 
0.013 (0.37) -0.013 (0.37) 
Constant -0.279 (0.56) 0.279 (0.56) 
No. of Obs. 236 236 
Wald chi2(9) 13.64 13.64 
FF 
Punishment Available 0.067 (0.26) -0.067 (0.26) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
-0.443 (0.33) 0.443 (0.33) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base:  Co-participant dovish lag 
-1.032*** (0.21) 1.032*** (0.21) 
Coordination achieved in previous period -0.334 (0.21) 0.334 (0.21) 
South-East Asian 
0.588 (0.37) -0.588 (0.37) 
Western European 0.101 (0.40) -0.101 (0.40) 
Undergraduates 0.083 (0.26) -0.083 (0.26) 
Social Sciences -0.010 (0.29) 0.010 (0.29) 
Humanities 
      Base: Science and Medicine Students 
0.177 (0.40) -0.177 (0.40) 
Constant 0.748* (0.45) -0.748* (0.45) 
No. of Obs. 240 240 
Wald chi2(9) 28.91 28.91 
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Table 5.12. The effect of punishment – NG-NP-NC v. NG-P-NC  
   30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 
All subjects 
Punishment Available -0.049  (0.15) 0.049 (0.15) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
0.889*** (0.20) -0.889*** (0.20) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base:  Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.816*** (0.15) 0.816*** (0.15) 
Coordination achieved in previous period 0.212 (0.15) -0.212 (0.15) 
South-East Asian -0.037 (0.21) 0.037 (0.21) 
Western European 0.211 (0.22) -0.211 (0.22) 
Males -0.233 (0.15) 0.233 (0.15) 
Undergraduates -0.088 (0.18) 0.088 (0.18) 
Social Sciences -0.199 (0.19) 0.199 (0.19) 
Humanities 
      Base: Science and Medicine Students 
-0.340 (0.21) 0.340 (0.21) 
Constant 0.550* (0.32) -0.550* (0.32) 
No. of Obs. 480 480 
Wald chi2(10) 52.86 52.86 
Males 
Punishment Available -0.089 (0.21) 0.089 (0.21) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
1.349*** (0.22) -1.349*** (0.22) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base:  Co-participant dovish lag 
-1.040*** (0.22) 1.040*** (0.22) 
Coordination achieved in previous period 0.334 (0.22) -0.334 (0.22) 
South-East Asian -0.038 (0.30) 0.038 (0.30) 
Western European 0.209 (0.29) -0.209 (0.29) 
Males n/a n/a 
Undergraduates -0.187 (0.24) 0.187 (0.24) 
Social Sciences -0.255 (0.24) 0.255 (0.24) 
Humanities 
      Base: Science and Medicine Students 
-0.465* (0.26) 0.465* (0.26) 
Constant 0.323 (0.42) -0.323 (0.42) 
No. of Obs. 240 240 
Wald chi2(9) 50.46 50.46 
Females 
Punishment Available 0.008 (0.25) -0.008 (0.25) 
Hawkish lag 
      Base: Dovish lag 
0.407 (0.26) -0.407 (0.26) 
Co-participant hawkish lag 
      Base:  Co-participant dovish lag 
-0.628 (0.22)*** 0.628*** (0.22) 
Coordination achieved in previous period 0.139 (0.21) -0.139 (0.21) 
South-East Asian -0.019 (0.35) 0.019 (0.35) 
Western European 0.071 (0.38) -0.071 (0.38) 
Males n/a n/a 
Undergraduates 0.061 (0.31) -0.061 (0.31) 
Social Sciences -0.235 (0.33) 0.235 (0.33) 
Humanities 
      Base: Science and Medicine Students 
-0.288 (0.35) 0.288 (0.35) 
Constant 0.716 (0.46) -0.716 (0.46) 
No. of Obs. 240 240 
Wald chi2(9) 11.46 11.46 
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Table 5.13. The effect of punishment – NG-NP-C v. NG-P-C  
  30 (Hawkish) 20 (Dovish) 15 (Equal) 
All subjects 
Punishment available  -0.156 (0.15) -0.042 (0.14) 0.130 (0.14)    
Hawkish lag 1.291*** (0.17) 0.524*** (0.18) -1.585*** (0.18)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.714*** (0.17) 0.952*** (0.17) -1.404*** (0.17)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.396** (0.18) 0.442*** (0.17) -0.754*** (0.18)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.621*** (0.17) 0.264 (0.17) -0.820*** (0.17)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period -0.089 (0.16) -0.177 (0.15) -0.032 (0.16)    
South-East Asian -0.010 (0.23) 0.181 (0.25) -0.146 (0.22)    
Western European -0.101 (0.23) 0.442* (0.24) -0.269 (0.22)    
Males 0.127 (0.15) -0.175 (0.15) 0.016 (0.15)    
Undergraduates 0.117 (0.18) -0.294* (0.18) 0.176 (0.17)    
Social Sciences Students -0.058 (0.17) -0.133 (0.17) 0.155 (0.17)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.023 (0.20) 0.022 (0.19) 0.033 (0.19)    
Constant -1.504*** (0.31) -1.255*** (0.32) 1.136*** (0.30)  
No. of Obs. 476 476 476 
Wald chi2(12) 80.59 55.58 154.55 
Males 
Punishment available  -0.333 (0.22) 0.020 (0.24) 0.137 (0.21)    
Hawkish lag 1.886*** (0.27) 0.206 (0.28) -1.859*** (0.27)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
1.262*** (0.27) 0.451 (0.36) -1.418*** (0.25)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.523* (0.28) 0.494* (0.26) -0.936*** (0.28)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.506** (0.24) 0.283 (0.25) -0.630*** (0.24)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period -0.185 (0.24) -0.278 (0.24) 0.104 (0.24)    
South-East Asian -0.328 (0.46) n/a -0.473 (0.44)    
Western European -0.118 (0.45) n/a -0.719* (0.42)    
Males n/a n/a n/a 
Undergraduates -0.091 (0.33) 0.092 (0.29) 0.112 (0.28)    
Social Sciences Students 0.048 (0.26) -0.267 (0.29) 0.057 (0.26)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.010 (0.32) -0.043 (0.32) 0.052 (0.27)    
Constant -1.442*** (0.52) -1.158*** (0.42) 1.618*** (0.52)    
No. of Obs. 236 236 236 
Wald chi2(11) 58.09 11.05 84.24 
Females 
Punishment available  0.043 (0.21) -0.237 (0.21) 0.110 (0.19)    
Hawkish lag 0.770*** (0.25) 0.953*** (0.27) -1.448*** (0.26)    
Dovish lag 
      Base: Equal lag 
0.307 (0.24) 1.340*** (0.24) -1.436*** (0.24)    
Co-participant hawkish lag 0.377 (0.25) 0.369 (0.25) -0.670*** (0.24)    
Co-participant dovish lag 
    Base: Co-participant equal lag 
0.692*** (0.25) 0.382 (0.26) -1.055*** (0.26)    
Coordination Achieved in the previous period -0.073 (0.22) -0.031 (0.23) -0.172 (0.24)    
South-East Asian 0.262 (0.29) -0.222 (0.30) -0.114 (0.27)    
Western European 
-0.220 (0.29) 0.278 (0.29) -0.050    
(0.28)    
Males n/a n/a n/a 
Undergraduates 0.237 (0.23) -0.531** (0.24) 0.242 (0.22)    
Social Sciences Students -0.324 (0.25) 0.073 (0.26) 0.248 (0.25)    
Humanities Students 
      Base: Medicine and science students 
-0.071 (0.28) 0.200 (0.29) -0.060 (0.28)    
Constant -1.382*** (0.41) -1.233*** (0.41) 1.047*** (0.40)    
No. of Obs. 240 240 240 
Wald chi2(11) 26.47 42.87 69.40 
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Table 5.14. Effects of co-participant gender in punishment (G-P-C) 
  All Punishment 
“Slap on the 
Wrist” 
“Full Monty” 
All subjects 
Male Co-Participant 0.874** (0.42) 0.432 (0.31) 1.173 (0.82)    
Chose hawkish 0.120 (0.37) 0.291 (0.32) -0.659 (0.65)    
Chose dovish 
      Base: Chose equal 
-0.263 (0.42) 0.088 (0.37) -1.544* (0.88)    
Co-participant chose hawkish -0.357 (0.29) -0.073 (0.28) -0.514 (0.53)    
Co-participant chose dovish 
      Base: Co-participant chose equal 
0.370 (0.32) 0.162 (0.32) 0.904 (0.55)    
Coordination achieved -1.160*** (0.28) -0.741*** (0.26) -1.812*** (0.60)    
South/ South East Asian 0.674 (0.63) 0.649 (0.48) -0.065 (1.03)    
Western European 0.662 (0.65) 0.667 (0.49) -0.219 (1.08)    
Males 0.070 (0.40) -0.551* (0.31) 1.463* (0.89)    
Undergraduates -0.695 (0.54) -0.179 (0.40) -1.350 (1.03)    
Social Science students 0.238 (0.49) 0.178 (0.38) 0.218 (0.80)    
Humanities Students 
       Base: Science and medicine 
students 
-0.035 (0.58) 0.177 (0.43) -0.341 (1.09)    
Constant -2.191*** (0.73) -2.274*** (0.59) -3.264** (1.42)    
No. of Obs. 480 480 480 
Wald chi2(12) 26.17 15.29 10.92 
 
Table 5.15. Effects of co-participant gender in punishment (G-P-NC) 
  All Punishment “Slap on the Wrist” “Full Monty” 
All subjects 
Male Co-Participant -0.141 (0.45) -0.125 (0.39) 0.158 (0.33)    
Chose hawkish 
      Base: Chose dovish 
-0.283 (0.26) -0.235 (0.26) -0.081 (0.29)    
Co-participant chose hawkish 
      Base: Co-participant chose equal 
-0.395 (0.25) -0.356 (0.26) -0.012 (0.29)    
Coordination achieved 0.054 (0.24) -0.057 (0.25) 0.125 (0.28)    
South/ South East Asian -1.027* (0.60) -1.030** (0.52) -0.140 (0.43)    
Western European -1.885*** (0.66) -1.428*** (0.55) -0.991* (0.51)    
Males -0.018 (0.44) -0.081 (0.38) 0.071 (0.32)    
Undergraduates 0.208 (0.45) 0.095 (0.39) 0.382 (0.34)    
Social Science students -0.220 (0.48) -0.193 (0.40) -0.162 (0.35)    
Humanities Students 
       Base: Science and medicine 
students 
-0.796 (0.73) -0.919 (0.69) -0.094 (0.49)    
Constant -0.501 (0.61) -0.528 (0.53) -2.031*** (0.57)    
No. of Obs. 476 476 476 
Wald chi2(10) 12.72 12.39 5.42 
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Table 5.16. The effects of gender information on punishment decisions - NG-P-NC v. G-P-NC 
  
All 
Punishment 
“Slap on the 
Wrist” 
“Full Monty” 
Males 
Gender information present 0.569 (0.44) 0.550 (0.37) 0.097 (0.35) 
Chose hawkish 
      Base: Chose dovish 
0.484 (0.33) 0.223 (0.30) 0.288 (0.34) 
Co-participant chose hawkish 
      Base: Co-participant chose 
dovish 
-0.543* (0.29) -0.228 (0.27) -0.384 (0.33)  
Coordination achieved -0.378 (0.28) -0.416 (0.28) -0.004 (0.30)  
South/ South East Asian -1.020* (0.60) -0.876* (0.48) -0.043 (0.42) 
Western European 
-1.217** 
(0.56) 
-0.897** (0.44) -0.448 (0.40) 
Males n/a n/a n/a 
Undergraduates 1.445** (0.63) 0.838* (0.48) n/a 
Social science students 0.197 (0.44) 0.107 (0.36) n/a 
Humanities students 
      Base: Science & medicine 
students 
-1.314* (0.77) -0.878 (0.59) n/a 
Constant 
-2.428*** 
(0.81) 
-2.034*** 
(0.66) 
-1.874*** 
(0.56) 
No. of Obs. 360 360 360 
Wald chi2(9) 14.70 11.09 3.92 
Females 
Gender information present -0.263 (0.52) -0.233 (0.47) -0.097 (0.30) 
Chose hawkish 
      Base: Chose dovish 
-0.222 (0.31) -0.375 (0.32) 0.274 (0.32) 
Co-participant chose hawkish 
      Base: Co-participant chose 
dovish 
0.103 (0.29) -0.199 (0.29) 0.459 (0.34) 
Coordination achieved -0.130 (0.28) -0.232 (0.29) 0.100 (0.29) 
South/ South East Asian -0.349 (0.69) -0.491 (0.61) 0.301 (0.50) 
Western European -1.194 (0.81) -1.119 (0.72) -0.157 (0.56)  
Males n/a n/a n/a 
Undergraduates -0.937* (0.55) -0.664 (0.49) -0.494 (0.36)  
Social science students -0.258 (0.61) -0.231 (0.54) -0.261 (0.38) 
Humanities students 
      Base: Science & medicine 
students 
-0.326 (0.73) -0.376 (0.66) -0.027 (0.42) 
Constant -0.704 (0.84) -0.515 (0.75) 
-2.179*** 
(0.73) 
No. of Obs. 356 356 356 
Wald chi2(9) 8.24 7.64 7.35 
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1. Screen Shots 
Figure 1.1 The Welcome Screen 
 
Figure 1.2. Instructions Screen 1
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Figure 1.3. Instructions Screen 2 
 
Figure 1.4. Instructions Screen 3 
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Figure 1.5. Instructions Screen 4 
 
Figure 1.6. Instructions Screen 5
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Figure 1.7. Instructions Screen 6  
This text was only shown in the treatments where communication was permitted 
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            Figure 1.8. Instructions Screen 7
In the treatments without communication the last sentence the words “to write 
messages to each other” were replaced with the word “and”. 
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Figure 1.9. The chat screen
In the treatments without communication the screen looked exactly the same apart 
from that the top right box and bottom half of the screen were not included. 
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Figure 1.10. The pre-decision screen 
 
Figure 1.11. The decision screen  
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Figure 1.12. The results screen 
 
Figure 1.13. The final payoff screen 
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2. Theoretical Predictions 
2.1. BOS 
 
Table 2.1.1. The BOS Game 
  Player 2 
  
Hawkish  
(2) 
Dovish  
(1-2) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (8, 6) 
Dovish  
(1-1 ) 
(6, 8) (0, 0) 
 
Equations 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 8 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  8 − 81(2) 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 6 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  61(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
8 − 81 = 61 ⇒ 1 =
4
7
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
3
7
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
4
7
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
3
7
 
 
 
Expected payoffs 
 
4
7
∗
3
7
∗ 8 +
3
7
∗  
4
7
∗ 6 = £3.429 
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2.2. BOS-E1 
 
Table 2.2.1. The BOS-E1 Game 
   Player 2  
  
Hawkish  
(2) 
Dovish  
(
2
) 
Compromise  
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (8, 6) (0, 0) 
Player 1 
Dovish  
(
1
) 
(6, 8) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Compromise  
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (5, 5) 
 
Equations 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 8 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  8ß1(2) 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 6 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  61(3) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 5 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 51 − 5ß1(4) 
 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
8ß1 = 61 ⇒ ß1 =
3
4
1 (5) 
 
From (1) and (3) and (4) 
 
61 = 5 − 51 − 5ß1 (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 (5)) 
⇒  61 =  5 − 51 − 5 ∗
3
4
1   
⇒ 
59
4
1 =  5  
 
⇒ 1 =  
20
59
 (6) 
 
Replace (6) into (5) 
 
⇒ ß1 =
3
4
∗
20
59
 
⇒ ß1 =
15
59
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⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 = 1 −
20
59
−
15
59
 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 =
35
59
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
20
59
 
 
⇒ ß2 =
15
59
 
 
⇒ 1 − 2 − ß2 =
24
59
 
 
Expected payoffs 
 
20
59
∗
15
59
∗ 8 + 
20
59
∗
15
59
∗ 6 +
24
59
∗
24
59
∗ 5 = £2.034 
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2.2.1 Alternative MSNE 1 
 
Table 2.2.1.1. BOS-E1 Game (Alternative MSNE) 
  Player 2 
  
Dovish 
(2) 
Compromise 
(1-2) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(8, 6) (0, 0) 
Compromise 
(1-1 ) 
(0, 0) (5, 5) 
 
Equations 
 
Player 2 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 6 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  61(2) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 5 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 51(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
 5 − 51 = 61 ⇒ 1 =
5
11
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
6
11
 
 
Player 1 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 0 + 2 ∗ 8 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 =  82(2) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 5 + 2 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 52(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
5 − 52 = 82 ⇒ 2 =
5
13
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
8
13
 
 
  
290 
 
Expected payoffs 
 
EP1 =  
5
11
∗
5
13
∗ 8 +
5
13
∗  
6
11
∗ 5 = £3.08 
 
EP2 =  
5
11
∗
5
13
∗ 6 +
5
13
∗  
6
11
∗ 5 = £2.72 
 
 
These calculation can also be calculated in the same way reversing the possible actions for 
players 1 and 2 
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2.3. BOS-E2 
 
Table 2.3.1 The BOS-E2 Game 
   Player 2  
  
Hawkish  
(2) 
Dovish  
(
2
) 
Compromise  
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (8, 5) (0, 0) 
Player 1 
Dovish  
(
1
) 
(5, 8) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Compromise  
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (5, 5) 
 
Equations 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 8 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  8ß1(2) 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 5 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  51(3) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 5 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 51 − 5ß1(4) 
 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
8ß1 = 51 ⇒ ß1 =
5
8
1 (5) 
 
From (1) and (3) and (4) 
 
51 = 5 − 51 − 5ß1 (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 (5)) 
⇒  51 =  5 − 51 − 5 ∗
5
8
1   
⇒ 
105
8
1 =  5  
 
⇒ 1 =  
8
21
 (6) 
 
Replace (6) into (5) 
 
⇒ ß1 =
5
8
∗
8
21
 
⇒ ß1 =
5
21
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⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 = 1 −
8
21
−
5
21
 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 =
8
21
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
8
21
 
 
⇒ ß2 =
5
21
 
 
⇒ 1 − 2 − ß2 =
8
21
 
 
Expected payoffs 
 
5
21
∗
8
21
∗ 8 +
5
21
∗
8
21
∗ 5 +
8
21
∗
8
21
∗ 5 = £1.905 
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2.3.1. Alternative MSNE 1 
 
Table 2.3.1.1. The BOS-E2 Game (BOS Section Only) 
  Player 2 
  
Hawkish  
(2) 
Dovish  
(
2
) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (8, 5) 
Dovish  
(
1
) 
(5, 8) (0, 0) 
 
Equations 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 8 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  8 − 81(2) 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 5 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  51(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
8 − 81 = 51 ⇒ 1 =
8
13
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
5
13
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
8
13
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
5
13
 
 
 
Expected payoffs 
 
5
13
∗
8
13
∗ 8 +
5
13
∗  
8
13
∗ 5 = £3.08 
 
  
  
294 
 
2.3.2. Alternative MSNE 2 
 
Table 2.3.2.1. The BOS-E2 Game (Alternative MSNE) 
  Player 2 
  
Dovish 
(2) 
Compromise 
(1-2) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(8, 5) (0, 0) 
Compromise 
(1-1 ) 
(0, 0) (5, 5) 
 
Equations 
 
Player 2 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 5 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  51(2) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 5 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 51(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
 5 − 51 = 51 ⇒ 1 =
1
2
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
1
2
 
 
Player 1 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 0 + 2 ∗ 8 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 =  82(2) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 5 + 2 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 52(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
5 − 52 = 82 ⇒ 2 =
5
13
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
8
13
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Expected payoffs 
 
EP1 =  
1
2
∗
5
13
∗ 8 +
1
2
∗  
8
13
∗ 5 = £3.08 
 
EP2 =  
1
2
∗
5
13
∗ 5 +
1
2
∗  
8
13
∗ 5 = £2.69 
 
 
These calculation can also be calculated in the same way reversing the possible actions for 
players 1 and 2 
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2.4. BOS-E3 
 
Table 2.4.1. The BOS-E3 Game 
   Player 2  
  
Hawkish 
(2) 
Dovish 
(
2
) 
Compromise 
(1 − 2 − 2) 
 
Hawkish 
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (18, 6) (0, 0) 
Player 1 
Dovish 
(
1
) 
(6, 18) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Compromise 
(1 − 1 − 1) 
(0, 0) (0, 0) (5, 5) 
 
Equations 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 18 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  18ß1(2) 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 6 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  61(3) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  ß1 ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 0 + (1 − 1 − ß1) ∗ 5 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 51 − 5ß1(4) 
 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
18ß1 = 61 ⇒ ß1 =
1
3
1 (5) 
 
From (1) and (3) and (4) 
 
61 = 5 − 51 − 5ß1 (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 (5)) 
⇒  61 =  5 − 51 − 5 ∗
1
3
1   
⇒ 
38
3
1 =  5  
 
⇒ 1 =  
15
38
 (6) 
 
Replace (6) into (5) 
 
⇒ ß1 =
1
3
∗
15
38
 
⇒ ß1 =
5
38
 
 
  
297 
 
⇒ 1 − 1 − ß1 =  
18
38
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
15
38
 
 
⇒ ß2 =
5
38
 
 
⇒ 1 − 2 − ß2 =
18
38
 
 
Expected payoffs 
 
5
38
∗
15
38
∗ 18 +  
15
38
∗
5
38
∗ 6 +
18
38
∗
18
38
∗ 5 = £2.368 
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2.4.1. Alternative MSNE 1 
 
Table 2.4.1.1. BOS-E3 (BOS Section only) 
  Player 2 
  
Hawkish  
(2) 
Dovish  
(
2
) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(0, 0) (18, 6) 
Dovish  
(
1
) 
(6, 18) (0, 0) 
 
Equations 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 18 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  18 − 181(2) 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 6 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  61(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
18 − 181 = 61 ⇒ 1 =
3
4
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
1
4
 
 
By symmetry 
 
⇒ 2 =  
3
4
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
1
4
 
 
Expected payoffs 
 
 
3
4
∗
1
4
∗ 18 +
1
4
∗  
3
4
∗ 6 = £4.50 
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2.4.2. Alternative MSNE 2 
 
Table 2.4.2.1. The BOS-E3 Game (Alternative MSNE) 
  Player 2 
  
Dovish 
(2) 
Compromise 
(1-2) 
Player 1 
Hawkish  
(1 ) 
(18, 6) (0, 0) 
Compromise 
(1-1 ) 
(0, 0) (5, 5) 
 
Equations 
 
Player 2 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 0 + 1 ∗ 6 ⇒ 𝑈𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠ℎ2 =  61(2) 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 = (1 − 1) ∗ 5 + 1 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 51(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
 5 − 51 = 61 ⇒ 1 =
5
11
  
 
⇒ (1 − 1) =
6
11
 
 
Player 1 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 (1) 
 
𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 0 + 2 ∗ 18 ⇒ 𝑈𝐻𝑎𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑠ℎ1 =  182(2) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒1 = (1 − 2) ∗ 5 + 2 ∗ 0 ⇒ 𝑈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒2 =  5 − 52(3) 
 
From (1) and (2) and (3) 
 
5 − 52 = 182 ⇒ 2 =
5
23
 
 
⇒ (1 − 2) =
8
13
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Expected payoffs 
 
EP1 =  
5
23
∗
5
11
∗ 18 +
18
23
∗  
6
11
∗ 5 = £3.91 
 
EP2 =  
5
23
∗
5
11
∗ 6 +
18
23
∗  
6
11
∗ 5 = £2.73 
 
 
These calculation can also be calculated in the same way reversing the possible actions for 
players 1 and 2 
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3.  Transcripts 
Key: 
 Subject Index = Unique index for subject. Corresponds to dataset 
 Top Option / Bottom Option / Middle Option= Indicates how the game was 
presented to subjects. e.g. Top Option: £6 (P1) £8 (P2) indicates that a subject pair 
saw the top option of the game as £6 for person 1 and £8 for person 2. 
 Time message written (seconds) = Time remaining at the time message for written 
(120 seconds were available in total) 
 
3.1. BOS Game 
 
S
u
b
je
ct
 
In
d
ex
 
P
er
so
n
 
N
u
m
b
er
 
T
o
p
 
O
p
ti
o
n
 
B
o
tt
o
m
 
O
p
ti
o
n
 
T
ex
t 
T
im
e 
m
es
sa
g
e
 
w
ri
tt
en
 
(s
e
co
n
d
s)
 
91 1 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
hello :) 116 
99 2 hey 114 
91 1 any thoughts? 112 
99 2 
i am going to be generous with 
this one 
103 
91 1 haha 97 
91 1 you sure? 94 
99 2 let's go for option 1? 91 
91 1 sounds good to me 85 
99 2 
as long as we pick the same option 
right? 
77 
91 1 better than getting nothing 72 
99 2 i mean, sorry option 2 69 
99 2 option 2! 65 
91 1 yeah 59 
91 1 option 2 57 
99 2 my bad 55 
91 1 all good! 50 
99 2 
second bullet point is looking 
pretty good... 
12 
91 1 lol 2 
           
92 1 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
rock paper scissors? 111 
100 2 agreed  99 
92 1 on 80 seconds go r p or s 86 
92 1 r 80 
100 2 r 80 
92 1 haha 76 
92 1 60 71 
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92 1 seconds 69 
92 1 p 61 
100 2 s 60 
92 1 fair enough ill take the 6 quid 47 
100 2 
thanks, good rock paper sissors 
idea 
25 
92 1 no worries =) 5 
           
101 2 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
You take £8 i will take £6  91 
93 1 
ahh ok, thats very kind of you, 
thank you :) 
77 
101 2 
£8 for Person 1 and £6 for Person 
2 (just to confirm) :-) 
8 
           
94 1 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
Hi! I'm a little poor right now. 
You? 
104 
102 2 aha yeah  84 
94 1 Mind if we go for the 2nd option 79 
94 1 ?x 76 
94 1 Pretty please? 68 
102 2 
i guess either way some money is 
better than no money 
54 
94 1 
Thank you so is that yes to option 
2? 
37 
94 1 Just to confirm 32 
102 2 
yeah why not, u got in first no 
point getting it wrong for both of 
us haha 
6 
           
103 2 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
I am going to choose the first 
option. 
106 
95 1 
i was going to choose the second 
option  
89 
103 2 
Well we need to come choose a 
senario where we both choose the 
same option to ensure that we both 
profit. 
60 
95 1 
Thinking about it now i don't mind 
if we choose the first one so its 
ok :)  
25 
103 2 Thank you :) 11 
103 2 Good luck! 2 
           
96 1 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
hi 118 
104 2 Hi 111 
96 1 how's life? 106 
104 2 Not too bad, you? 95 
96 1 Can't complain :) 89 
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104 2 
Anyway. Happy for you to take 
the £8? 
87 
96 1 
I'm happy either way so long as 
we agree 
78 
96 1 
I really don't mind, I'd jsut be 
gutted if we got nothing 
69 
104 2 
Rock, paper scissors doesn't work 
on here... 
50 
96 1 Lol, don't think we have time 43 
104 2 Haha 40 
104 2 Well 38 
104 2 £8 for you then 35 
104 2 ~Congratulations! 31 
96 1 
I'm happy for you to take it if you 
want? 
28 
104 2 Both being too nice!  16 
104 2 I suggested it first ;) 8 
96 1 Lol, it's unusual in these things... 5 
104 2 Just leave it as it is 4 
104 2 Bye 3 
104 2 :) 2 
           
97 1 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
we need to pick the same one 114 
97 1 I am happy to take less money 108 
97 1 
in order that we are both able to 
get some 
101 
105 2 
Ok then! That makes sense, we 
will go for the first option then? 
87 
97 1 Yes im happy with that 80 
97 1 (I think that is how things work!) 72 
105 2 Yep! Cool :) 67 
97 1 awesome 63 
97 1 I hope this works out right 15 
97 1 :) 13 
105 2 I think it will :) 9 
105 2 Hopefully! 4 
  2         
106 2 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
i think we should pick which ever 
is displayed on the top 
108 
106 2 oh we can already see it 95 
106 2 can i have more money? :( 89 
106 2 hello? 76 
98 1 yeah sure 73 
106 2 really :) you're nice 65 
98 1 we'll pick the bottom one 65 
106 2 thank you 61 
98 1 i.e you £8 me £6 58 
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106 2 yes 48 
           
117 2 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
hi there 117 
107 1 
hi, well we need to choose the 
same thing either way really! 
104 
117 2 
yeah, so which would you bargain 
for/ 
85 
117 2 ? 82 
107 1 
Haha, well would obviously prefer 
£8, but happy to have £6 if you 
want the £8 
67 
107 1 £6 is better than £0 51 
117 2 True 47 
107 1 So, you want £8? 25 
117 2 
If we could go for the second 
option that would help my finaces 
greatly but i dont mind either way 
23 
107 1 sure £6 is nice 16 
117 2 second one it is 9 
107 1 deal! 5 
117 2 thanks alot 3 
           
108 1 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
im willing to agree to choosing the 
same one, are you? 
95 
118 2 
Yes. Agreeing on the same divison 
is the only why either of us can 
make any money 
44 
108 1 higher or lower amount for you? 27 
           
119 2 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
I'm happy with 6 115 
109 1 Ok, So second decision then? 104 
119 2 Yup 100 
109 1 Cool. 97 
109 1 Thank you. 94 
119 2 =] hey its free money 86 
109 1 true! 80 
           
110 1 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
Hello 119 
120 2 hi 115 
120 2 what do you want to decide? 106 
120 2 how shall we choose? 94 
110 1 I'm happy to have £6 76 
120 2 are you sure? 72 
110 1 I'd rather have £6 than £0 so yeah  63 
120 2 ok, ye 58 
120 2 that makes sense? 54 
110 1 I don't mind really 35 
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120 2 
so we will go with choosing the 
decision that means you get £6? 
20 
110 1 Yep 15 
120 2 ok great.  9 
110 1 Cool seeya 3 
           
121 2 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
what do you want to decide? 108 
111 1 
i am not fussed with either 6 or 8 
to be honest 
105 
121 2 me neither 98 
111 1 
so if you want to take the 8 i'll 
take 6? 
89 
121 2 ok 84 
111 1 so top option right? 75 
121 2 yep 68 
           
112 1 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
shall we go for £6 for person 1 and 
£8 for 2 
105 
122 2 ok that is acceptable 91 
122 2 
i am sorry that one of us has to get 
more than the other 
75 
112 1 
or do you want to go for £8 for 1 
and £6 for 2 
69 
112 1 then we both get 8 not 6 58 
112 1 no sorry £6 for 1 17 
122 2 
ok we'll go for the 8 for person 1 
and 6 for person 2 
14 
122 2 confirm 10 
112 1 ok 7 
112 1 8 for 1 2 
           
113 1 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
Hi 115 
113 1 Any thoughts? 107 
123 2 Hi 106 
113 1 
I don't really mind which sum of 
money I get 
94 
123 2 
Well, obviously, i'd rather we 
chose the same one 
92 
113 1 That would be for the best 81 
113 1 Rck, Paper, Scissors? 72 
113 1 *Rock 67 
123 2 Ha 63 
113 1 (That was a serious suggestion) 32 
123 2 Which one should we pick? 9 
113 1 Option 1? 4 
123 2 Ok 1 
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114 1 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
hi 116 
124 2 
lets both agree to choose the top 
option? 
110 
124 2 hi  106 
114 1 yeah that sounds good to me 101 
124 2 or the bottom? i dont mind? 93 
114 1 
so £6 for person 1, and £8 for 
person 2? 
86 
114 1 we will go for the top 79 
114 1 agreed? 60 
124 2 
ok, theres only £2 differenc 
anyway 
60 
124 2 agreed 58 
           
115 1 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
hi 114 
125 2 Hi there 94 
115 1 do you want the £6 or £8?  82 
115 1 
may aswell just make the same 
desicion 
71 
125 2 I don't mind, happy to take either 62 
125 2 Yeah, both just need to agree. 50 
125 2 I am happy to take the 6 41 
115 1 ok :) 35 
125 2 
Easy, so you (as player 1) select 8, 
and I will go for 6. Done. Enjoy! 
5 
           
126 2 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
Im happy to take the lower amount 94 
116 1 
I'm also very happy with that 
obviously 
75 
116 1 so option 2? 69 
126 2 That was easy. 61 
116 1 
Yeah a lot easier than I thought, 
thanks 
41 
126 2 yeah, option 2 39 
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25 2 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
hello 115 
17 
1 if we chose option 1 we both get more than 
a fiver 
113 
17 1 or option 2#] 104 
25 2 lol 100 
25 2 I don't mind which I get 94 
17 1 ok then, option 2? lol 87 
17 
1 but we must both choose the same one or 
we'll get nothing  
60 
25 
2 so £8 for person 1 and £6 for person 2? (just 
clarifying) 
58 
17 1 yeah 53 
25 2 sure 51 
25 2 it'll pay for my dinner, so it's all good lol 40 
17 1 haha same 32 
             
26 
2 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
There is no point in doing the 5 each as the 
minimum on the other two is 6 at least, so 
just need to decide who gets 8 and who gets 
6 
97 
18 
1 We should do the one where you get the £8 
and I get the £6 
91 
26 2 ok that's fine 82 
18 1 Good Good 77 
             
19 1 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
Both go for division 2! 115 
19 1 Yes? 103 
27 
2 how about if you are person 1 you get 8 and 
i get 6? 
98 
27 2 dont mind as 6 is mroe than 5! 89 
19 1 Are you sure? 81 
19 
1 If we don't agree then neither of us get 
anything. 
49 
27 
2 yeap. its better than argueing and I still get 
mroe than 6, and you were nice enough to 
offer the same. so its win win in my books. 
49 
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19 1 Thanks! :D 34 
19 1 So division 3? 26 
27 
2 oh that bit missed off meant you offered a 
fair split so its fine with me 
23 
27 2 cool go for 8 for you 6 for me. 7 
19 1 THANK YOU 3 
             
28 2 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
we should chose division 2 or 3 104 
20 
1 it would benefit both of us to choose one of 
the 8 and 6 pound options 
104 
20 1 yeah but which? lol 96 
28 2 yes, who should get the £8 87 
20 1 flip a coin? 84 
28 2 lol .. if only as we dont have a coin lol 69 
20 
1 if you can guess my age you can have the 8 
pounds 
67 
20 1 we need to make a decision quickly 45 
28 2 ok 26 
28 2 il guess what level your degree is 17 
28 2 undergrate 15 
20 
1 ok you can have the 8 pounds, choose 
division 2 
5 
28 2 ok 0 
             
21 1 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
Hi! 111 
29 2 Hi 105 
29 
2 You can take the £8 if you want, my good 
deed for the day : ) 
85 
29 2 8 for you, 6 for me? 78 
21 1 haha, If you're sure!  76 
21 1 That sounds great  65 
21 1 :) 56 
29 
2 yeah might as well, at least this way we're 
better off than just going for a fiver each! 
56 
21 1 exactly yeah  49 
29 2 cool, 40 seconds left ! 37 
             
22 1 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
Hi.  113 
30 
2 Hiya - I'm happy to take 6 quid and give 
you 8.  :) 
111 
22 1 I was going to say the same! 105 
30 
2 Haha.  I typed it first!  ;)  So decision 1, 
yeah? 
94 
30 2 No, wait.  Haha.  That's wrong.  Decision3! 81 
22 1 Haha, alright, you win this one.  77 
22 
1 Alright, decision three is fine with me. 
Thank you! 
70 
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30 
2 So decision three.  Sounds good.  Happy 
Christmas! 
63 
22 
1 Happy Christmas to you as well! I hope you 
spend the six quid, plus the two for showing 
up, on something nice =) 
37 
22 1 on something nice * 27 
30 
2 My family are coming to visit from the 
States!  I'll buy Dad a drink. ; ) 
11 
16            
23 1 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
Hello! 115 
23 
1 I'm happy to take the £6 so we both get 
more than £5 
91 
31 
2 Hi, we might as well go for either option 1 
or  3? 
91 
31 2 ok then deal 78 
23 
1 Which would be.... option.... 3? Yes Ok. 
Excellent 
67 
31 2 so option 3 yes ? 67 
23 1 I thought you might agree lol.  60 
31 2 haha :) 46 
16            
32 
2 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
I am happy to go home with £6 and you take 
the £8  
107 
24 1 Are you sure? Im happy to go with 5-5 79 
32 2 Nope I would prefer to have the extra £1 62 
24 1 okay if you insist 50 
32 
2 £6 me and £8 you then we both get the 
maximum possible 
36 
24 1 sure 29 
24 1 so person 1=8 pounds, person 2=6£ right? 5 
32 2 yes 1 
             
1 1 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
hi 115 
1 1 are u willing to go for the first choice? 101 
9 
2 if we choose the first one or the third one 
we will make more money than the second 
one 
101 
1 1 yaya 96 
9 2 i say option c 89 
1 1 wont pick option 2 87 
1 1 i prefer option 1 82 
1 1 hmm 75 
9 2 i prefer option 2 73 
1 1 y? 69 
9 2 so i get £8 62 
1 1 obviously 2 is not goog 57 
9 2 you still get £6, £1 more than option 2 50 
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1 1 can we go for option 1??? 32 
1 1 please???? 31 
9 2 option 3  30 
1 1 only 25 secs are left!! 24 
9 2 please 24 
9 2 option 3? 18 
1 1 no mroe timr!!! 16 
1 1 nono 14 
1 1 1 plz!! 13 
9 2 3 9 
1 1 ok... 6 
1 1 option 2 4 
9 2 3 1 
1 1 option 2!!!! 0 
             
2 1 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
hi 118 
10 2 hi! 115 
10 2 £5 each is probably the fairest 107 
2 
1 I propose a 50-50 choice of the first or last 
option? 
101 
2 1 Then we get at least 6 each 91 
10 2 How would we decide? 91 
10 
2 How would we decide which one we 
choose 
68 
2 
1 countdown from 3, then each type 'a' or 'b'. 
If we pick the same letter we go option 1. If 
we go different, we go option 3 
57 
10 2 Ok 50 
10 2 3 47 
2 1 yeah? 46 
10 2 yes 44 
10 2 3 42 
10 2 2 40 
10 2 1 39 
10 2 b 37 
2 1 So i'll do a countdown. then type a or b 35 
2 1 Sorry!  31 
10 2 oops 28 
2 1 Was just checking that was ok 25 
2 1 Aha 22 
10 2 thats fine 22 
2 1 Right, you do the countdown, I'm ready 10 
10 2 3 8 
10 2 2 7 
10 2 1 6 
  
311 
 
2 1 a 5 
10 2 b 5 
10 2 fiver each? 0 
             
11 2 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
Hey, I am going to go for division 2 98 
3 1 I'd like to go for 1 86 
11 
2 we both get more money then in division 3 
so lets go for it 
75 
3 1 1 69 
3 1 ? 67 
11 2 I won't be changing from 2 63 
3 1 then we both get nothing 57 
11 2 your call 2 or nothing 45 
3 1 or, your call 1 or nothing 35 
11 2 then it will be nothing I'm afraid 22 
3 1 sorted 18 
11 2 2 and we both get more money 10 
3 1 an interesting water of 5 minutes 8 
3 1 1 and we both get more money 2 
             
12 2 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
Hi there 116 
4 1 hey 112 
4 1 what we gunna do? 94 
12 
2 so i think we should go for option 2 or 3 
because they benenfit us both the most 
87 
4 1 yes! 82 
12 2 but its just deciding which one haha 68 
4 1 clever person 2 :P 64 
4 1 yeah 57 
12 2 has been said... :P 53 
4 1 haha i like it 46 
12 2 errrr whats a random way 43 
4 1 oh crap 45 secs 41 
4 1 ermmmm 28 
12 2 ill flip a coin 23 
4 1 can i just get an extra 2 quid? 17 
12 2 h or t 15 
4 1 headsd 14 
4 1 haha 12 
12 2 tis heads 5 
4 1 sweet 2 
12 2 go for 2 1 
4 1 2? 0 
             
13 2 hey 117 
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5 1 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
hey 115 
13 2 so youre person 1 right? 106 
5 
1 yeah, i'm happy for either of the last two 
options 
93 
13 2 guessing we're both wanting £8 as well? 93 
5 1 i'll take the £6 if you like 83 
13 2 yeah? that sounds awesome 75 
13 2 so person 1 gets £6 and person 2 gets £8? 63 
5 
1 yeah sounds good. that's more than i came 
with so i'm happy. 
55 
13 2 same 50 
13 2 cheers 48 
5 1 your welcome 30 
13 2 didnt need 120 seconds lol 19 
             
6 
1 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
Right. Were going to split it so I get £8 and 
you get £6.  
95 
6 
1 Theres no chance I am going to change this 
decision 
83 
6 
1 For both of us we are better off to split in 
this way 
69 
14 2 Not strictly true 58 
6 1 You gain more in this decision  48 
6 1 You get £6 instead of getting £5 or nothing 29 
14 
2 I am aware that the third decision is 
pointless 
29 
6 
1 If you wish to split it so that you get the £8, 
be my guest 
5 
             
7 
1 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
I think we should both choose the option 
where we get £5 each as it is fairest 
99 
15 
2 Hi i personally dont care about it being 
exactly equal 
75 
15 2 i dont mind having 6 58 
7 1 Are you sure? 53 
15 2 6 is more than 5! 47 
7 1 That is very true 28 
15 2 yeh as the 5 5 option means i will get less 22 
15 2 so choice 1? 7 
             
16 2 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
which one are you going to choose? 112 
16 2 don't want to chat? 72 
8 
1 I'm going to choose the £5 decision! What 
about you? 
54 
16 
2 alright, i'll choose that too....so we'll get 
equal amount of money 
33 
16 2 done! 31 
8 1 Seems fair :-) 23 
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16 2 yeap 20 
             
43 2 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
hello 117 
33 1 hi 114 
33 
1 so we must choose the same division ... 
whats ur idea? 
99 
43 
2 in my mind, we could go equal, but we both 
lose a certain amount of money, I suppose 
that you have the £8, and I'll take the £6 
69 
33 1 yea... so dont go equal 47 
43 2 that you take the £8 and I'll take the £6 47 
33 1 sure? 39 
43 2 why not, I don't mind 31 
43 2 so it's number 3, choice 3 right? 13 
33 
1 ok, then we'll go for £8 for person 1 and £6 
for person 2 
11 
33 1 yes, number 3 7 
43 2 yeah 5 
33 1 thanks btw  2 
43 2 nice one :o) 1 
             
34 
1 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
quite happy to choose the top option if it 
means we both get more than £5 
78 
44 2 Sounds good to me if your sure? 62 
34 1 yeah, it's cool :) 53 
44 2 :) 49 
             
35 1 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
hi 118 
45 
2 flip a coin between 1 and three, I'll pick 
whatever you ger 
100 
35 
1 I guess it makes sense to go for either top 
or bottom  
92 
45 2 *get 92 
45 2 so flip heads top tails bottom 79 
35 1 Ok 68 
35 1 Its tails 56 
45 2 ok I'll pick bottom 46 
35 
1 so we both go to the bottom, I get £6 , you 
get £8 
39 
45 2 seems fair as this can get 25 
35 
1 Great idea  by the way! yeah definitely the 
fairest way 
5 
             
36 1 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
Hey 111 
46 2 Hi. I'm going to go for the £5 / £5 thing. 100 
46 2 Seems more fair. 92 
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36 
1 Why, if I take 8 and you take 6 you still get 
more than 5 
78 
46 2 Fair enough. I'll go with that then. 17 
36 1 Cool xD 10 
             
47 2 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
do you want 6 or 8 pounds 108 
47 2 your choice 77 
37 1 I would obviously like 8 pounds 77 
47 2 happy days ill take 6 64 
37 1 Beautiful 50 
37 1 Thank you 40 
47 2 so that's option 3 9 
             
48 2 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£5 each? 108 
38 
1 I think we should agree on one of the 
unequal divisions as then we both get more 
than £5 
91 
48 2 Which one do you want to go for then? 69 
38 1 Well, I imagine we'd both prefer the £8 43 
38 1 but I don't mind 30 
38 1 I'd rather £6 than £5 22 
48 2 Would it be ok to go for the first one then? 11 
38 1 yeah 2 
             
39 
1 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
Well we should decide on the same or we 
both get nothing! 
110 
49 
2 the only way we can make money is to 
choose the same decision 
102 
39 1 I guess the fairest is to both choose £5 each? 83 
49 
2 basically its better for one of us to make £6 
than both make £5 
73 
39 1 Yeah but who will get what? 58 
49 
2 well one will get £2 extra and another will 
get £1 but will still be better than £5 
23 
39 1 You get £8, I get £6 5 
39 1 i dont mind 1 
             
50 
2 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
So, we are obviously better off with either 
option 1 or 2 
106 
40 1 yeah 97 
40 1 any ideas which one to choose? 86 
50 2 Are you willing to take the £6? 78 
40 1 i would obviously prefer the £8 64 
50 2 Same 55 
40 1 are you willing to take the £6? 55 
50 2 I guess I am 46 
  
315 
 
50 
2 In the interests of us both getting a better 
deal 
31 
50 2 So option 2? 19 
40 1 yes, it does make sense 14 
50 2 Ok 9 
40 1 great, thanks! option 2  1 
             
41 1 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
what do you think is the best idea? 110 
41 
1 think its in our best interest to choose one 
that involves one of us getting 6 and the 
other getting 8 
84 
51 2 yes 74 
41 1 how shall we decide which way round? 59 
41 1 is there a fair way? 53 
51 2 no 47 
51 2 i've seen this before 40 
41 1 so have i 34 
51 2 do you want 8? 32 
51 2 im happy to have 6 27 
41 1 ok then 17 
51 2 i didn't think we would get to chat 12 
41 1 are we agreed with that? 9 
41 1 no neither 5 
             
42 1 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£6 (P2) 
Hey 118 
52 2 hello 104 
42 1 How are you? 92 
42 1 I know we don't have long! 86 
52 
2 I am well thanks. Let's both choose £5 for 
each of us - that way we both get the same 
amount of money. 
48 
42 1 Well I'm happy to choose 6 and you get 8 30 
42 1 then we both have more 26 
42 1 what do you think? 19 
52 2 £5 each 7 
42 1 fine o 3 
42 1 *ok 0 
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170 2 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
he 114 
170 2 hey 112 
163 1 Hey 112 
170 2 same dcision? 109 
170 2 which one shall we go for? 101 
163 1 So, clearly needs to be one of the top two 99 
170 2 yes 96 
170 2 first one? 89 
163 1 Might as well, £5 > £0 80 
170 2 ok so thats the top? 73 
163 1 yeah 67 
170 2 ok cool we will do that then 60 
163 1 
I'm assuming this is the only one for the 
whole thing 
42 
170 2 yes as am i 36 
163 1 Alright, just checking 28 
170 2 ok 22 
163 1 Well, that was easy. 5 
             
164 1 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
hotdogs? 111 
171 2 haha 105 
164 1 split equal? 92 
171 2 Yeah, lets go for £5 each 81 
164 1 or do you want 8? 71 
164 1 you have 8 i'll have 5? 62 
171 2 I'm happy to go for 5 each, seems fairer 50 
164 1 ok  35 
164 1 £5 each it is  25 
171 2 OK Cool! 16 
             
165 1 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
hi :) what option do you want to go for ? 107 
172 2 
There is no point in us both getting £5. 
Shall we agree on option 2 or 3? 
72 
165 1 yes but how to decide ?  49 
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172 2 Who's poorest? 38 
165 1 time is ticking# 12 
172 2 Time's running - lets go for option2 9 
165 1 thank yuo!!!!!!!!! 3 
             
173 2 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
hello want to do it in a fair way - rock 
paper scissors? 
105 
166 1 ok 90 
173 2 go 3 secs after this message? 70 
173 2 rock 64 
166 1 scissors 63 
166 1 fair enough 56 
173 2 sorry! is that ok? 50 
166 1 yeah that's fine 39 
166 1 well done! 35 
173 2 okay so 3rd decision down? 27 
166 1 yep 21 
173 2 thankyou! 18 
166 1 enjoy your extra £3! 10 
             
174 2 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
Go for the £8  75 
174 2 I will take £5 64 
167 1 excellent, option c then 51 
167 1 *B 40 
174 2 Sure 33 
167 1 thank you 22 
             
175 2 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
hi 107 
168 1 
hi :) i think we should split it equally as its 
fairer 
100 
175 2 I propose the same 95 
168 1 sorted!  90 
175 2 so we choose senario 1 - £5 each 79 
168 1 yeah, that seems to be the best option 60 
175 2 ok, agreed :) 51 
168 1 cool :) 39 
             
169 1 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
Hi :) 116 
169 1 £5 each? I am player one 108 
176 2 hi 107 
176 2 
well if youir happy to take 5 then how 
about you take 5 and i have 8 
80 
169 1 
Both select £5 each, then we get £5 plus 
£2 show up £7 
73 
176 2 
yeah but if your happy with 5 i may aswell 
have 8 
48 
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169 1 
No. Im being fair to you, remember I 
make the decision, if we choose differently 
we get nothing 
46 
176 2 
yeah but it doesnt make much sense if 
your happy with 5  
20 
176 2 decision 1 17 
169 1 
Im telling you I am going to choose £5 for 
both of us 
16 
176 2 ok 6 
169 1 remember if different we get nothin 1 
             
177 1 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
I will choose option 3, as to spilt the 
money evenly does not make sense.  
96 
183 2 okay 84 
177 1 Awesome :) 75 
             
178 1 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
hay, ok what do you want to do?  111 
184 2 
im person 2, you can take the 8, i'll have 
the 5? 
102 
178 1 sounds good to me 80 
178 1 so we are chosing option 2?  71 
184 2 yeah 63 
178 1 super 60 
178 1 thankyou  57 
184 2 
cos then at least we know no ones gonna 
lie and lose the extra money 
46 
178 1 exactly 38 
178 1 
i was going to say the same to you before 
you said it  
28 
184 2 damn haha 18 
178 1 :) 15 
184 2 but yeah we;ll go with 2 9 
178 1 option 2 4 
             
179 1 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
hello :) 117 
185 2 hi 114 
179 1 
okay, so i take it we both want a bit of 
money here 
104 
185 2 indeed 100 
179 1 so if we both go for the 3rd option 95 
185 2 yeh £5 and £5 88 
179 1 it's a 5 each 87 
179 1 exactly 84 
185 2 yeh i agree 82 
179 1 both happy 81 
185 2 yep 77 
179 1 perfect :) 70 
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185 2 fantastic 67 
179 1 easy decision haha 35 
185 2 
i know, if we have any other where we 
cant chat then still choose £5 and £5 
11 
179 1 ok  0 
             
186 2 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
what do you think we should do? 110 
180 1 
alright i'm pretty happy just to go £5 and 
£5 
102 
186 2 yeah me too 94 
180 1 haha that was easy then 87 
186 2 ha 71 
186 2 great, sorted 68 
             
187 2 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
equal money each? 110 
181 1 
hey, i am happy to just have 5 if you want 
to take 8. seen as we would both get 5 
anyway 
96 
187 2 if u are happy to take 5 that is fine with me 61 
187 2 as long as you are ok with that? 47 
181 1 yea thats fine so we both go for option 2? 41 
187 2 yes 36 
187 2 thank you :) 28 
181 1 great!!! 23 
             
182 1 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 each? 101 
188 2 Good idea 91 
182 1 sorted 63 
188 2 i will definately stick to that 57 
188 2 will you? 38 
182 1 of course 34 
188 2 great 20 
             
189 1 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
hello 118 
195 2 hi!! 112 
195 2 what would you like to do?? 108 
195 2 are you there? 87 
189 1 
i think the £5 split is the most 'fair' 
division 
83 
195 2 I would agree with that! 77 
189 1 
unless you are feeling particularly 
alturistic, and wish to give me £8? :p 
68 
195 2 I am unsure :P are you feeling generous? 44 
195 2 i would like to but then, it is a tad unfair... 34 
189 1 
i will select the equal £5 split, to make 
sure there is no feeling of spite at the end 
25 
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189 1 is this ok? 12 
195 2 
5/5 split is probably the best, and then we 
are the most even keel for the rest of the 
experiment! 
12 
195 2 that is what i will be selecting also 3 
189 1 yes sounds good to me :) 3 
             
196 2 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
I think £5 for Person 1 and £5 for Person 
2? 
100 
190 1 Would be the fairest 90 
196 2 yeah okay 84 
190 1 Awesome 64 
196 2 DONE 61 
             
191 1 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
Hello! 117 
197 2 heya:) 110 
197 2 only makes sense to split in 50\50 96 
197 2 £5.00 each 86 
191 1 
No, why don't we say you get 8 pounds 
and me 5 
78 
191 1 
because then we get as much money as 
possible 
69 
197 2 
I think it's only fair for it to be split 
between the two of us equally 
60 
191 1 and I'd like to make someone's day 56 
197 2 what do you say? 55 
197 2 noooooo 51 
191 1 well, it's not like I'm losing out 46 
191 1 I still get 5 39 
197 2 we are both students, lets split it equally  34 
197 2 
I know but I think we deserve the same 
amount 
27 
191 1 
no, because it's sensible for one person to 
get more. 
19 
197 2 yes or yes? lol 19 
191 1 I'm choosing 8 for you 13 
197 2 okay then 9 
197 2 thanks 8 
197 2 :) 5 
191 1 no worres 4 
             
198 2 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 for both of us? 111 
192 1 sounds good to me 105 
198 2 awesome :) 90 
             
199 2 £ each? 111 
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199 2 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
5 108 
199 2 *£5 for 1 and 2? 79 
193 1 
i am happy to give you £8 for being fair. 
so, £5 for person 1, £8 for person 2. yes? 
59 
199 2 If your sure, thankyou 44 
193 1 no problem :) 37 
199 2 :) 33 
             
200 2 
£8 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£8 (P2) 
hi 115 
194 1 hey, 8 for me 5 for you? 102 
200 2 
i will give you the higher one this time and 
then you give it to me the next time? 
99 
194 1 yeah sure 96 
194 1 we can just alternate it each time 82 
200 2 every time we should confirm it yeah 76 
194 1 yep  73 
200 2 
so shall we say in CAPS  each time YOU 
and ME before and both say okay 
51 
200 2 so this time it is YOU 26 
194 1 okay i get you 22 
194 1 and its always the higher value? 17 
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245 2 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
Hello 118 
245 2 How desperate are you for £18? 105 
235 1 
Hey should we choose the least amount of 
money for each person|? 
103 
235 1 eh 99 
245 2 No 96 
235 1 id rather get some money  93 
245 2 We should make the money 91 
235 1 okay 88 
235 1 so we pick the m ost|? 81 
245 2 You want the 18? I'll be kind 76 
235 1 sure if you dont wnt it 64 
245 2 Well I do 58 
245 2 But I'd rather 6 then 5 53 
245 2 So I think we go Person 2 gets 6 38 
245 2 And you (person 1) has 18 29 
235 1 okay sounds good 29 
245 2 Agreed? 26 
235 1 yeah 23 
245 2 Of course, haha 19 
245 2 I'll take £8 it's quick money 12 
235 1 yeah haha 5 
245 2 £6 for person 2 2 
              
236 1 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
6 for me 18 for you? 114 
236 1 option 2... 101 
246 2 ok yea sounds good 94 
236 1 
I'm not fussed for £8 for a couple of 
minutes work 
74 
236 1 'work' 62 
246 2 yea, easy money 62 
236 1 sorted then 46 
246 2 perfect 39 
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246 2 thanks, very much 14 
236 1 rather that than a fiver each anyway 11 
236 1 no worries 9 
              
247 2 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
i think we should pick the first or last 109 
237 1 Well,  100 
247 2 
did you have a preference before deciding 
if you were person 1 or 2? 
95 
237 1 Becuase I am person 1 I like the last one 93 
237 1 
I just want an option where we all pick the 
same thing 
77 
237 1 
So I thought you might want to do the five 
pound each thing 
69 
237 1 
But, yeah, the first and last get us the most 
possible for both 
56 
237 1 Do you know which you'll do? 45 
247 2 Yeah that's what I thought 44 
247 2 
I obviouslt would prefer to pick the first 
one equally 
35 
237 1 right 29 
247 2 *obviously 29 
237 1 hm 15 
237 1 uh 14 
247 2 ok I'll pick the 3rd one 2 
              
238 1 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
hi 117 
238 1 what do you want to do? 112 
248 2 I think we should do option number 2 105 
248 2 so we both get £5? 95 
238 1 
i think one of the others would be better 
because then we will both get more that £5 
79 
238 1 but who is willing to accept the lesser? 70 
248 2 
do we only make the decision once, or are 
there multiple rounds of decision making? 
52 
238 1 just once 47 
248 2 
right so then one person gets more and the 
other person  much less 
28 
238 1 yeah but still more than middle 19 
248 2 not by very much 9 
238 1 go for 1 2 
              
249 2 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
hello 114 
239 1 hello 110 
249 2 what do you think we should do? 106 
239 1 its in our interest to split 6/18 in some way 101 
249 2 Yeah i was thinking that 92 
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239 1 i don't mind getting the 6 88 
249 2 neither do I really 82 
239 1 so which way round? 70 
249 2 erm.... 66 
249 2 I'll take the 6 55 
239 1 alright 49 
249 2 good good 44 
239 1 a coin toss would be excellent here 38 
249 2 it sure would haha 27 
239 1 so were going for 18 person 1 6 person 2? 10 
249 2 yeah 5 
239 1 alright cheers 0 
              
250 2 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
hello 97 
250 2 What are your thoughts on the options? 74 
240 1 Hello there. Well go for it 53 
250 2 I'm happy to take £6 and then you get 18 32 
240 1 Okay lets do it 18 
250 2 great 14 
              
241 1 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
hello! 118 
251 2 hiiiii 115 
251 2  115 
241 1 what do you think? 112 
251 2 okay how do you want to do this# 108 
251 2 lol 107 
241 1 hmm... 104 
241 1 tricky 102 
251 2 welll first off do you haev a job? 98 
241 1 hahaha, no 94 
241 1 you? 89 
251 2 hah okay same boat 89 
251 2 no  86 
251 2 im here on a visa and have little $$ 74 
241 1 
makes more sense to go 6/18, but which 
way round is a problem 
59 
241 1 maybe just 5/5? 53 
241 1 fairest? 52 
251 2 
so im fine with us both getting 5£ or if 
youre feeling generous 
49 
251 2 hah yeah  45 
241 1 ditto 44 
251 2 
okay so i think thats our answer then 
yeah? 
32 
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241 1 ok go on, you take 18 27 
241 1 why not 26 
251 2 oh man okay! 22 
241 1 you're 2, right? 21 
251 2 ur awesome! 19 
241 1 hehehe 16 
251 2 yes im person 2 16 
241 1 aces 11 
251 2 thanks alow you made my wknd! 5 
              
252 2 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
How would you like to split? 114 
242 1 ok so what do you want to do? :) 112 
242 1 Ah  108 
242 1 
haha ok, well if you choose one of the 
larger devisions, then both person gets 
more money 
94 
252 2 get more 90 
242 1 
OBVIOUSLY both of us want to get 18 
pounds or w/e it was 
79 
252 2 This is true 74 
242 1 so how to decide who gets which 61 
252 2 rock paper scissors on three? 58 
242 1 sure 52 
252 2 1 49 
252 2 2 49 
252 2 3 47 
242 1 scizzors 47 
242 1 oops 45 
242 1 wait 44 
242 1 go sagain 43 
242 1 :P 43 
252 2 quick 41 
252 2 1 2  36 
242 1 1 36 
242 1 2 34 
242 1 3 32 
242 1 paper 30 
252 2 paper 30 
242 1 1 27 
252 2 sicssors 27 
242 1 2 24 
242 1 3 23 
252 2 rockl 21 
242 1 scizzors 20 
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252 2 i win 18 
242 1 ok there you go 18 
252 2 thank yo 14 
242 1 congrats :P 13 
252 2 very democratic 4 
242 1 so person 2 gets 18 right? 4 
252 2 I like it 1 
242 1 indeed 1 
252 2 yes 1 
              
243 1 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
What would you suggest? 106 
243 1 
C seems the fairest... but least profitable 
for both 
92 
253 2 
I think one of the first two, - as we each 
end up better than 3? 
74 
243 1 yeah 67 
243 1 
we could always try and describe 
ourselves so we can meet after and split 
the money fairly 
50 
243 1 *fairly 44 
253 2 
We could... but I think that might be a bit 
beyond. I'm happy to go with 1? 
26 
243 1 
I'm broke so would probably go for first 
option... hang on really? 
11 
              
254 2 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
hey 117 
244 1 Hi 113 
254 2 
Start with £6 P1, £18 P2.   Then we 
alternate to £18 P1, £6 P2 ok? 
95 
254 2 and just repeat that 85 
244 1 i'm happy to go with p1 £6 and p2 £18 49 
254 2 
We need to make the same choice each 
time, so alternate how much you get 
36 
244 1 don't we only get one choice? 23 
254 2 
You will get £6 first time, and then £18 
the next, then £6, then £18 etc. Does this 
make sense? 
21 
254 2 
Yes, but we both need to make the same 
choice 
16 
254 2 
so choose £6 to start, then 18, 
6.18,6,18,6... etc 
4 
              
265 2 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
safest to do 5 and 5 111 
265 2 otherwise we get nothing 101 
255 1 you happy with that? 97 
265 2 we only have one round tho yes? 82 
255 1 yeah just one 77 
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255 1 if we dont say the same we get nothing 69 
265 2 
actually you know what, we will get more 
out of it if one of us choose to do the 18 
and other other 6 
63 
255 1 so if we both say 5 59 
265 2 i will take 6 54 
265 2 if you want the 18 51 
255 1 you sure? 48 
265 2 i dont mind...and i still get more than 5# 43 
265 2 5£** 36 
255 1 so were going decision one 34 
265 2 yes decision one 26 
265 2 i promise 25 
255 1 okay 8 
265 2 
its too bad we cant talk after about 
this...haha 
3 
              
266 2 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
yo 117 
256 1 yoo 110 
266 2 how we going to work this out 109 
266 2 
clearly makes no sense to pick bottom 
option 
93 
256 1 TRUE 86 
266 2 im poor 78 
256 1 me too 74 
266 2 haha 71 
266 2 lets play rock paper scissors 55 
256 1 hmm 53 
256 1 ok 49 
256 1 how  46 
266 2 just type r/p/s 44 
256 1 ok 41 
266 2 one of them 39 
256 1 3 35 
266 2 i'll count down from 3 35 
256 1 ok 2 secs 31 
266 2 3 24 
266 2 2 23 
256 1 ok go 23 
266 2 3 21 
256 1 s 21 
266 2 2 19 
266 2 1 18 
266 2 r 17 
256 1 lol that didnt work 11 
  
328 
 
266 2 haha 7 
266 2 1 more go 4 
266 2 3 3 
266 2 2 2 
256 1 ok 1 
266 2 1 1 
266 2 r 0 
              
267 2 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
I am putting division 1 no matter what 107 
267 2 
you might as well take the £6 plus the £2 
sign up fee 
90 
257 1 I am putting decision 3 then 73 
267 2 well that's pointless 64 
257 1 I propose decision number 2... 35 
267 2 thats less money than divison 1 for you 22 
267 2 im putting division 1 16 
267 2 you get more money than division 2 9 
257 1 It's fairer for both of us  4 
              
258 1 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
hiya 117 
268 2 Yo 110 
268 2 
I'm very happy to take the 6 pound and 
you get the 18 
98 
258 1 
alright awesome. then we can switch next 
round? 
78 
258 1 
and then alternate throughout the 
experiment? 
69 
268 2 There on to usa 54 
268 2 us* 51 
258 1 oh crap 46 
268 2 nah you take it  42 
258 1 really? 33 
258 1 thank you 30 
268 2 Yeah i only want a nandos 27 
258 1 hahaha 23 
258 1 i'll pay it forward 18 
268 2 aye? 11 
              
259 1 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£18 for me and £6 for you? You'll get 
more than if we chose the first option and 
got a fiver each 
73 
259 1 ?? 41 
269 2 
I will choose £18 for me and 6 for you, 
you can go along with that if you wish but 
that is what I will choose 100% 
4 
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270 2 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
Which do you think? 116 
260 1 
ok so no matter what it is in our best 
interest to agree on one of them, and not 
the second option 
102 
270 2 
I agree that it's best for us to go for the 
same one... And it's best to go for 1 or 3 
83 
270 2 but which way round are we going to go? 74 
270 2 please keep messages short 47 
270 2 they go off the screen otherwise 41 
270 2 I'm quite happy to go for 3 34 
270 2 so you'll get 18 and I'll get 6 27 
270 2 i'd rather go home with 6 than 5 19 
270 2 division 3? 16 
270 2 ... 11 
260 1 okay cool sounds good! 10 
270 2 good stuff! 7 
260 1 :) 4 
              
261 1 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
I'm going for £18 107 
271 2 which one do you want to select? 105 
271 2 are you sure? 72 
261 1 Yes 65 
271 2 im going for 18 too 14 
261 1 Ok  5 
              
272 2 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
would you rather have 18 or 6? 108 
262 1 
Obviously 18, but can simply split if need 
be 
94 
272 2 we cant split outside the room sadly 82 
262 1 TRUE 78 
262 1 Well I don't mind 76 
272 2 
however if you want the 18 i will take the 
6 
73 
272 2 better than 5 each 68 
262 1 Either way is better than 5 yeah 66 
272 2 so option 3 then? 51 
262 1 Ok option 3 46 
272 2 i would take that 41 
272 2 awesome 40 
262 1 Job done :) 35 
272 2 hahaha 31 
272 2 its free money either way 19 
262 1 Exactly 16 
262 1 Alcohol money :D 12 
272 2 pretty much! 7 
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272 2 have fun :) 1 
              
273 2 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
Hi 115 
263 1 hi 112 
263 1 what do you want to do 103 
273 2 well I think the £5 one is pointless 82 
263 1 definately not the bottom option! 81 
273 2 haha I know right 73 
263 1 lol yeah 58 
273 2 do you want to go for the 6 or the 18 38 
263 1 
so do you fancy taking one for the team 
and having the £6 ;) lol 
38 
273 2 haha I knew you'd say that 24 
263 1 youre thinking the same i suppose 15 
273 2 you could take the 6 if you prefer :P 13 
263 1 erm... 8 
263 1 erm,.. 6 
263 1 5secs 4 
              
264 1 
£18 
(P1) £6 
(P2) 
£6 (P1) 
£18 
(P2) 
£5 (P1) 
£5 (P2) 
hey 116 
264 1 we should do one of the top 2 107 
264 1 what do you think? 93 
274 2 
we'll each do better if we take turns. 
starting with person 1 (you) getting £18 
and me £6, and then my turn at getting £18 
and you £6 
87 
274 2 if we repeat this everytime 75 
274 2 we will do better 73 
264 1 theres only one round i think? 66 
274 2 oh 54 
264 1 
or i can meet you outside and we can split 
12 each 
37 
274 2 ok 25 
274 2 you can have the 18 22 
264 1 okay 17 
264 1 where shall we meet 14 
274 2 so go for £18 you and £6 me 10 
264 1 top of the stairs? 6 
274 2 yeah 3 
264 1 k 1 
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4. Coding Tables 
 
Coder:  
Game: BOS/ BOS-E1/ BOS-E2/ BOS-E3 
Subject Numbers: _________ and _________ 
Time at which FINAL agreement was reached (sec): ____ 
First please select one of the four categories below in order to most broadly describe the 
nature of the conversations 
NB. You must choose one and only one of these four categories for each conversation 
 
   
 
1. Efficiency talk 
o Use this category if subjects recognise that although one 
person will get more than the other if the unequal outcome is 
chosen, both (or one participant in the case of BOS-E2) will 
get more in an unequal outcome compared to getting (5, 5) or 
nothing at all in the case of non-coordination 
o Example: “One of us can get 6 and the other 8, and that is 
better for each of thus than if we each get 5” 
 
If you feel 
that there are 
elements of 
both in the 
conversation 
them choose 
the one that 
leads to the 
final 
decision. 
 
If no 
decision 
reached due 
to this kind 
of 
disagreement 
choose 3. 
  
 
2. Fairness/equality talk 
a. Use this category if people refer to the fairness and/or equality 
of the equal outcome, (5,5). Example: “We can get the same, 
and that is fair” 
   
 
3. Conflict 
a. Use this category if subjects cannot agree on an outcome 
 
   
 
4. Other (if possible please give brief explanation why you think none of 
1,2,3 apply) 
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You can select as many of the following categories as you wish – choose those that you 
think apply to the conversation: 
 
1. Greeting 
 
  
 
2. Open first offer Question 
a. e.g. “What shall we do?”. This category is used if no specific offer is made 
at the start of negotiations. There is merely an opening question such as the 
example. 
 
  
Categories 3 and 4 relate to discussion purely based on deciding which of the two unequal 
allocations they should settle on. 
 
3. First offer generous 
a. The category is used if the person to open negotiations offers their co-
participant the higher amount of the unequal outcome. Example: “You can 
get 8, I am happy to get 6.” 
 
 
4. First offer non-generous 
a. The category is used if the person to open negotiations offers their co-
participant the lower amount of the unequal outcome. Example: “You can 
get 6, I then get 8.” 
 
  
Category 5 relates to discussions such as those above but where the discussion also includes 
mentions of the fact that subjects will get more earnings in total if they coordinate on an unequal 
outcome. 
 
5. “Better than nothing” 
a. This category is used if a subject agrees on an outcome because 
coordinating is better than not coordinating.  
Example: “I am OK with this proposal, because it is gives something which 
is better than nothing (=0)” 
 
  
 
6. First mover proposes  equal outcome 
 
 
7. Counter offer equal 
a. Use this category if one person suggests an unequal outcome and the other 
person proposes the equal outcome instead. 
 
  
 
8. Random 
o Use this category if people try to find a random way (a methods based on 
chance) to decide on an allocation  
a. e.g. Rock, paper, scissors 
 
   
 
9. Counter offer “no I want more” 
a. This category is used if an offer made by a co-participant of a lower 
amount is not accepted 
Example: “No, I will not accept 6, I want 8.” 
 
 10. Counter offer “no you have more!” 
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a. This category is used if an offer made by a co-participant of a higher 
amount is not accepted 
Example: “No, I will not accept 8, I want 6. You have the 8” 
 
  
 
11. Assurance of offer made or received 
a. e.g. “Are you sure?” This category is used if a co-participant asks for 
confirmation of a previous offer. 
 
  
 
12. Appealing to better nature (sympathy etc.) 
a. e.g. “I’m a bit skint this weekend so can I have the higher amount?” 
 
  
 
13. no firm agreement reached (ran out of time) 
a. Use the category if it seems that subjects did not keep an eye on the time 
and ran out of time 
  
 
14. no firm agreement reached (fighting for last word) 
a. Use this category if subjects did not reach an explicit agreement but instead 
fought for the last word in the negotiations, e.g. a subject waits till the last 
second to claim an amount so that his/her partner couldn’t make a counter 
offer 
  
 
15. Sticking to guns when disagreement 
a. Use this category if a subject refuses to move on an offer despite 
disagreement. 
  
 
16. One subject indifferent 
o when one subject "claim" they are happy to take either outcome, "I don't 
mind which we go for" 
  
 
17.   Both subjects indifferent 
o "I don't mind either!" 
  
 
18.  Necessity of Coordination 
o "We need to pick the same one in order to earn money" "Let's both agree to 
pick this option" 
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5.  Chi-squared tests for differences between person 1 and person 2 behaviour 
 
Table 5.1.  Individual choice differences between person 1 and person 2 with no 
communication 
 
This table reports the p-values for the differences between individual choices made by those 
labelled person 1 and 2 using the chi-square test/ fishers exact test 
 
 Overall Hawkish Dovish Equal 
BOS 0.502 0.502 0.502 X99 
BOS-E1 0.478 1.000* 0.604* 0.476* 
BOS-E2 1.000 1.000* n/a100 1.000* 
BOS-E3 0.748 1.000* 0.716* 0.525 
 
* indicates that a Fisher’s exact statistic is reported as opposed to a chi-squared test due to 
observation numbers. 
 
 
Table 5.2. Outcome differences between person 1 and person 2 with communication 
 
This table reports the p-values for the differences between outcome for those labelled person 1 
and 2 using the chi-square test/ fisher’s exact test 
 
Own choice Hawkish Hawkish Hawkish Equal Equal Equal Dovish Dovish Dovish 
Co-
participant’s 
choice 
Hawkish Dovish Equal Hawkish Dovish Equal Hawkish Dovish Equal 
BOS 0.757* 0.738 X101 X X X 0.738 n/a102 x 
BOS-E1 n/a 0.262 n/a 0.490* 0.490* 1.000* 0.262 n/a 0.490 
BOS-E2 n/a 0.643 n/a n/a n/a 0.627 0.643* n/a n/a 
BOS-E3 0.669* 0.337 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.337 n/a n/a 
 
* indicates that a Fisher’s exact statistic is reported as opposed to a chi-squared test due to 
observation numbers. 
  
                                                 
99 X here indicates that this outcome is not applicable in this particular game 
100 n/a here indicates that this outcome did not occur 
101 X here indicates that this outcome is not applicable in this particular game 
102 n/a here indicates that this outcome did not occur 
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6. Tests of order effects 
 
In the order to test for order effects in the experiment we run chi-squared tests. For this with test 
if incidences of choosing an individual choices (without communication) or outcomes (with 
communication) differ between difference ordering. Where significance difference between 
orderings is found we also report the observation numbers below the table of test statistics. Due 
to the low observation numbers in these categories these order effects could well be due to 
randomness. We also notice that although the order was assigned randomly by the computer in 
the experiment, some orders were used more than others. We therefore believe that these order 
effects need to be investigated further with more observations in order to provide a better 
interpretation and more reliable statistics. This can be the subject of future research. 
 
6.1 Games without communication 
 
Table 6.1.1. Test statistics for difference in strategy choices between orderings (without communication) 
BOS 1.000 
BOS-E1 0.630* 
BOS-E2 0.838* 
BOS-E3 0.012*& 
 
*indicates that a Fisher’s exact statistic is reported as opposed to a chi-squared test due to 
observation numbers. 
& indicates significant behavioural differences observed between strategy choice orderings 
 
Table 6.1.2. Individual choice differences between orderings in NC-BOS-E3 
 
Choice Amount  
Equal Dovish Hawkish Total 
Ordering     
1 7 2 0 9  
2 5 0 2 7  
3 1 3 0 4  
4 5 5 1 11  
5 2 0 4 6  
6 2 0 1 3  
Total 22 10 8 40  
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6.2 Games with communication 
 
Table 6.2.1. Test statistics for difference in strategy choices between orderings (with communication) 
BOS 0.117* 
BOS-E1 0.062*& 
BOS-E2 0.274* 
BOS-E3 0.027*& 
 
*indicates that a Fisher’s exact statistic is reported as opposed to a chi-squared test due to 
observation numbers. 
& indicates significant behavioural differences observed between strategy choice orderings 
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Table 6.2.2. Outcome differences between orderings in C-BOS-E1 
 Profit from Game 
 0 5 6 8 Total 
Ordering      
1 0 0 4 6 10 
2 1 1 4 4 10 
3 1 3 1 4 9 
4 0 0 3 6 9 
5 2 0 6 1 9 
6 0 0 4 1 5 
Total 4 4 22 22 52 
 
 
Table 6.2.3. Outcome differences between orderings in C-BOS-E3 
 Profit from Game 
 0 6 18 Total 
Ordering     
1 2 1 7 10 
2 0 6 5 11 
3 1 2 4 7 
4 0 2 1 3 
5 2 2 0 4 
6 1 4 0 5 
Total 6 17 17 40 
 
